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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-227
Monday
27 November 1995

Daily Report
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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Italian Ambassador Describes Cooperation Projects

AU2711105095 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 22 Nov 95 pp 1, 7

[Report by Dukagjin Hata: "Ambassador Foresti Very Enthusiastic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] About one month after President Berisha's successful visit to Italy, Dashamir Shehi, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mr. Paolo Foresti, Italian ambassador in Tirana, gave a joint news conference in the Palace of Congresses at 1230 [1030 GMT] yesterday. This news conference was to mark the end of the first phase of the cooperation project between the two countries and the start of a second three-year phase, which will doubtless give new impetus to the economic and social reform of a country whose survival, almost buried as it was under the weight of the collapsing communist Pyramid of Cheops, was only a few years ago ensured with the help of Italian emergency aid. The striking spiritual affinities between the two peoples who are joined and divided by the same sea have acquired new substance following Berisha's visit to Italy, a visit that underlined the unswerving support of a Western country for Albanian democracy and for the new political class in Albania. Mr. Foresti presented journalists with extensive data about cooperation with Italy, in which he stressed cooperation on development, Italian cooperation with the World Bank's projects for Albania, and the work of Italian-Albanian joint enterprises. The Italian ambassador in Tirana also outlined the public investment program for 1995, which amounts to 5,605 million leks. "It is a question of a broad program of cooperation that affects various areas, and is 8 billion lira [L] more than the initially forecast sum of L218 billion." According to Mr. Foresti, most assistance used to come in the form of emergency aid. However, there has been no question of further humanitarian aid in the 1993-95 period, and the entire sum of L226 billion has been and remains destined for cooperation projects. Albania is thus leaving behind its years of hunger and perverse isolation, and has been involved in democratic, psychological, and institutional reform. Of the total sum spent since cooperation began in November 1992, L68.1 billion has been in the form of gifts, and 158.1 billion leks has come in the form of loans.

Some of the fields covered by Italian aid during this time have been farm machinery, accounting for about L12 billion, and the refurbishment of the Tirana electricity network at a cost of 6.5 billion lira, without mentioning food and medical aid. Besides this, a range of loans financing various projects go to complete the picture of cooperation. Besides the loan of L13 billion for the repair of Tirana's water supply network, a further L22 billion is earmarked for the second phase of the Boville reservoir, L13.3 billion for continuing work on the integrated telecommunications project, and L6 billion for the Tirana-Durres railroad. Mr. Foresti considered President Berisha's visit to Italy to have been very fruitful. His visit was followed by the approval of the most recent projects that had previously remained on paper, including L22 billion for the third phase of the Boville reservoir, and L9 billion for the electricity networks of Tirana, Shkoder, and Durres.

"These cooperation projects," Mr. Foresti said, "were expanded thanks to joint financing by international organizations such as the World Bank." These plans include L24.8 billion for the feeder roads project, and L3.4 billion for the repair of the irrigation network. One might add the "Cross-Border" project in cooperation with the EU at a cost of 10 million ECUs, which in 1995 has involved work at the port of Vlore, at the Durres industrial area, and elsewhere.

"On the basis of these contributions," Mr. Forest continued, "we are constructing a second phase of cooperation involving a further tranche of investment in Albania. In contrast to the first phase, which also included emergency aid, this second phase will be directed entirely at the infrastructure and will also support the Italian capital that is involved in Albania."

Mr. Shehi said that "The Italians have always made a first-rate contribution, not only in the considerable amount of capital that they have poured into Albania, but in the technical assistance and institutional support they have given to construction and to the infrastructure in general."

Mr. Shehi called the autumn of 1995 a season of investment, which, he said, will further increase the Albanians' trust in the road of democracy and democratic institutions on which they have embarked, and to which friendly Italy has certainly given a valued contribution.

Growing British Investment in Country Reported

AU2711084895 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 26 Nov 95 p 15

[Report by Alban Beqa: "The Focus of British Investment in Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Economic ties between Britain and Albania have been reborn after a long gap under the communist government. British exports to Albania now amount to 5 million pounds per year. In the second quarter of this year alone, the import of British goods amounted to 106 million leks, or 0.69 percent of Albania's total imports.

There is a growing interest among British firms in investing in Albania. Two British oil companies, Premier and Shell, have signed agreements for projects in oil-bearing areas. On 17 August 1994, Premier Consolidated Oilfields Plc signed an agreement with Albpetrol to form a joint company called Anglo-Albanian Petroleum (AAP), in which each party will have a 50 percent share.

Under the agreement, AAP operates on land with two licenses. Drilling will take place in the areas of Dumre and Patos-Marinze. AAP will bring "enhanced oil recovery" technology to Albania, which will increase oil production. Premier will make drilling possible to a depth of 6,000 meters. The other company, Shell International, is planning to prospect on land. British Petroleum signed a contract with Rinas Airport last year for the fueling of aircraft.

Tourism is another area of British investment. The British Government has financed a comprehensive study to exploit the tourist potential of Gjiri i Lalzit, a long beach to the north of Durres. At Butrint in the south, an archaeological agreement was signed between Albania and Britain in July last year. Lords Rothschild and Sainsbury are financing a program of joint excavations conducted by the British Archaeological Institute in Rome and the Archaeological Institute in Tirana. Many British tourists are visiting the south of Albania from Kerkyra, and many British travel agencies are encouraging this trend, even though they are not entirely pleased by the standards of the hotels and infrastructure. Britain took sixth place in the amount of aid given to Albania in the second quarter of 1995, granting about 59 million leks during this period.

Britain also contributes to such multilateral organizations operating in Albania as the EU, the World Bank, etc., which are aiming at vitally important areas for the economy such as the infrastructure that is so badly needed for the development of a market economy, especially in order to attract the investment of firms of European and world renown, which will enable Albania to rise to a position of equality.

'Grave Difficulties' Expected Without Emigre Help

AU2711105195 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 23 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by "Be. Ma.": "Foreign Currency From Emigrants Challenges the Experts and Equals Foreign Aid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If emigre help were not available, Albania would be facing grave difficulties, a report from the Finance Ministry's Department of Economic Development and Foreign Aid states. Without this help, Albania would require twice as much help as it does today in the form of loans, food aid, and all other kinds of support. With the money that they bring from the countries where they work, Albanian emigrants challenge the experts and equal the aid from the world community. The living standards of Albanian families, especially those in the towns, unquestionably depends on the direct help provided by emigres. In 1994, it was calculated that every second Albanian family had someone employed abroad. This proportion had changed by 1995. It was calculated in October 1995 that three-fifths of Albanian families have someone abroad. According to the Statistics Institute, about 13 percent of the Albanian population and 28 percent of its able-bodied work force is working abroad.

In 1994, $262 million came from emigres, or twice the amount of aid and loans that came from the IMF, other international organizations, and foreign countries.

Earnings from emigres are becoming an increasingly important factor in the Albanian state's wretched balance of payments [illegible] even exceeds the value of exports.

Banking institutions now calculate emigrants' earnings as a very important source of foreign currency for the strained finances of Europe's poorest country.

However, our emigres also bring a large quantity of foreign currency "silently," as the language of finance calls it. According to data from the Human Development Report, this "silent" form of foreign currency earnings comes in the form of goods and amounted to $120 million in 1994 and $150 million in 1995.

The total contribution of emigres in 1995 in net foreign currency and goods amounted to $450 million or 25 percent of GNP. On the basis of these figures, the aid of 400,000 emigres has played a major role in the process of change in Albania.

It is calculated that if Albanian state institutions had found a more practical formula to make it easier for emigres to stay in foreign countries, the help that they would be providing would be much greater and living standards would be higher. The effect of the blight of unemployment would also be less significant and Albania's social services network would breathe more easily. However, emigres find it very difficult to remit foreign currency to Albania. From many countries where they work, especially Greece, they cannot officially send foreign currency via the banks or the post office.

Our state should at least have solved that problem. About 8 percent of depositors at Greek banks are Albanians. Not even the biggest Greek bank Interamerika can accomplish the banking transaction for the transfer of money on deposit by Albanians, because it lacks an Albanian partner.

Thus about $900 million of emigres' earnings languishes in foreign banks instead of being in our banks, where it could play a quite remarkable role in coping with inflation and deflation and especially influencing the exchange rate between the Albanian lek and foreign currencies.

Stock Exchange Planned By 'End of March'

AU2511145095 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by Arlinda Causholli: "First Albanian Stock Exchange Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—A Wall Street in Tirana, too! A stock exchange is to be created in the Albanian capital for the first time, where shareholders will register their stocks and will be able to inspect each other's holdings. A free market of capital will be created, permitting transactions in accordance with all the regulations and principles of stock exchanges such as London, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Milan, and New York. It is planned to be created before the end of March. What has made possible this great leap forward in the Albanian economy has been the privatization of the first 20 companies. Those who registered the first 740 million bonds and many others who watched the results of the first round have now become shareholders and in a few months will be the first participants in the Albanian stock exchange.

Finance Minister Dylber Vrioni announced this at a news conference yesterday. "Before the end of February," the deputy prime minister said, "the first lot of shares bought from the newly privatized enterprises will be registered on the stock exchange. The stock exchange will graft the experience of Central Europe onto East Europe, because of our almost identical experience in moving from a centralized to a market economy." Only the issue of the first shares has made it possible to create a stock exchange. The creation of stockholding companies out of the first 20 enterprises, while a list of 30 others is in preparation, has created a collection of bonds that were shown at their true value. "The first phase of privatization can be considered extremely successful," Vrioni added, "although people are still unaccustomed to the momentum of this kind of economy." Besides registering capital, the stock exchange will also be an "engine of truth." People possessing capital that is recorded in its memory will easily be able to check one another when transactions take place. It can be checked whether a person wishing to sell an apartment block is indeed the genuine owner. This will almost completely eliminate fraud.

The first signs of a miniature stock exchange appeared a short time ago when privatization bonds were issued. The "exchange" moved from the tellers' counters of the Savings Bank to the free currency exchange market, where the bonds floated to their real value. According to certain laws that traders instinctively grasped, these bonds were traded on a more organized and less speculative market. The price of the bonds was directly subject to supply and demand, leading to profits for many people. The market in the bonds was at least subject to the genuine principles of a stock exchange. "The state's continued support for the first privatized enterprises will be very important," Dylber Vrioni continued. "Besides credit of 10 million ECUs, which we have received to put these enterprises into production and to help their proprietors, we will also place at their disposal a support network with specific plans based on long-standing experience."

Greek President Interviewed on Bilateral Relations

AU2311105695 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 20 Nov 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Greek President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos by Tatyana Vasileva; place and date not given: "Bulgaria Does Not Deserve To Be on Schengen's Black List"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vasileva] Mr. President, is the normalization in the Skopje-Athens dialogue to the detriment of Sofia?

[Stefanopoulos] I have never believed that normalizing relations between two neighboring countries could negatively influence relations with a third, also neighboring state. This is especially true at the time of mutual economic dependence, modern communications means, and exchanging messages almost with the speed of a lightening. Therefore, I cannot understand the concern of certain people with improving the climate in the Balkans. Such problems already are outside the frame of our time. They are trying to create a climate of mistrust and insecurity. The only road toward peace leads through strengthening cooperation and the mutual convictions related to common interests.

[Vasileva] How do you assess Bulgarian-Greek relations?

[Stefanopoulos] For many years Greece and Bulgaria have been following a consistent policy of mutual understanding and multilateral cooperation. It is possible to characterize this period as a period of ascending development which produced positive results. I am happy that both countries selected the road of friendship and understanding, which guarantees peace in the Balkans.

[Vasileva] You are the first Greek head of state to visit Bulgaria in a long time. How would this influence future relations?

[Stefanopoulos] I am glad for the opportunity to visit your country. This visit makes me feel that I have a special role, namely, to prove that official visits by heads of state are a natural evolution and a specific expression of good relations between two states. What remains to settle is not much, but it is important. The fact that those matters will be resolved within a short period of time after my visit to Bulgaria does not mean that my visit was late. My visit should be viewed as a clear expression of the two countries' political willingness and the two nations' desire to strengthen our already close relations.

[Vasileva] Will Greece support our quest to join the EU? Could we rely on your help in taking our name out of Schengen's "negative list?"

[Stefanopoulos] Greece already declared its support at the very beginning, and the developments confirmed its position. However, I am not the one to speak about the specific steps my country will undertake in facilitating your integration in the EU. However, I think that Greece repeatedly demonstrated its goodwill and made certain specific steps. I fully support Bulgaria's membership in the EU.

As far as the "negative list" is concerned, I fully sympathize with Bulgaria's bitterness, because you do not deserve this. However, my prerogatives as president do not allow me to express positions on purely technical procedures, regardless of how important they are for you. Nevertheless, Greece understands your reaction to the "negative list" and will support you as a friendly country. We know that many states have the same problem, but I think that Bulgaria has a chance to be taken off the "black list" when the Schengen agreement is reviewed. This would guarantee border control and resolve the problem of illegal immigration.

[Vasileva] Could you comment on the situation in the Balkans on the verge of resolving the Yugoslav crisis?

[Stefanopoulos] I already expressed hope that the Yugoslav crisis could be resolved in the name of peace. Now I could repeat that this problem which shook not only the Balkans but also Europe and the world, could only be resolved under UN auspices.

It is high time not only for Yugoslavia, but also for the neighboring Balkan states, to prove that they want peace. This would help them to overcome past problems and establish relations they deserve or would like to have, noting their pro-European orientation.

[Vasileva] The opinion has been expressed that Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey could be the cornerstone of Balkan stability. Is this a sufficient reason to support our quest to join NATO?

[Stefanopoulos] Let me stress that it is especially dangerous to talk about cornerstones, triangles, axes, or other schemes which lead toward establishing military structures. What is important is to establish zones of peaceful cooperation among the Balkan states, which could in the future cover the entire regional space. Thus we could reach the situation in which we speak about a region where the new generations will not seek security and progress in military coalitions, but rather in utilizing our peaceful experience as neighboring states.

Greece has repeatedly stated that it supports you in your quest to join NATO, which does not need any special justification. The only justification could be strengthening peace and security in the region.

[Vasileva] What importance do you attribute to the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the bridges across the Danube in strengthening economic relations among the Balkan states?

[Stefanopoulos] The free movement of people and goods, and economic prosperity, are factors of stability and peace. From this point of view any project that could facilitate the achievement of such goals must stimulate the activity of all interested states. Technical problems which emerge accidentally in the process of implementing those projects, could be resolved through the goodwill of all. Greece has its own projects and supports every enterprise in this direction. I like to recall the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers in Ioannina, which established a very promising foundation of opening spiritual bridges between our countries. I hope that this meeting will soon produce positive results.

Russian Experts Show Interest in Belene Plant

AU2411133095 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Nov 95 pp 1-2

["DEMOKRATSIYA" staff report: "Russian Experts Are Coming Because of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, but Their Real Aim Is the Belene Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia (DEMOKRATSIYA)—A group of Russian nuclear power experts and designers is arriving in Bulgarian today. The group will take part in the seminar that will be held in the Novotel Hotel in Sofia on 23 and 24 November on the subject: "Modernization and Reconstruction of Units Equipped with WWER-400 and WWER-1000 Reactors [water-cooled, water-moderated energy reactors]; A New Generation of Nuclear Power Plants With Enhanced Safety." The seminar is expected to be attended by Russia's Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Sidorenko and managers and leading specialists from Russian design institutes and nuclear plant manufacturers. On the Bulgarian side, managers and specialists will take part from the government's department for the energy industry [Committee on Power Supply], the National Electricity Company [NEC], and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, and invitations have also been sent out to the National Assembly, Council of Ministers, ministries, government departments, and independent ecological movements, according to the NEC press center. At a special conference to be held in Kozloduy on 21 and 22 November, the Russian specialists will hold working consultations on the topic: "Developing a Program for Investigating the Condition of the Reactor Shell of the No. 1 Generating Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant."

According to informed sources, the visit by the Russian nuclear experts was arranged during Deputy Prime Minister Tsochev's visit to Russia. The manufacturers and designers of the nuclear reactors in operation in Bulgaria must adopt a view concerning the reactor shells, the technical reequipment of the nuclear power plant, and the development of projects for a new generation of medium- and high-capacity reactors with enhanced safety.... According to informed persons, it is crystal clear that Russia is ready to fight to defend its presence as a manufacturer of nuclear plant equipment, and it regards Bulgaria as its own market. They find proof of this in last week's statement by Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Bulgarian Committee on Power Supply, who said that "the actual power plant in Belene will not be the same as the one designed 10 years ago, but we will make maximum use of the investments made so far in the construction." This plainly indicates that, despite the protests and disagreements, despite the clear evidence that the Belene nuclear power plant is not wanted, the socialist government has firmly decided that it will be built. According to informed sources, the issue of completing the construction of the new nuclear plant even formed the subject of talks held last week between the Bulgarian Government delegation led by Kiril Tsochev and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov.

Government and energy industry officials have already found a good "smokescreen" to conceal their keenness to finish building the Belene nuclear power plant. The power supply committee chief declared that Bulgaria has the ambition of forming a connecting link between the energy systems of Europe, on the one side, and those of Russia and Ukraine on the other, which would enable us to enter the manufacturers' league. Other nuclear experts are crowing that within four to five years it will become possible to link the Bulgarian energy system to the European one, and they add that the new generating unit at the Belene plant is to provide the connecting link.

Serbia's Tomic Urges Flexible Border Controls

AU2711144895 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 24 Nov 95 p 8

[Interview with Dragan Tomic, deputy prime minister and minister coordinator of the Republic of Serbia, by Irina Simova; place and date not given: "We Dream About Balkan Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Simova] Will the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia follow the example of the other former socialist countries and introduce mass privatization?

[Tomic] As far as privatization is concerned, we intend to study the mistakes made by other countries, because those mistakes could result in damage and consequences that could rapidly liquidate the national wealth of any state.

Serbia began privatization together with Hungary as the first among the East European states. The manner in which we conducted privatization allowed us to preserve certain capacities, which were lost in countries such as Romania and the Czech Republic. [passage omitted]

[Simova] What are the prospects of developing Bulgarian-Serbian cooperation?

[Tomic] I frequently make official visits to Italy and Switzerland. If you open my passport, you would think that I have never travelled abroad, because I have never been stopped by the border police. This is how we should begin to cross the border between our countries, this is how we should come to you, and you to us. However, you know what the situation in this sphere now is, and how much it differs from West Europe, where the border police simply waves you through with a flick of the wrist. This is what we must do in the Balkans—alleviate the border regime.

At the international conference of Balkan managers we had a dream and we told everybody about it. We dreamed the establishment of a Balkan alliance. It would be marvelous if goods could cross our borders as a result of a simple flick of the wrist. If we could achieve this, namely, that goods could cross our border in the same manner as European goods cross EU borders, it would be wonderful. However, what will happen depends on your country and other Balkan states.

Iraqi Opposition Warns of Intelligence Activity

NC2511163795 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi People in Arabic 1500 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Iraqi opposition parties' Coordination Committee in Bulgaria has warned the Iraqi nationals residing there of increased intelligence activity in the past three months by the regime's embassy in Sofia. In a communique distributed to local media and Arab and foreign embassies, the committee said personnel belonging to the Saddam regime agencies arrived in Sofia recently and began to gather information about every Iraqi national refusing to have ties and communicate with the regime's embassy and its intelligence dens in Bulgaria.

The communique asked Iraqi opposition figures to be vigilant and cautious. It said that the Saddam regime agencies, together with weak-willed Iraqis, have set up an intelligence body called "The Defense of Iraqi People's Interests." It added that the Baghdad ruler's ambassador, Muhammad Amin, personally supervises this intelligence facade and organizes its meetings at the Iraqi School's building in the Bulgarian capital.

The communique clarified that the Saddam intelligence members, including Colonel Karim Ahmad, Muhammad al-Nuri, and Jasim Muhammad al-Nu'aymi, travel between Sofia and Varna, pay provocative visits to the homes, shops, and offices of the Iraqi nationals residing there, and issue them direct death threats if they continue to oppose tyrant Saddam.

The communique of the Iraqi opposition parties' Coordination Committee in Bulgaria said the Saddam regime's embassy instructed its personnel in Sofia who are posing as businessmen and merchants to contact and seek the help of Bulgarian mafia gangs in return for sums of money to attack Iraqi opposition activists. The aim is to avoid diplomatic embarrassment with the Bulgarian Government and make the incidents appear as normal criminal acts.

The communique added that the committee held contacts with the Bulgarian Foreign and Interior Ministries, informed them of the available information, and asked them to take the necessary precautions to deal with the Saddam intelligence activities there.

Havel on Dayton Agreement, Other Issues

LD2611171695 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 26 Nov 95

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Eva Hulkova; place and date not given; from the "Conversations at Lany" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hulkova] [Passage omitted] You were right in believing in a positive outcome of the talks in Dayton. It seems that the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro will be lifted, or are already being gradually lifted, and so will the arms embargo against the republics of the former Yugoslavia. This is an extremely smart move made by, among others, Bill Clinton.

[Havel] This is no victory yet. It is an important step forward. Of all the papers that have been signed so far, this is the most important. [passage omitted]

The worldwide role of the United States has again been confirmed. The extent of its responsibility, its feeling of being responsible, and, indirectly, the necessity of a U.S. presence in Europe have also been confirmed. Europe was unable to cope with this conflict over the years, and, in fact, the dawn only broke the moment the United States became involved.

It is a great lesson for Europe. At the same time, it is, in some way, also a lesson for the United States, especially for the American isolationists, who are under the impression that the United States has won the Cold War and now can tick off the whole matter, does not have to worry any longer about world developments, and can now care for itself because everything is all right. It is not all right. Even (?peace) has to be won. It is necessary to build a new system of coexistence in the world. This is a more demanding task than the previous one. [passage omitted]

However, the Dayton agreement is a big step forward, and it is undoubtedly a reason for cautious, sober jubilation.

[Hulkova] A reason for light euphoria at the end of November?

[Havel] I do not think it is a reason for euphoria. It is a major impulse for hope.

[Hulkova] [Passage omitted] You talked to students at the University of Usti nad Labem last week, and it seems that on this occasion you were, in a way, telling our economists what to do with the state budget. Would you care to talk about this?

[Havel] During this discussion with the students, which was quite interesting and to which we can return later, I did not speak about the budget in any direct way. However, I discussed the budget with almost all mayors I met. [passage omitted]

All of these talks reassured me in my opinion—an opinion of a noneconomist, I have to add—that the processes of money reallocation should be decentralized. This means that certain money allocation would not have to be dealt with in the budget. [passage omitted]

The reallocation of money is based on the principle of solidarity. The richer are giving more to those who are worse off or who need some money. However, it seems to me that this solidarity is being applied predominantly at the national level. The main spheres, such as defense, the police, and so on, will be and always must be dealt with at the national level. However, in my view, in many spheres of public interest, which are guaranteed by the state on the basis of the Constitution—such as education, health care, and so on, or even some spheres that are not guaranteed by the Constitution but are equally a matter of public interest, such as the infrastructure network and transport—a certain part of resources could be reallocated in different ways and at different levels from those implemented in a centralized process of money allocation from the state budget. [passage omitted]

Last Arms, Tanks Destroyed Under CFE Treaty

AU2511192695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by "gag, CTK": "The Czech Republic Disarmed Before the Deadline"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech Republic fulfilled its obligations under the Vienna Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] eight days before the deadline. A total of 35 OT-64 armored carriers, four OT-810 armored carriers, and three FUG D-422 artillery systems were destroyed in Sternberk this month. In Novy Jicin, 11 T-55 tanks were dismantled.

Klaus Meets With Lithuanian Counterpart

LD2311232795 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2200 GMT 23 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has met his Lithuanian counterpart, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, who is on an official visit to the Czech Republic. The two prime ministers have discussed, among other things, Lithuania's possible admission to CEFTA, the Central European Free Trade Association. Jitka Kucerova reports.

[Kucerova] Vaclav Klaus said that the Czech Republic supported Lithuania's entry into this organization, currently consisting of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Both prime ministers also confirmed that the drafting of a Czech-Lithuanian agreement on a free trade zone was under way. The agreement will cover three groups of commodities the exchange of which will be gradually deregulated and liberalized.

Lithuania expressed its interest in the purchase of Czech trolleybuses and the purchase and assembly of Czech buses Karosa. The two countries will also cooperate in air and railway transport.

Agreement on Trade, Economic Union

LD2411143095 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Lithuanian delegation headed by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius is concluding a two-day official visit to the Czech Republic today. The Lithuanian prime minister will be received by Czech President Vaclav Havel.

The Czech Republic and Lithuania are aspiring to set up a strong trade and economic union of Central and East European states, which would replace the currently existing organization of the Central European Free Trade Association that includes the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. In the near future, Slovenia and later the Baltic states will join this organization. An agreement on this was reached yesterday by Vaclav Klaus and Adolfas Slezevicius, prime ministers of Lithuania and the Czech Republic.

Klaus assured his counterpart that to some degree he would support Lithuania's efforts to join the Central European agreement as soon as possible. The first step in this direction would be an agreement on setting up a free trade zone signed by both states. The preparation of the document started in October and is expected to be ready by the spring of next year, when President Vaclav Havel pays an official visit to Lithuania in April.

Klaus Criticizes Style, Goals of Social Democrats

LD2611182695 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus criticized the political style of Social Democrats today. He said in a debate broadcast by Nova Television that their style is so bad that it is not even fit for our country. In his view, the Social Democratic Party is pursuing goals that belong somewhere else.

Former Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa, who also took part in the debate, said that he does not think any longer that a coalition between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSDS] would be realistic. According to him, the latest developments have reassured him in his view that the next elections will become a confrontation between the ODS, or possibly the right wing, and the Social Democrats.

Commentary Criticizes Zeman's Attac[illegible] a Klaus

AU2711105295 Prague LIDOVE NOVI[illegible] in Czech 22 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Karel Kriz: "Embarrassing Duel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reacting to the statement made by Vaclav Klaus that social democracy wants to take this country back to before 17 November 1989, Milos Zeman [Social Democratic Party chairman] described the prime minister as a collaborator with the former regime. This took place precisely as President Havel was speaking in the Hovory v Lanech ["Conversations in Lany" TV program] about political decency and the standards that politicians set by their conduct in society. The president used as a negative example another recent statement by Zeman, namely, that the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] must win the elections if for no other reason than so that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] cannot steal another 300 billion korunas.

Vaclav Klaus's comment on the CSSD is certainly cheap. Nevertheless, the prime minister at least attempted to substantiate his claim by specific arguments in direct polemics with the social democratic program. Milos Zeman did nothing similar—not now nor when he described the entire Czech Government as a band of political gangsters. So, if Zeman knows any of Klaus's text, in which at least a breath of socialist palaver could be traced, let him show it. I have not found anything in that vein, and I know well even Klaus's pioneering work of the 1960's, in which he even then conducted sharp polemics with the protagonists of a third way. Moreover, Klaus long before November openly described socialism—even the Western type—as old rot, which Milos Zeman well knows. After all, he has always described himself as being to the left of Klaus and even before November defined himself as a centrist. I do not know precisely what the present Czech prime minister did on 17 November, but I do know that both his sons were on Narodni Avenue [reference to the revolution]. The petition (not only) for Havel was signed by almost 60 employees of the Economic Institute and by only one of the fraternal Forecasting Institute (Tomas Jezek). Valtr Komarek, the then director, drafted another petition, a more accommodating one, had it circulated, and sent it directly to Jakes [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia secretary general]. I believe that all those who, thanks to Komarek, after two decades returned from various places to a research institution, including Klaus were grateful to him for this solution at the time. And, in conclusion, if Milos Zeman claims that the Forecasting Institute was a *nomenklatura* institution, he should not forget that he received the offer to work there before November. Is that not so?

ODS Selects Election Leaders, Reelects Klaus

AU2711100195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Martin Manak: "The ODS Is Not Scared of Social Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its All-State Congress in Hradec Kralove this weekend, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] approved the names of election leaders for the Chamber of Deputies, its long-term political program, and new officers.

Party Chairman Vaclav Klaus said in his opening speech that no other alternative is open to his party but the coalition with its current government partners. He said that the ODS was striving for the maximum possible cooperation with these entities. "Nevertheless, we do not intend to give in on certain fundamental stands just to demonstrate the unity of the coalition," he added. "We are not afraid of social democracy or its program," he continued. "It only is an expression of a hopeless lack of ideas on the part of a party that does not dare say that it advocates socialism," the ODS chairman observed, and described the CSDD [Czech Social Democratic Party] program as a "compilation of populism, irresponsible promises, and false goals." According to the ODS leader, the election campaign could be "extraordinarily sharp." We are ready to respond harshly to attacks because we do not intend to confuse decency with weakness.

On the basis of proposals from the regional associations, the congress approved eight regional leaders for the Chamber elections. Vaclav Klaus will be the number-one in Northern Moravia, Josef Zieleniec in Prague, Ivan Kocarnik in Central, Jan Ruml in Western, Jiri Vlach in Southern, Jan Strasky in Eastern, Vladimir Budinsky in Northern Bohemia, and Milan Uhde in Southern Moravia.

The delegates passed a a resolution acknowledging the "possible" names of five representatives who will run for the ODS for the Senate: Filip Sedivy is to symbolize the link to the Federal Assembly, Tomas Jezek the Chamber, and Karel Dyba the Cabinet. Komercni Banka Director General Richard Salzmann should be an example of an "apolitical" person, and Jan Koukal of the success of the local politics of the ODS. The party chairman rejected the idea of a Senate "superleader." "The superleader does not exist, and there is no need to give names," Klaus emphasized. After the October session of the ODS Executive Council, Klaus announced that, at the congress, the party would elect one all-state leader for the Senate elections. The ODS had reckoned on Milan Uhde for this but he refused. The congress also agreed on rules for the selection of other candidates for both the Chamber and the Senate elections.

Vaclav Klaus was reelected party chairman by 259 votes of the 272 valid ones. Executive Deputy Chairman Libor Novak and Deputy Chairmen Zieleniec, Strasky, and Vlach were also confirmed in their posts. Christian Democratic Party Chairman Ivan Pilip automatically becomes the fifth deputy chairman of the party until the next congress. The delegates rejected extending the period of office for elected ODS officers from one to two years and elected a new Executive Council.

KAN Rejects Merger With ODS, Elects Executive

AU2711100395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by "rep, CTK": "KAN Rejects the Merger, and Some of Its Members Join the KDS"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hradec Kralove, Svitavy. At the KDS [Christian Democratic Party] congress, 60 percent of delegates voted in favor of the merger, and at the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] congress practically all of the participants did. Nonetheless, this voting has not convinced the KAN [Club of Nonaligned Activists] congress delegates, and they have rejected integration of the right-wing parties.

KAN abandoned the extended partnership treaty with the KDS, which allowed for a joint merger of these parties with the ODS. A total of 46 congress delegates were in favor of abandoning the treaty, 36 were against it, and nine abstained. [passage omitted]

Pavel Holba, a former member of the KAN Central Council, was elected new chairman of KAN. Subsequently, the KAN congress delegates decided that the club would not participate in the parliamentary elections next year as an independent party.

Following the weekend talks between the three right-wing parties, the integration of the right-wing parties has only partly succeeded. The ODS is to merge with the Christian Democrats, some KAN members are leaving for the KDS, and the weakened activist club remains independent.

Rostislav Gargulak, spokesman of the platform "For Maintaining the KDS," which rejected the merger, did not rule out the possibility that his group would negotiate with both KAN and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. "We certainly will try to preserve the symbol of the KDS," Gargulak said.

[Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech on 20 November on page 2 in a similar report adds: "Congress delegates tasked the KAN Central Council to draft a political program for KAN by the next party congress, to take place on 15 May 1996 at the latest." It also names other new executives: "Jiri Machac has become the new deputy chairman. The remaining members of the executive are Miloslav Pisecky, Zdenka Svandova, and Helena Frankenbergerova."]

Defeated Factions of KDS, KAN May Merge

AU2511194695 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by Martin Manak and Miroslav Korecky: "ODS Yes, KDS Yes, KAN No"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Rostislav Gargulak, spokesman of the platform "For Maintaining the KDS" that was formed two weeks ago, expressed his disagreement with the opinion of Vaclav Klaus regarding the affinity of views held by the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and the KDS [Christian Democratic Party]. Gargulak sees the main difference in the emphasis on moral values. "The prime minister is one of the protagonists of moral relativism in this country," the opposition platform spokesman said. According to him, after the merger with the ODS, the KDS will not be able to implement its program. Gargulak described the treaty as "degrading." On the other hand, Petr Pleva of the Brno KDS believes that a chance will come in the future to work to a much greater effect within the ODS. Prague delegate Vit Razek said that the main reason for the integration was the personal greed for power on the part of some KDS representatives. According to him, the integration treaty guarantees, among other things, the minimum of four places on the Parliament Chamber slates for the KDS. Ivan Pilip, who was reelected KDS head on 19 November, will concurrently be deputy chairman of the ODS until the next congress of Klaus's party.

Following the vote in favor of integration, Pilip voiced the idea that the unsuccessful faction of the KDS may form a "joint grouping" with KAN [Club of Nonaligned Activists]. Gargulak, however, rejected this possibility. Pilip also indicated that, despite the rejection of the merger treaty, some of the defeated KAN representatives could appear in the "main group" of candidates for places in the KDS slates from the Chamber.

Treason Charges Against Zdenek Mlynar Annulled

LD2411151895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Prague City Public Prosecutor's Office today annulled charges of treason against Zdenek Mlynar. This has been confirmed to Czech radio by spokesman Slavomir Novak:

[Begin Novak recording] The Prague City Public Prosecutor's Office has issued the following statement regarding the case of criminal charges against Professor Zdenek Mlynar:

The Public Prosecutor today completed the evaluation of evidence in the Mlynar case and decided to terminate the proceedings initiated by the investigator—that is, by the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism—which accused Mr. Mlynar of treason, according to Paragraph 92, Section 1, Article 1 of the Criminal Law. This is because the facts revealed do not adequately support the accusation. [end recording]

However, the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism continues to insist that the accusation against Mlynar of treason is based on evidence and is legal and substantiated and that the Office is going to lodge a complaint for the violation of the law. This was announced by Pavel Bret, deputy director of the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism.

Former Intelligence Agents Said To Launder Money

AU2711095895 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by "km": "Behind the Money Laundering Are Intelligence Agents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Policemen believe that former espionage agents of communist Czechoslovakia are behind the money laundering in the case of the privatization of the Prague Stazap wholesale warehouse.

According to the data we could verify with the Interior Ministry archives staff, even a representative of one of the most secret intelligence units, in which the so-called nonlegal agents have been prepared for espionage abroad, has been involved in this affair. These agents have been sent abroad under false names and resumes. Miroslav K., a representative of this unit and full-time employee of the pre-November Interior Ministry, whose cover name was "Kollar," is now working in the firm IFC Group.

It was precisely the IFC Group to which the government sold the lucrative Stazap wholesale warehouse three weeks ago. At the time, the company had already been investigated by the police for fraud and financial machinations. Miroslav K. previously worked in the firm IFC Transport, which operated the leased Stazap warehouse.

Miroslav K. refused to say anything about his past or current work in the IFC firm. "No comment" was the telephone message his wife passed on to us.

Secret archive data indicate that, before he started training nonlegal agents, Miroslav K. operated in Australia, the United States, and South Africa.

The investigators, who are prosecuting the boss of the IFC Group, Miloslav Lavicka, so far only for embezzlement of more than a million korunas, suspect several domestic and foreign firms of money laundering. These firms are mostly professionally connected. It is believed that money of unknown origin has been channeled in connection with the operation of Stazap via a complex process from Germany, through the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, on to Switzerland. The entire project involves the Swiss firm Hatra, the German IFC Hamburg, the Czech IFC Transport company and IFC Group, and the Slovak company IFC Bratislava.

Miloslav Lavicka himself, who had or has a stake in these firms, was an employee of the Cechofracht foreign trade company before November 1989. In 1986, he was a Cechofracht representative in Hamburg, in the Eberhard Klemens organization, and was sent to Canada three years later.

A representative of the Interior Ministry archive service confirmed that Cechofracht employees who were sent abroad for extensive periods before November 1989 had to be in contact with the intelligence service.

First Female Deputy Defense Minister Appointed

AU2611171795 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 21 Nov 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "For the First Time, the Deputy Defense Minister Is a Woman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan has chosen former Pardubice Mayor Hana Demlova (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party) to be his deputy. It is the first time in the Czech Army that a woman has been appointed to such a high office. The minister put her in charge of social, health, and housing affairs in the Army. Demlova will take up the office on 23 November. The Defense Ministry Press Service released this information. Demlova was born in Brno in 1943. Since graduating from college, she has worked, among other things, in the area of economics and planning.

Slovak, European Parliaments End Session

LD2411130495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The three-day constituent session of European Parliament deputies and the National Council of the Slovak Republic parliament ended in Bratislava at noon, with the adoption of a declaration and a recommendation of the joint parliamentary committee of the European Union and the Slovak Republic. Editors Anna Cabakova and Jarmila Tosecka report from the National Council on the contents of this document and on the course of today's concluding deliberations. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] A joint document, a declaration, and recommendations were adopted at the conclusion of the constituent session of the joint parliamentary committee of the European Union and the Slovak Republic. I will mention in detail at least some of the parts of the recommendation: to lead a structural dialogue between the Slovak Republic and the European Union; to focus on narrower cooperation in the sphere of foreign and security policies. It also expresses the wish that the National Council of the Slovak Republic ratify the Slovak-Hungarian treaty as soon as possible.

The joint parliamentary committee, among other things, insists on the need for open permanent dialogue with the aim of safeguarding support toward Slovakia's entry into the European Union.

Shortly after 1130, the cochairmen of the joint parliamentary committee concluded the three-day constituent session by thanking those present for their active participation. [passage omitted]

EP Official Welcomes Meciar Interest in Dialogue

LD2311234595 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2105 GMT 23 Nov 95

[Unattributed interview with Herbert Bosch, head of the European parliamentary delegation currently attending the joint session of the European Parliament, EP, and the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Bosch speaks in German with simultaneous translation into Slovak—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Mr. Bosch, you have just completed two days of talks with the deputies of the Slovak Parliament. Do you think your image of Slovakia is already somewhat more complete?

[Bosch] I believe we made a very good start by setting up this joint parliamentary committee. We arrived in Slovakia in order to explain and to tell our Slovak colleagues that we wished to see Slovakia in the European Union. At the same time, we wanted to explain and to make clear that this is going to be a long-term process, and we wanted to openly and clearly discuss with our parliamentary colleagues problems encountered on Slovakia's path toward the European Union.

[Correspondent] If a meeting at this level had been held somewhat earlier, would it have been necessary to send a warning resolution by the EP?

[Bosch] I think one should view this resolution in the context of the demarches handed to Slovakia recently. The EP enjoys a long tradition and clear views on parliamentary democracy. The EP has always been very sensitive to and very clear on the issues of parliamentary cooperation and parliamentary customs.

[Correspondent] The resolution mentions, among other things, certain possible sanctions vis-a-vis Slovakia. These are, for example, the possibility of closing down the EU office in Bratislava or even the possibility of suspending the validity of the association agreement. Are these options still there?

[Bosch] First, there was no such threat in the EP resolution because it did not mention the possibility of closing down the Bratislava office. This was only a proposal and a request by one political group in parliament, but the request was not incorporated into the resolution.

Second, I believe that this resolution need not be viewed as a threat. It is an expression of our concern and our view that there are certain things in Slovakia that must improve. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Did you find any new elements in today's address delivered by Prime Minister Meciar?

[Bosch] If I, as a guest, may take the liberty of saying so, it was a bit too long when compared to what is usual. However, as to the content, I think it was very important that the prime minister was present at our joint meeting. This was a good signal also for my colleagues from the EP. We have gained the impression that, in spite of all the recent agitation in connection with the resolution, your prime minister is very much interested in the continuation of this dialogue, especially with the EP. [passage omitted]

Meciar on Talks With EU, Economic Progress

LD2411214195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1740 GMT 24 Nov 95

[Regular weekly interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Marian Ondas on 24 November; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Ondas] This week Slovak citizens have been interested mainly in the session of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the European Union [EU] and Slovakia. What do you think about this dialogue? What is in it for the two sides?

[Meciar] Every dialogue benefits anyone who approaches it with good intentions and in good faith. The same goes for the dialogue between our National Council and representatives of the European Parliament, sitting in a joint committee. Its value is in that it enables representatives of the European Parliament to familiarize themselves with our internal political conditions, our personalities and our views, and with our way of conducting a discussion. On the other hand, it enables our deputies to be in direct contact with European ideas and ways.

The Austrian or Swedish approach to the European Union is quite different from the Slovak approach because our situation is more involved. Needless to say, Austria and Sweden already have a democratic political system or a market economy, while we are still only creating these things. [passage omitted] I accepted and welcomed these negotiations, and I participated in them. It will be good to see this process continuing, and it will be a good thing if the views we receive from elsewhere always reach us only through such sincere and open dialogue.

[Ondas] It seems that the present dialogue with the West is more open. What is the government doing in the way of direct contacts in order to present Slovakia to the world in an undistorted way?

[Meciar] First of all, government members are taking part in various events organized by all sorts of bodies. Then there are the activities of the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic corps, something that is gathering speed quite well. Finally, the so-called boomerang effect is beginning to assert itself. This means that certain people threw a boomerang in the hope that it would land somewhere outside our borders, but the boomerang is now coming home. This is a good thing because a number of views unilaterally released into the world can now be verified. It is therefore possible to objectively assess not only the situation in Slovakia but also those who released the original information in the first place. [passage omitted]

[Ondas] Prime Minister, in your view, what are the most important factors behind Slovakia's current economic progress? Can good economic results affect in any way Europe's position vis-a-vis Slovakia? Do you think that, if the political tension in our country is reduced, the European political structures will be more inclined to accept our positive economic results?

[Meciar] This question reminds me of the philosophy that says: I will forgive you anything but your success. The Slovak Republic is in a situation in which people and their creativity form the basis of what is being achieved. In every country it is people who decide on its future. Money resources, the shape of factories, basic capital, the value of funds—all are variable. There is but one constant value—the people.

Slovakia is carrying out its economic transformation in a way different from that implemented in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We are doing it our own way. Our way seems to be proving that in many theoretical controversies of 1991 the truth was outside these debates. It is becoming obvious that in many instances both approaches are possible. In any case, all that is bringing about good results is good.

As regards our economy today, first, it comprises some growth elements that are becoming even more dynamic. Second, there is a positive foreign trade balance. Third, the position of the Slovak koruna is getting stronger. Fourth, our economy provides social security and improves employment figures. Fifth, our economy today is bringing about a different type of social policy, changing it from emergency network [zachranna siet] to a policy based on the regeneration of human resources. All this is a complex change that affects the whole range of human activities.

We are following this path. This approach is being verified by life and is giving credit to those who trusted us. [passage omitted]

Deletion of Language Law From EP Document

AU2511195595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by "rej": "Joint EU and Slovak Republic Parliamentary Committee Will Deal With Language Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The text of the resolution that the European Parliament [EP] addressed to the Slovak Government on Thursday, 16 November, does not mention the law on the state language, a passage on which featured in the original draft. According to K. Petoecz, foreign secretary of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS], this portion of the draft was deleted because the National Council of the Slovak Republic passed the law Wednesday night and EP deputies did not have an opportunity to familiarize themselves with its final wording. However, as representatives of the EP Liberal Faction informed K. Petoecz, the law will be dealt with by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EU and the Slovak Republic this week. K. Petoecz fears that the adoption of the language law will aggravate interstate relations with Hungary and will isolate the Slovak Republic further internationally. On the domestic political level, he expects, in this connection, political tensions to heighten, but also interpersonal relations to worsen. At the same time, he expressed the hope that the president of the Republic will return this anticonstitutional law to parliament and that a sufficient number of honest deputies, deputies for whom the principles of Western democracy they profess are more important than momentary popularity, will be found in support of the law's submission to the Constitutional Court, as many, at the very least, as did not vote for the law in parliament.

Ethnic Hungarians: Language Law Unconstitutional

LD2411160595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Michal Kovac today in Bratislava received Chairman of Coexistence Miklos Durary, Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Hungarian Civic Party Chairman Laszlo Nagy, and other representatives of the Hungarian Coalition parties in parliament.

Presidential Spokesman Vladimir Stefko said after the meeting that the representatives of the ethnic Hungarian parties told Michal Kovac that several passages of the Language Law are unconstitutional. They added that the law does not adequately take into account international conventions and standards.

The representatives of the Hungarian parties pointed out to the president that should the law as it stands now come into force on 1 January 1996, the press of the ethnic minorities could be stopped with immediate effect.

Meciar Interviewed on Domestic Politics, NATO

LD2311012695 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2014 GMT 22 Nov 95

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by journalists Peter Susko from Radio Twist, Jan Skoda from PRAVDA, and unidentified moderator—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Moderator] Prime Minister, my colleagues and I have agreed that the first question we will put to you will not be in your capacity as prime minister but as chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. A spokesman for your movement published a statement on the demarche [European Parliament resolution 16 November] saying, and I quote: This declaration, that is the European Parliament resolution, reminds the HZDS of recent history when the leader of Nazi Germany first sent states demarches and then occupied them with tanks. In the same way the leader of the Soviet Union, that is the former Soviet Union, sent demarches to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and then Warsaw Pact occupying forces occupied our country. And so on. Nobody has firmly distanced themselves from this statement yet.

[Meciar] This statement, as issued by the head of the Press and Information Department of the HZDS [Stanislav Haber] is his personal standpoint. The deputy chairman of the movement, Mrs. [Olga] Keltosova, has expressed her opinion about this. That was a personal standpoint. I discussed with him how this statement was issued. He had just returned from a rally on the square and was highly emotional, which is why the statement he issued sounded the way it did. At the same time he told me that he was going on holiday and would end his HZDA work on 15 December. This is an opinion with which no official body within the movement has identified itself.

[Unidentified questioner] Prime minister, in connection with this I would broaden this to mention your address to an international conference in Berlin, which in my personal view was inappropriate, because on German soil you said in connection with circumstances very well known to us, given the demarches and relations with the European Union and the European Parliament in general, you compared the situation now with that in 1938 and 1939. With the passing of time, do you not think that in this way you gave Mr. Haber a reason, and that he may have wanted to use his initiative and take things further? How should the public see this?

[Meciar] My participation in Berlin was a reaction to the conference which was taking place there and it was also a reaction to the demarche which the Slovak Republic received at that time. As far as the method, which was questioned by me and others, is concerned, if any decision is to be made about a society where there are two sides, both sides must be listened to before a decision is made. That is the basic principle of any kind of democracy or democratic dialogue. I said what I did in connection with the absence of dialogue, that this [word indistinct] has not been solved. The model of dialogue with associated countries in general has not been worked out, and there is no model for dialogue in these situations either. Nobody questions that we are the legitimate government and, naturally, we have every right to discuss these matters. That's one thing. The other thing is what kind of impact did these steps have on the domestic, the internal, scene and in what kind of context did they take place.

Let us take the following examples: The opposition interpreted the demarche as political support for the opposition. There were meetings in the country to discuss the setting up of some sort of a government by technocrats [urednicka vlada]. We were beginning to hear arguments saying that this government's time was up and that in fact the demarche was aimed against the government. In the light of all this, we now have to be frank and ask whether in fact this was what the authors of the demarche wanted to achieve. Sometimes people may mean one thing but achieve something quite different.

Likewise, it was quite inappropriate that we were not consulted on the matter first, a fact I described in the words: "About us, without us." We are a legitimate government, other legitimate governments let us know the EU stance and we simply have the right to participate in a dialogue on a matter like this.

A long time ago, a certain French thinker said that neither a judge with an axe to grind nor an enemy should be called upon to deliver a judgement and that a judgement must be arrived at openly. So, we are now here to defend our point of view openly before any conclusions are arrived at.

[Susko] In this context I would like to say that at your Paris talks with the OECD you said that you accepted the demarche but did not agree with its content. If I understand properly, this then was a question of communications. But I was present also when you visited Spain and I thought that you had a very successful dialogue with Mr. Gonzalez. In fact, so successful that after the talks you said that Mr. Gonzalez had called you a personal friend and that the relationship had become closer. And yet, despite all this, despite the fact that in July you and Gonzalez discussed our integration into the EU, a few months later there was the demarche, endorsed by Spain, the country chairing the EU.

[Meciar] Let us examine the history of all these developments. Let us go back to the time when certain Hungarian political parties came back from the United States [where they discussed the Slovak Language Law and the basic treaty] with the message that in the fall something would happen. Everyone denied it. Then the president of the Republic returned from the United States with the very same message: Something is being hatched up for the fall. This was followed by a group of three academics who described themselves as Soros University professors and who produced a theoretical analysis of the situation in Slovakia which, they said, was bad and the country was in disarray. Although they did not communicate with us, their work was given extremely great publicity worldwide. Next came the president's visits to Germany and the United States when the conflict between the government, president, and the constitutional bodies was presented quite clearly: The situation in Slovakia was characterized as undemocratic, Slovakia's foreign-political orientation was questioned, and it was alleged that instead of moving towards the EU we were turning eastwards instead.

It was said that all this should be taken very seriously and, naturally, the various countries accepted these arguments. They assessed the internal political development in Slovakia as unsettled, which is quite true because in this respect we are in the same unsettled situation as other comparable countries going through a gradual democratic development. However, during all this nobody communicated directly with us.

In examining communications at the state level we have to say that our internal economic and social problems were our main concern and that, although we have been successful, we are now paying a price for this approach. These were the concerns we put above everything else and in doing so we somewhat underestimated certain external signals.

[Susko] Pardon me for saying so, but you think that you focused more on the economy as it were. But apart from the economy, there are also political relations within Slovakia's political system, or in other words relations with the opposition, for example. I think that the response from abroad is targeted precisely at these issues.

[Skoda] I would like to add something to what my colleague has said. You received [U.S. ambassador to Slovakia] Theodore Russel. The text [of the U.S. demarche] says: Over the past year, the U.S. Government was continually voicing its concerns, here we do not comment on the developments in domestic politics, about the expansion of party politics [Meciar's HZDS], and about the breach of the democratic ways of governing. This means that they claim, or rather that the letter claims, that they [U.S. Government] were continually expressing their concerns during the last year. It is therefore likely that some kind of communication or dialogue actually did exist.

[Meciar] We were in opposition for most of the year as far as the last year is concerned. [Laughter] As for this year, that's another matter.

Naturally, as for political development in our country, then this is the same as in all postcommunist countries, although in our country there is a little more to it.

First. What is going on here is the change in the political system, the dismantling of the old system and the emergence of a new one. Both people and relationships are changing. Political parties are emerging, the judicial system and culture are acquiring a new shape, and new personalities are also emerging.

This development in not over. In Slovakia, it has traveled one-half of its path.

Second. The state has been formed. There were positive and negative attitudes with regard to independence and sovereignty. It was a new watershed in society.

The third watershed, which is being experienced by society, is the process of forming a new social structure and the reorganization of ownership relations. In addition, there is also the negative impact of the economic crisis, as it may be put. This is yet another upheaval in our society. What we have to do now, is to rebuild and unify our society. It is natural that while going through this watershed, our society is being polarized and we have to seek ways of uniting our society.

At that time [last year] we based our thinking, that is the government's thinking, on giving jobs to people and improving social conditions. This was to be the basis on which we were going to strive for the next four years for political unification.

This means that we counted on a long-term process of development and we did not count on the fact that things could move faster. The other thing we counted on was that if our focusing on internal political problems should yield positive results, it would be appreciated abroad and this, in turn, would improve the overall position of the state.

The other issue we based our thinking on was our awareness of the fact that there would be no NATO enlargement before 1997 and that there would be discussions, there would be moves aimed at bringing us [NATO and postcommunist countries] closer together, and that there would be other steps within this process but no decisions would be made.

We were also aware of the fact that within six months of the EU countries' conference, there would be no discussion about joining the European Union, that a discussion would be launched with all associated countries, and that the outcome of this discussion would vary. We concluded that this gave us a certain breathing space and that we could therefore spread these matters over several years.

It is turning out that adopting this strategy was incorrect on the part of the government. [passage indistinct by one of the interviewers]

[Meciar] On the part of my government! The point is that while we adopted in effect a passive approach to these matters, the opposition made use of the scope we left open in our foreign policy and was active in this sphere. After all, representatives of an opposition party actively contributed to the EU standpoint. A representative of the Hungarian political parties admitted it cooperated with the EU and a Democratic Union [DU] representative also admitted it. The upshot of this is that what we failed to deal with had been dealt with in other ways.

There is, however, yet another matter. There exist political parties which enjoy popular support. In our country there are political parties with political contacts abroad. This communication channel via political parties appears to be important in the EU because lobbying through political and party institutions takes matters to political groups with contacts in the center and the center then spreads information worldwide, to the whole world. The influence thus spread is quite considerable.

[Susko] Do you mean that all the arguments contained in the demarches, i.e. the criticism that the opposition has been left out from the agencies overseeing the work of power structures, attacks against the DU in parliament and attacks against the president are unjustified?

[Meciar] No. Let's understand that these matters are part of the democratic development and that they are different from the way in which they were presented in the [EU] statement.

First. As long ago as in March or April, the Liberal International launched a grand debate about our intention to expel the DU from parliament. This news went round the world and people were urged to write letters in support of the DU and its deputies, although nothing of this kind had actually been taking place.

The debates on this topic are still going on in our country. But what are they about? Is there a bill about the expulsion of the DU or its deputies from parliament? No, there is no such bill. An examination stage [of DU petition lists] has ended and a committee will have to take a decision on this matter and say what should be done next. But we shall have to discuss this matter. We should not make a conclusion that this is the final decision or that things have been taken further. We should not accuse anyone of harboring plans because harboring plans is not a punishable offence, it is something which is very difficult to prove.

[Susko] Prime minister, sorry to interrupt you but in this context I am looking for similarities with my own foreign experiences. I am prepared to accept your argument but, somehow, one thing is in the way and I think it is in the way even in foreign relations. Namely, a commission has been set up to carry out certain investigations. If the investigations of the ["falsified" signatures for DU petitions] rested with the legal profession and investigators, everything would be OK. But it seems to be wrong that some kind of commission has been set up to investigate these matters although parliament and the Constitutional Court had confirmed that DU deputies had been legally elected to parliament. I think that the EU rebuke was also concerned with this issue.

[Meciar] Well, your first error is to say that the Constitutional Court has never confirmed that DU deputies were elected legally. The question was something quite different.

[Susko] [In the background] Indirectly, it did.

[Meciar] I can't answer this question because it is still open and the Constitutional Court has even stated that should the question be put differently, it would investigate whether the deputies got into parliament legally. [passage omitted]

We have to consider the attitude of a party [DU] which got into parliament in this way and whose deputies are getting their pay as if everything was all right, a party which insists on denying this state of affairs and which, instead of examining its own behaviour, aggressively accuses everybody around of bad intentions, everybody from the police to the government, the coalition, and to myself personally. That's what they are doing instead of saying to the public: Sorry, some people in our ranks were irresponsible and certain things happened as a result. This would make things easier and there would be no EU demarche. Nor would the DU have to ask the European Parliament's liberal faction for protection and help regarding the alleged threat of being thrown out of parliament. What happened to date is that doubts have been raised regarding the DU's participation in the elections but not the mandate of its deputies.

[Susko] Do you agree that if Slovakia had none of these problems, there would be no demarche?

[Meciar] I do not believe that, there would still be demarches. If somebody needs a pretext, then there are always gray areas in which to find one.

[Susko] Are you saying that the EU is looking for a pretext to justify sending us demarches?

[Meciar] Of course not. What we see here is a case of someone's lobbying losing support at home and their seeking support among friendly circles abroad.

[Susko] Circles who accept only opposition arguments but not the arguments...

[Meciar] We can certainly prove that those circles do not communicate with us.

[Susko] Are you saying that they do not communicate with their embassies in Slovakia either?

[Meciar] Of course they have their sources of information but such information reaches only the various governments and foreign ministries, not the European Parliament.

[Susko] And yet, foreign delegations representing various levels, from ministries to government representatives, do visit Slovakia. [passage omitted] I can't imagine that foreign delegations come to Slovakia to meet only the opposition. I think that their contacts are mainly official contacts with their counterparts. I really do not believe that there is a lack of communication or that outside the country there is not enough information available to objectively assess the situation in Slovakia, including relations between the coalition and opposition.

[Skoda] I should not think that other countries have inadequate information. After all, coalition parties' deputies do visit the European Parliament, for example. And I do not think that representatives of our present government and parliament travel less than those of any previous parliament. Aren't the people who visit Brussels and Strasbourg also seeing their European Parliament and EU counterparts there?

[Meciar] Naturally, I and other members of the government meet foreign delegations for talks, but this particular issue, and certain aspects of this issue, have never been discussed in the course of any of the talks with me. Anyone can confirm that.

For example, in the course of my talks with the U.S. secretary of defense the question of democracy in Slovakia was raised. In the preliminary talks leading up to the main meeting, two facts served as evidence of undemocratic occurrences: First, that Deputy Schmoegnerova's handbag had been stolen and, second, that the former parliament speaker, Deputy Miklosko, had been beaten up. Naturally, in the course of the discussion any such concerns were dispelled but what is under scrutiny, too, is how these incidents occurred in the first place.

The point is that apart from the discussion with me, there was also a meeting with the head of state. While the discussion with me was to the point, discussing

NATO, the other meeting devoted 40 minutes to the lack of democracy in Slovakia and that was the parting impression the delegation were left with. In other words, the delegation had no subsequent opportunity to verify the allegations made during the talks with various officials and its members therefore left with the impression that, to say the least, we have our differences over here. My policy is not to talk about internal issues. I discuss only issues of mutual interest.

As regards the procedure surrounding the adoption of the EU Council of Ministers' stance, that is its adoption by the EU foreign ministers, here, of course, a certain sequence was followed. Someone had to propose it and some states showed more initiative than others. We know that the whole process was meant to demonstrate a kind of unity and some sort of great pressure on Slovakia. But whatever the process, when a stance is being adopted by a government body, then someone should also talk to the legitimate government involved. It just isn't on to jump to conclusions without first consulting the legitimate government concerned.

Throughout history, no decision concerning another state has ever been adopted without that state's representative being involved. I dispatched Jozef Sestak, minister of state at the foreign ministry, telling him: "Make yourself available. Whatever they ask, give an explanation. Tell them you are there and ready to communicate our point of view. If necessary, ask them to wait and I'll dash to the airport, get there, and explain things personally." But we were not given such an opportunity. So much for the form.

As regards the content and the actual issues, then they are much the same as anywhere else. [passage omitted]

[Susko] [words indistinct] election law because it is a significant question?

[Meciar] Basically, there exist two election systems and these exist in certain variants. There is a system of proportionate representation which has been transplanted from Italy. We have been applying it so far. There is a system of majority representation in the British or French manner. The best system for our conditions would be the German system, a combination of both; that is a system change.

The change of legislative institutions must prevent a certain formation having a majority in the election commission which would vote, conveniently for itself, about the conclusion of the election commission. It would then acquire certain legal form and then the result as a whole would be put into question. It must be done by impartial bodies. The best thing would be to set up an institution of election courts, perhaps at the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, which would control the center, and specialized lower courts which would control the propriety of the election struggle. What happens now is that there are mistakes in the commissions but also directly in the elections [words indistinct].

[Susko] You have said, and I remember it very well: If one needs to explain something abroad I go there. How would you explain that you were not received by any head of state. Do you think that the opposition or opposition deputies are to blame or is it because of insufficient information, let us say by President Clinton or Chancellor Kohl?

[Meciar] As to Chancellor Kohl and Clinton, I have not met them, I have not met the Dutch Queen or British Queen, I have met President Chirac several times, I have met the Italian president, I did not met the president of Portugal through health reasons, and the Spanish president was traveling somewhere else—he had also been invited by some other representatives.

[Skoda] Prime Minister, the weight of the personalities you have enumerated is somewhat different from those mentioned by Mr. Susko. He probably means that these are personalities which have considerable influence in European or world politics and can influence what we are aiming at in our foreign political orientation, that is, integration into the West European security and economic structures.

[Susko] Moreover, no head of state, apart from the pope, has been in Slovakia since last November.

[Skoda] Germany is now a new great power and communication with it is not on the level you would wish.

[Meciar] Let me now mention that I have also met the German president and I will mention others. But let us now talk about this problem. Accepting visitors in our country is now very problematic. Why do they not want to come? If they come to visit us they find that the parliament has passed a vote of no confidence in the president. If somebody accepts an invitation and goes to visit parliament which does not trust the president, what is the relationship between these institutions? Is he to get involved in this conflict? It happened to a foreign minister of one state. The government had passed a vote of no confidence in the president. So if he goes at the invitation of the president does he not visit those two, and if he goes at the invitation of those two does he not visit the president? This is the dilemma and everybody says that if this is not solved in line with the constitution why should we come to visit you and if we go to visit you at whose invitation and who do we visit? This is our internal problem.

[Susko] The European Union has written what it wants: To renew cooperation between representatives of the highest Slovak constitutional bodies. That was in the text, as far as I could read it. In other words, they want it.

[Meciar] Yes, that is their wish and we wish the same thing. There was this inclination at the beginning when the government started work, there was this inclination after that, but the government cannot be permanently under the influence of the pressure on the part of the president of the republic. No doubts can be cast upon the government. He cannot convene meetings behind our backs saying that he will remove the government and appoint a new one. That is unconstitutional activity. Steps cannot be taken along the lines when the government has documents and the president has strictly secret material. [sentence as heard] [words indistinct] The program and the activity of the government cannot be questioned in such a way that there is no communication with the government. Foreign policy by the president cannot be conducted by Benes [foreign minister in the postwar Czechoslovakia], it must be conducted by Schenk as minister of foreign affairs. There must be communication. What happens is that the government assesses the contents of the economic policy of the state which is recognized everywhere as good; the president then endorses this, but immediately afterwards he says "but" and simply negates the work. This should not happen. For God's sake, even if there are internal differences in politics, it cannot be exported outside. The problem here is, we feel it in this way and we react to it. The discussions as to the reaction at the moment are at the stage that parliament passed the vote of no confidence and had a legitimate reason to do so, the government passed the vote of no confidence and it had a legitimate reason for it. All the representatives of central bodies of the state administration passed a vote of no confidence and they stated their reasons for it. Nowadays we have disharmony. To renew communication these facts would have to not exist and second, something would have to happen after the demarche. I spoke on the radio after the demarche and I opened up space for a dialogue again. But I came back from Germany and they welcomed me at the airport by telling me what the president had said about the government and me. This should not happen. Immediately after that I found out about talks of the opposition parties which consulted with the president how to overthrow the government. Was this the meaning of the demarche? Is this the way to communicate about the state's activity? This cannot be so.

[Susko] Prime Minister, why do yo not sit with the president at one table?

[Meciar] Are you aware that we have invited the president to attend a government meeting and that he did not turn up?

[Susko] You should sit at the table with him in front of television cameras, at a forum where viewers would be able to clearly say who is right.

[Meciar] The viewers know these shows, they know what each of us has done. I have never opposed any talks [with President Kovac] and I have no reason to do so now.

There was an invitation [for the president] to attend the government session and there were several invitations to attend a parliamentary session. Deputies have even asked to be received by the president because he cast so much doubt on the work of security structures and the intelligence service. These were grave deeds. Just imagine that you said in the West that the police and security institutions were out of parliamentary control and that the judicial system was not subject to control. This would be generally regarded as a total breakdown of the state. Immediate actions would be required in this respect because human lives would be in jeopardy. That is normal communication. But if communication is rejected, who then should pursue it?

Deputies go to see the president and ask for evidence but they are seen by two low-ranking officials who have no evidence and who have nothing to say to them. This means that, as far as communication is concerned, both parliament and the government are being turned down. What can one do about it?

[Susko] Does this mean that you would accept an invitation from Radio Twist? [laughter]

[Meciar] No, not an invitation from Radio Twist, but I would accept an invitation from other radios. [Commotion and laughter]

[Susko] Prime minister, I would like to recall one issue we digressed from earlier on, the issue of demarches and poor communication as a cause of the misunderstanding with the European Union. This was the second demarche. I know, you'll tell me that the first one was handed to Jozef Moravcik's government. All of us know very well that this was the demarche responding to the parliamentary session in November last year, when the reshuffle of parliamentary posts and changes in media leadership and so on, took place. Western Europe, or the European Union, responded to these developments by issuing this demarche. Do you not think that since this first demarche we have had plenty of time to give consideration to matters on which our Western European partners feel sensitive? Do you not think you have made a mistake by not responding properly to this demarche and by not introducing measures to change this situation over the last six or nine months? I personally think that there would be no harm if, figuratively speaking, you let the opposition deputies have a bite at the cherry, since you allowed them into the OKO [Special Inspection Agency, overseeing the work of the Slovak Intelligence Service].

[Meciar] Editor, I will have to put right what you have said. This was not the second demarche, it was the third one. The first demarche was in February 1994 when the European Union sent us its statement on the lack of accommodating attitude Slovakia was displaying regarding Gabcikovo Nagymaros and asked me, as prime minister, to adopt immediate measures to ensure that an accommodating attitude towards Hungary was adopted. At the same time the statement failed to define what the lack of accommodating attitude and the Hungarian interests were. All the same, we resolved the matter, regardless of the demarche, a little later. So, that was the first demarche.

The next demarche was delivered at the time when we were not in power and the former government did not recognize this demarche in full and partially rejected it.

And now we have the third demarche to which we have not responded yet. Instead of responding to it, we thought we would first consult about it, we would explain things and talk about them. I will be going to Spain and very frank and open discussions will be held also with other states. We do not wish to respond by sending an open statement to the European Union. Instead, the National Council will respond to it. A debate on the subject will be held.

And now to your question about our political system, about what happened and what some regard as a cause of tragedy today.

The proportional representation system was introduced in 1992. It was I who proposed that we switch from the majority to the proportional system in parliament. It has transpired that the proportional system, which was in place while polarization of society was under way, resulted in the parliament's failure. It was one of the causes of the parliament's failure.

What transpired was the lack of expediency in, say, electing Mr. Peter Weiss [chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left], the National Council deputy chairman, or the first deputy chairman, or Mr. Cernak [currently deputy chairman of the Democratic Union] the National Council deputy chairman.

As soon as we elected them, they used their posts to wage destructive attacks against their political partners. That was wrong, no matter whether some like it and some don't. [passage omitted]

[Susko] Wasn't the relationship with the president a problem then [after 1994 elections]? This problem is still topical today for it has not changed.

[Meciar] The relationship with the president did not dominate matters at that time. [passage omitted]

The development which preceded the return to the majority system was logical. And now when the composition [of parliamentary agencies] is evaluated, the opposition say they have neither a chairman or a deputy chairman! Pardon me for saying so but in America, in the United States of America they have a normal well functioning majority system. [passage omitted]

In the Czech Republic they also have the majority system and no one questions it. It is up to political parties, after they have reached an agreement with their partners from the deputies' majority, whether they are ready to accept it and treat it [the majority system provisions] either as an internal or external matter.

If I were an opposition deputy and if I were interested in resolving problems, I would not go round Europe crying. I would do something else. I would try to renew trust and dialogue with my partner. And that's what is lacking. There are no attempts to renew trust, there are no attempts to establish a partnership dialogue. Permanent attacks resulting in the polarizing and dismantling of the political scene are being waged. Relationships are being exacerbated on a permanent basis. [passage omitted]

Political parties have failed to define their interest but what they have defined is their interest in changing the political system without renewing trust. But that is is not possible. If we suddenly switch to dismantling the present government coalition, regardless of guarantees.... [changes thought]

I am not saying that people should not criticize us, that's the government's deal, but they should do so without nasty and destructive intentions, without proclaiming: We'll topple the government within the year, or: We'll lock all of them up, we'll put them behind bars, they'll do time. They should not advise us to choose cosier cells!

They should conduct their criticism without waging a destructive war among people, a war which is simply generating hatred in families and elsewhere. If this goes on, we shall not have a good system. No matter what they say, this would be a step back which would plunge society into another kind of chaos.

That's why we prefer to be criticized for switching to the majority system, which is a democratic system. We left the position of one National Council deputy chairman vacant for the opposition, but no one was interested and the post in OKO is under discussion. [passage omitted]

[Susko] Prime minister, you do not enjoy complete confidence even within the government coalition. But let me leave the EU for a while and turn to another issue, to NATO. One of your partners said that should entry into NATO mean the loss of sovereignty, then we should consider moving in another direction. You know what I mean. Do you agree with this view?

[Meciar] In concluding the coalition agreement, we said that the government policy would be carried out to an agreed extent and that extent would have to be fulfilled by all members of the government coalition. This, however, does not restrict the policies the coalition parties pursue outside government. For example, we have a situation when the Slovak National Party [SNS] is criticized for its attitude towards NATO and yet the military aspects of NATO are being handled by an SNS minister and everything he does meets with approval.

[Susko] Isn't it time for you to make an important foreign-political statement, clearly declaring that we do not want anything else [than NATO], and that we reject any arrangements for a half-sovereign or half-neutral [Slovakia]. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, recently said that it is necessary to set up an alternative to NATO. Such signals are very dangerous. Is it not clearly time to say what path we want to follow?

[Meciar] This is precisely what I have been saying in all my addresses, be they delivered at home or abroad, when dealing with this issue. My view is as follows: We have said yes to joining [NATO]. We have agreed the sequence of the practical steps to be taken as well and we are fulfilling our obligations. Just have a close look at all those demarches and you will find nothing in them that casts doubts on the government's honorable fulfilment of our obligations vis-a-vis the EU or NATO, or concerning any other agreement we have signed. I have personally signed all those agreements.

[Susko] Didn't [former defense minister] Imrich Andrejcak sign an agreement on military cooperation with Russia?

[Meciar] Yes, but all agreements have also been signed by me. And as regards military cooperation with Russia, what exactly did he sign? It certainly was not the kind of agreement that was presented to the public. It dealt with cooperation between ministries and that is something quite different from military cooperation. Anyway, we have already implemented and realized all the steps agreed therein. [passage omitted]

[Susko] Prime minister, all this may be true but it is also a fact that although the SNS is a member of a government coalition which implements a government program committed to following a certain clear direction, the SNS chairman casts doubts on this orientation and talks about something quite different.

What will happen when the crux comes and we have to decide in a referendum? Will members of the government coalition roll out three different campaigns: One for NATO, one for neutrality, and who knows what the third one might advocate? [passage omitted]

Would you not prefer someone else for a coalition partner, someone who would not let you down even on such issues as the Slovak-Hungarian treaty?

[Meciar] The SNS properly fulfils its government coalition and parliamentary obligations. The government bears no responsibility for the party's internal discussions which do not impinge on its activity as a government member. So this really does not concern us. [passage omitted] In Slovakia, we do not have any mechanism which would make the power structure function. This kind of mechanism is lacking in our country. What is also lacking is even a form of everyday conversation. [passage omitted]

[Susko] I would like to point out that an American news agency carried a teleconference [passage omitted] Strobe Talbott said in the teleconference that the United States supported the idea of an integrated and unified Europe that the United States wants to build with its many European friends and partners. This is substantial force for democratization and stability and, above all, which is what Strobe Talbott said, in Central Europe, and he added that Russia has an interest in it. So, in fact, there is no other alternative.

[Meciar] There are no other alternatives. But considering future development predicted in Europe, as predicted by NATO countries and the United States, it is based on the fact that NATO will be expanded, there will be integrated countries, there will be countries which will cooperate with NATO and, within the framework of cooperation, Russia is to be counted on. I think there is an agreement about this.

[Susko] Whose agreement?

[Meciar] I think agreement of all in Europe. There are no fundamental objections to it. But an argument emerges the moment we talk about central Europe as a NATO member and about the possibility of deploying nuclear arms in central Europe. Everybody who goes into NATO can envisage that he would accept all the obligations, including deployment. But then he must consider the value of another side. Admittedly, there are states, let us say, I think Denmark, which did not want to deploy nuclear arms, the French have some exceptions as to their NATO position, but nowadays it is not in the interest of the members to permit such exceptions to the newly accepted members.

[Susko] But there is emphasis on democratization and stability.

[Meciar] A debate is starting about this. The United States and Russia, and Germany to a certain extent, think that this discussion will lead to some sort of a global conclusion. We will respect this conclusion. We are not changing our policy aims and direction. We are waiting for the result of these talks which are probably being conducted at various levels but this does not prevent us from getting ready. Then there is the delimiting factor of speed with which we would join NATO. There are two views. There is the British view which envisages that we should change substantially both arming and technology. If we followed this path we would not have resources for it. The second view is American and it says that it is sufficient to alter and modernize communication technology, in other words one does not have to exert such rapid pressure on rearmament of the army and on internal resources. It is economically feasible. But this is a discussion inside the system. There are obligations within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and we are fulfilling these obligations. Our participation is being assessed and they say that Slovakia is doing very well. We have pledged that we will build two flight air squadrons, we have progressed in the building. It will cost us 6 billion crowns. We are simply taking these concrete steps.

There is debate about this, but there is no debate about us, the Slovaks, to go to some other security structure, to go and set up some other security formation. There are only 5.3 million of us.

[Susko] So you can say unequivocally that Russia does not provide any security guarantee for us.

[Meciar] Russia does not represent absolutely any threat for us.

[Susko] I am asking about security guarantee. Can you see what I have said?

[Meciar] We have not concluded any allied treaties with Russia of this character which would say that Russia should grant us security guarantees.

[Susko] We have a lot of other questions and you are a very good partner to answer them, but my task is to finish, as the producer signals that we are running overtime. I have no signal that we are getting more time even though my colleague is the prime minister. But despite that I would ask, if you permit: Is the criticism of the European Union viewpoints coming to an end, is there a beginning of some cooperation or active relations with the EU? So what now, prime minister? This is what we have called it. Go ahead.

[Meciar] Our direction towards the EU is unchanged. It will continue. There is a certain misunderstanding which must be explained. The misunderstanding, as well as the rules of further communication must be explained, accepted, and adhered to on both sides. We are not the only ones with this problem. I talked with prime ministers of other states and they also feel this way, although they have not received demarches of this kind. But others got demarches too. As to the questions of integration policies and so on, there exist given programs and we must honestly fulfil them. Obligations must be fulfilled honestly, otherwise trust cannot be strengthened. But we must also demand understanding for the internal development in our countrywhich is different from the development in the countries of Western Europe, it has a different historical dimension, a different timetable,and a different target. That is why we must cultivate this understanding and tolerance in each other.

From the point of view of stabilizing internal political development I am saying that the basic thing is renewing the trust of political entities so that they do not try to destroy one another. There is a natural development: Entities which were in the elections in 1994 will not be there in 1998 in the same form. But we cannot live with hatred, with threats and threats of violence and intimidation of one group against another. This cannot happen in everyday life.

[Susko] Prime minister, will you make a gesture in this sense? Will you make the first step or will you wait for the other side?

[Meciar] The discussions are under way. Some accommodating steps are being sought and some points of mutual understanding are being sought, although it is a considerably difficult process. The Christian Democrats do not want to leave their platform, the Hungarian parties, some of them find it difficult to leave the platform of insisting on autonomy which they are for and which is politically unacceptable for us, and the DU has its internal problem which it must solve. There are variants of prognoses as to how they will fare inside their party. The Party of the Democratic Left keeps saying:

Wait, we will solve our internal relations and then we will do something. It has now been a year that they have been saying this. The government must function, the parliament must function, and they are working on the principles existing in our country.

As to the president of the republic: There is a possibility of a constitutional solution and I exclude any other solution in Slovakia except a constitutional solution. I will not permit other solutions except democratic and constitutional ones. There exists a possibility of achieving agreement on the division of power or a manner of performing the role, which I suggested at the beginning of this year, but the agreement is not valid. There is a possibility of solving things in the National Council, there are about three constitutional possibilities, or by the citizens deciding. But we cannot solve this matter in any other way. On the other hand, I do not assume that it is a feasible idea to continue the so-called secret talks behind the scene on how to overthrow the government in an undemocratic way and how to set up a different government. In this case it does not involve only seats, it involves the system of organizing power in the state, in Slovakia. And democratic power in Slovakia must be defended, it must be defended against such expressions. So the question is not only for me, but for others too: What now? How to start making something out of the polarized camps, how to find grains of trust, how to find contact persons who will build this trust on both sides and find an atmosphere of understanding? It is not possible to further escalate these relations, passions, and hatreds without the threat of conflict.

[Susko] Will you make the first accommodating step?

[Meciar] What is that step supposed to be? [passage omitted]

President, Opposition: No Talks on Toppling Meciar

AU2511155595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Nov 95 pp 2-3

["Survey" by "bog, jo": "Presidential Spokesman Vladimir Stefko: It Is Absolute Nonsense; Opposition Refutes Meciar's Words on Slovak Television"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [SME] Vladimir Meciar said on Slovak Television on 21 November that the opposition was holding talks with the president on, among other things, overthrowing his government. Can you confirm this?

Vladimir Stefko, spokesman for the president of the Slovak Republic: "It is absolute nonsense! I was present during all negotiations between the president and representatives of opposition parties. They have always been held at the request of their representatives, and the president and many opposition politicians were stressing that the government of Vladimir Meciar is legitimate, just as the parliament and the president are legitimate, and that no ambitions exist to bring down the prime minister's Cabinet. This is also logical nonsense because parliamentary support for the government of Vladimir Meciar is sufficient, so no reasons exist to fear a destabilization of his government."

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]: "The KDH was negotiating with the president on the exact opposite—on compelling Meciar's government to remain in office even if it wanted to tender its resignation. We want Meciar's government to rule until complete exhaustion."

Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]: "First of all, I disagree with the practice of accusing someone who does not sit with you in front of the television camera and is unable to react immediately. Second, the SDL has repeatedly made it clear that it respects the results of the elections and that the government should fulfill its promises and govern up to the end of the electoral term. It was not the SDL but representatives of the government coalition who started spreading rumors in the summer about some kind of destabilization in their own ranks."

Jozef Moravcik, chairman of the Democratic Union: "It is nonsense. The opposition is contemplating 'overthrowing' the government, but in the elections."

Gyula Bardos, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] deputy to the National Council of the Slovak Republic: "This statement clearly belongs in the category of Vladimir Meciar's fabrications. It is another figment of his wild imagination. I declare in the name of the MKDH, with full responsibility, the it is not true. Our movement has not been involved in discussions on this issue at all, neither with the president separately nor within the framework of the Hungarian Coalition nor as part of the opposition."

Kovac Ready for Dialogue With Meciar

AU2511152095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "ns": "President Advocates Resumption of Dialogue With Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The president is always ready for a dialogue with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and has repeatedly tried to bring it about, Vladimir Stefko, the president's spokesman, told PRAVDA yesterday. He was reacting to journalists' calls, made during the television program "And What Next, Prime Minister?" on Tuesday, for a discussion between the two politicians in front of television cameras. As the spokesman added, however, he is not convinced that dialogue in front of cameras is at this moment the most suitable first step toward establishing communication. According to Stefko, the situation is too complicated, and it would be better if problems were discussed in a working atmosphere first and only then, possibly, in the presence of journalists. "At any rate, the president advocates the resumption of dialogue and communication not only with the prime minister, but also with all members of his Cabinet," he added. Asked by PRAVDA whether the president would initiate such a meeting, Stefko replied that it is not important at this moment who gives the first impetus. "It could be either the president or the prime minister." He also said that the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic is discussing with the management of Slovak Television the possibility of the president's appearance on television. It is likely that it will take place already today, and there exist two possibilities. Either the head of state will present his position on all-social phenomena that were assessed also by the prime minister in the program on Tuesday, or he will meet with journalists in front of cameras and reply to their questions.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 23 November on pages 1 and 3 carries a similar report on presidential spokesman Vladimir Stefko's comments on a possible "dialogue" between the head of state and the prime minister. The report notes: "Vladimir Stefko confirmed that the president is always ready to conduct a dialogue, to receive the prime minister and his colleagues, and to talk in a 'businesslike and constructive' way. Naturally, I have doubts as to whether such a conversation should take place before television cameras. This could have the opposite, polarizing effect and divide society into two camps. 'I believe that a television dialogue, which is possible, should be preceded by a working, businesslike dialogue between the two politicians without television cameras,' Vladimir Stefko said."]

Partner Says Kovac Jr Planned To Kill Meciar

AU2411184395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Juraj Handzo: "Further Antics from Chilo-Ptak"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Another letter from Branislav Chilo-Ptak concerning the criminal act of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction abroad was delivered to the PRAVDA editorial office yesterday. One month ago, Chilo-Ptak sent us two other letters from Hungary, in which he claimed that Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping had been staged and organized by the son of the president himself. [passage omitted]

At the outset of his letter, Chilo-Ptak challenges statements made by Michal Kovac Jr., [and his business partners] Martin S.-M., and Marian K. in the press. [passage omitted] In connection with the 11 November arson attack on the Mercedes belonging to Marian K., he says: "He surely knows the people who did it, and he also knows why they did it. They want to silence him because they know that he is down and, if he breaks, he will start talking, also about how they were plotting to eliminate Meciar. You should take a closer look at Marian K.'s companions, what kind of people they are. You would not be surprised that I am hiding. During our last meeting, when Michal Kovac was giving me instructions on what to do for the kidnapping plan to come off, he inadvertently spilled the beans and said that, when the first plan did not come off, the second must.... The first plan supposedly concerned just Meciar because Miso [familiar form of Michal] Kovac was very nervous that Meciar was after him and his father. Marian K. was to take care of it. He and his people were eager to blackmail and also to kill, so that Meciar would leave them in peace for good. Just as they were planning to assassinate Meciar, they also prepared the kidnapping of Michal Kovac.... Marian K. is now inconvenient to Michal Kovac, who will want to get rid of him. I want you to know that, when this happens, it will be my turn. Our newspapers wrote that I am wanted on fraud charges. Let me say only this much: Everyone who becomes involved with people such as Kovac and his companions meets such an end." [passage omitted]

Kovac Jr Denies Fraud Accusations

LD2511232795 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1915 GMT 25 Nov 95

[Interview with Michal Kovac Jr., son of Slovak President Michal Kovac, by correspondent Bronislav Tesarik, in Vienna, date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tesarik] We are here in Vienna, the capital of Austria, in one of many solicitors' offices. Michal Kovac Jr. has chosen this place to react here to the statement made by Peter Krylov in the program "Case Technopol—Krylov Spoke" broadcast on 18 November.

Mr. Kovac, what is your position on what Peter Krylov said on the program?

[Kovac] Last Saturday, Slovak Television 1 broadcast an interview with Peter Krylov. The interview dealt with the case of Technopol. [passage omitted]

I must say right at the beginning that all statements made by Mr. Krylov in connection with me and my father are pure lies, lies that only a man with no conscience or moral or human feelings is capable of telling. [passage omitted]

I do not want to burden you with comparisons and denials of all the lies and thought-up things presented by Mr. Krylov in his television interview. I will only mention a few of them because it is up to the relevant investigative bodies and courts to search for truth and guilt or innocence in the case of a fraudulent trade deal. I believe that before investigation bodies or, if need be, before court I will prove my innocence, provided the investigation is carried out without outside, inadmissible interference, without false, paid-for witnesses, and in line with investigation procedures.

First, Mr. Krylov referred to me as his partner. I was never Krylov's partner in any firm, and neither my company [Sycko] nor I ever concluded any trade contract with Mr. Krylov.

Second, Mr. Krylov claimed to have made my acquaintance, I quote, approximately at the beginning of November, sorry, at the end of November or the beginning of December 1991, at his company premises in Munich, and during this visit, as he claims, we presented to him a more or less complete project of a so-called trade deal with Technopol. This statement is an absolute lie.

The truth is that my trade partner Mr. Syc-Mily and I met him at the beginning of 1992, not in his office, as he claims, but in one cafe at the end of the pedestrian zone in Munich. The meeting was initiated by our Dutch partner, Mr. van der Werf. [passage omitted]

Mr. Krylov was interested in knowing what we were trading in, and he briefed us on his trade. Mr. Krylov mentioned during this talk that he worked for Radio Free Europe as a speaker. Talking about trade, we made it clear to him that we were not interested in trading with him because, due to the volume of our trade, to have our Dutch partner was sufficient for us. We traded in textile neither before nor after this meeting took place, therefore we could not give him any expert consultation on how to conclude trade contracts with Technopol.

Third, in an effort to give reasons for my participation in this deal, Mr. Krylov claimed in his recorded testimony that for a long time I had been a Technopol employee. When Mr. Krylov learned from our press that I had never worked for Technopol and that I did not know anybody there, he spoke in the STI interview only about very good contacts of all three of us with Technopol. This is a lie, too. I never had any contacts in Technopol. The truth is that Mr. Krylov traded with Technopol as early as before 1992, and he himself had very good contacts in Technopol. [passage omitted]

Does it not seem to you, esteemed viewers, that my father's political opponents directly cooperated with Mr. Krylov either directly or indirectly as early as before his first testimony in November of last year? Some people from the circle of my father's political opponent's personally knew Mr. Krylov, and they knew him well enough to know that he can be not only blackmailed but also bribed. They knew very well that he was prosecuted in the former Czechoslovakia and that he kept this fact a secret when seeking German citizenship, which he obtained in 1992, before some of his friends and current aides of the political opponents of my father helped him to wipe out criminal offenses from the register. [passage omitted]

Fifth, Mr. Krylov claimed in the STI interview that he had given me money in Luxembourg and then in Munich. This, of course, is also invented. My partner Mr. Syc-Mily will provide more detailed counterarguments because I do not have the documents here with me. [passage omitted]

Those who made it possible for a multiple fraudster to speak on our television did not even consider it important whether Mr. Krylov could prove his claims. They are content with his claiming it and happy that it will help to discredit me and, most of all, my father.

Esteemed television viewers, I have to recall one more detail. Technopol, having found out that it was stripped of $2.3 million, employed foreign lawyers in the summer of 1994 and reported the case to police authorities in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. As far as I know, the only person found guilty of this crime was Mr. Peter Krylov. I am familiar with the testimony given by Mr. Krylov and Mr. van den Werf. My name appears only in the testimony given by Mr. Krylov, and only as late as in October 1994. In Mr. Krylov's statement made on STI on 18 November 1995, my name is put in the foreground, as if my father and I were the main actors in the fraud. [passage omitted]

I believe that in the course of the investigation or, if need be before court, I will prove my innocence. If this happens, it is up to you whether you believe false statements made by a person who was sentenced for similar fraud and the interpretations made by the political opponents of my father, or whether you believe my words. I have to go on living separated from my family and wait for the German Prosecution bodies to interrogate me. This is also due to the fact that our government has not yet asked the Austrian authorities for me to be returned. Neither people in Austria nor in the Federal Republic of Germany are able to understand this. Our government probably knows very well why not to do this. The government needs the case of Michal Kovac Jr. to remain open, not closed, so that it can use it for propaganda. It seems that I will have to spend Christmas away from my family. All this is merely because I am a president's son. If I were the son of a rank-and-file citizen, I would not have been abducted abroad or, if so, the government would have immediately asked for my return. There are people in our country who, in their fight against their political opponents, will not stop even before threatening one's freedom, health, or the life of children of their opponents, as is the case in my situation. I am sure that you have come to understand that the issue at stake is not so much my person but rather that of my father. I believe that truth and justice will win eventually. Thank you.

HZDS Satellite Party Opposes NATO Membership

AU2511192795 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Nov 95 p 4

[Report by NARODNA OBRODA: "'Green' Parties and the Slovak Republic's Entry Into NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The NARODNA OBRODA editorial office has received a statement from the Slovak Green Alternative (SZA) Presidium, signed by SZA Chairwoman Zora Lazarova [member of the parliamentary club of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, with which SZA concluded a coalition agreement], that states:

"Green parties and green nongovernmental organizations all over the world, regardless of whether they are more radical or more realistic in their orientation, are among the most active fighters for peace. They are opposed to any armament and to nuclear armament, in particular.

"SZA is unequivocally opposed to Slovakia's entry into any military alliance. It proclaims the demand for Slovakia's neutrality in the military-political sense. At the same time, it considers Slovakia's integration into European economic structures, particularly the EU [European Union], to be fully warranted.

"SZA naturally respects the position of the government and of other, non-Green parties that have a different opinion. According to SZA, the most democratic solution would be if a step of such serious nature as Slovakia's entry into NATO were to be decided in a general referendum.

"One would expect also deputies from the Green Party in Slovakia (SZS) [member of the opposition Common Choice parliamentary group] to approach this issue in a similar spirit. However, SZS Chairman Jozef Pokorny has assumed the completely opposite position, stressing that, even though the SZS originally advocated neutrality and a referendum, it is now in the process of reassessing its position on this issue. Pokorny said that, once again, the Green Party in Slovakia will be a bit different from the other Green parties in Europe. It will develop initiatives and utilize its contacts abroad, be they in the FRG or on the soil of the European Parliament, in order to enlist support for Slovakia's entry into the military NATO pact, despite being aware of the fact that it is thus acting at variance with the principles of the Union of European Green Parties.

"On the one hand, the highest SZS representatives permanently protest against the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, which meets all European safety standards, and, on the other, they support the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed on the territory of Slovakia, which can be expected to take place, sooner or later, in the event of Slovakia's entry into NATO."

Goncz Appeals to Slovak President on Language Law

LD2311161695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 23 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Goncz appealed to Slovak President [Michal Kovac] to find a solution complying with European standards for the situation which evolved after the approval of the language law by [Slovak] parliament [on 15 November].

In his letter to Michal Kovac, the Hungarian president stressed that this is required by the development of the two countries' good relations, the Slovak-Hungarian historical reconciliation, the principle of a democratic and constitutional state, and the assertion of the rights of national minorities.

Arpad Goncz also expressed his conviction that the situation of the minorities—which is one of the standards which democracy is measured against—cannot be considered to be exclusively a domestic matter of the country concerned.

Kovacs Reacts to Meciar Comment

LD2411102495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs agrees that another Slovak-Hungarian prime ministerial meeting to discuss the language law is important. Kovacs reacted on radio to the Slovak prime minister's statement published in today's issue of NEPSZABADSAG. In this statement, Vladimir Meciar said he is willing to hold further talks with Prime Minister Gyula Horn. He also stated that the majority, which is necessary for signing the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, is already present in the Slovak parliament; however, if Budapest continues to take steps which Pozsony [Bratislava] finds offensive, that can cause the ratification process to be drawn out.

In reaction to this, the Hungarian foreign minister confirmed that it is not his government's aim to politically discredit Slovakia, but it does have the right to inform international organizations about the language law, which unfavorably affects the minorities.

Horn Interviewed on Bokros Tendering Resignation

LD2311231495 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1855 GMT 23 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Has Prime Minister Gyula Horn accepted Finance Minister Lajos Bokros' resignation?

[Begin recording] [Horn] No, I told him straight away when he raised this issue at the government session that I would not accept it. I understand him, and I also agree that the finance minister's room for maneuver is extremely narrow, but this also applies to the whole of the government. I do not accept it because the government needs Finance Minister Bokros's expertise, activity and also his social sensitivity, which he represents in the Interest Coordination Council. He is struggling with the task of trying to find a price-wage agreement tomorrow [24 November]. This is a great thing because we anticipated the rightful needs of our social partners, and we went to the final limits of concessions. We want social peace and political stability.

I also wish to stress that the government is fully united in the belief that the economic stabilization must be carried out to the end. I am determined in this respect. We take into consideration the rightful and acceptable needs, but we cannot change this tendency, this process, which began a few months ago.

[Unidentified correspondent] Lajos Bokros said that the government is at a crossroads. Is the choice really between the preservation of social peace and stabilization?

[Horn] I would join the two together. Every internal need is about this, after all, as well as the expectations of foreign partners. Yes, stabilization, but at the same time we must take into consideration the limits of society's tolerance, and the necessity of preserving political stability.

I understand the finance minister's despair, since he feels that in the situation which has evolved following the Constitutional Court's decisions, his scope for maneuver has become extremely limited. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Is there any other way, after a great part of the finance minister's program was destroyed, than the speeding up of inflation, the raising of taxes, an increase in the budget deficit? Bokros did not see a chance for this under the current circumstances.

[Horn] [Passage omitted] I believe that we can move ahead in 1996, indeed to a great extent. I am not only thinking of the situation of state finances, but also of the favorable processes which have started already in 1995. These are above all the economic growth, the further increase in investments, the favorable change in the rate of export and import, the significant increase in agricultural exports. Even though these are only beginning steps, they have already begun, and they will evolve in 1996 and we will be able to move forward in many issues. So I am not so much of a pessimist. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Can the government work together with Lajos Bokros in the future?

[Horn] This question has not even been raised. The government members argue with the finance minister and vice versa, I also argue with him and he with me, but how could anyone try to form a stand and find solutions without arguments in such complicated issues. [passage omitted] As I said, there are disputes, but there is no such tension in the government which would blow the fuse, and due to which cooperation between the government members and the finance minister would become impossible.

[Correspondent] Did the Constitutional Court's decision blow the fuse? How will the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the government develop now?

[Horn] The Constitutional Court made five decisions in the past months, according to preliminary calculations the joint effect of these is somewhere in the region of 30 billion forints. This has definitely made the government's situation, the government's stabilization efforts, more difficult, in fact much more difficult. I and my colleagues in the government are not trying to force any changes in our relationship with the Constitutional Court. We respect the court's decision, even though we must live with the consequences, we must take them into consideration. This creates a new situation in several areas. [passage omitted] We are not concerned with our relationship with the Constitutional Court but with handling the situation which occurred in the wake of its decision.

[Correspondent] Several people, among them the finance minister, say that a political direction is emerging from the Constitutional Court's decisions. Can you continue to go along with this political direction? Can you carry out the reform of state finances this way?

[Horn] What the finance minister said is his personal view. This is not a case of going along together. The Constitutional Court is an independent institution, the government has its own tasks. The Constitutional Court does what it sees best and we do what the electorate empowered us to do, which is our duty, to settle the country's issues. If we cannot handle properly the situation which evolved in the wake of the Constitutional Court's decision in the way we said, then we have to find other ways and possibilities.

[Correspondent] Tomorrow, at the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] Congress, you will evaluate the government's work. Do you feel that you will receive the support of the congress and the Socialist Party for the stabilization policy which has so far borne the name of Lajos Bokros?

[Horn] I am almost certain that the decisive majority—not the simple, but the decisive majority—of the HSP supports the stabilization program and the government policy. It is natural that they criticize us, I have nothing against that. I wish to appeal to everyone on one issue only. It is of fundamental importance—and almost everyone agrees—that we should settle the country's economic and financial situation, and start the country off on the road of development and modernization. We should also not lose sight of preserving political stability. I agree with all this, but it can only be carried out if the government is also part of it, that is, if the [Socialist] party, the coalition partner [Alliance of Free Democrats], the great majority of the public, and the social partners support the government in carrying out these tasks. These tasks cannot be carried out by a destabilized, discouraged government. Therefore, I hope that at tomorrow's congress the HSP delegates will reassure us in this.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for the interview.

[Horn] Thank you.

Says Bokros Needed

LD2511212995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 25 Nov 95

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by correspondent Jozsef Orosz in Miskolc, venue of the Hungarian Socialist Party congress, date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Orosz] Prime Minister, a few minutes ago your Finance Minister Lajos Bokros was cheered by the crowd when he received a T-shirt with I Love Lajos printed on it. Does it suggest to you that the Socialist Party does indeed need Lajos Bokros and his economic policy?

[Horn] Let us clarify something. We cannot speak about the Bokros package or Bokros program, what we have is a government program and government package. Of course it bears his name, but without the government's support for these ideas and proposals, or the agreement on tax bands he concluded in the Interest Coordination Council yesterday, he would get nowhere with it.

Of the large number of contributions here, I heard none suggesting that the stabilization program or the financial, economic austerity measures should be stopped or social provision systems should not be transformed. [passage omitted]

[Orosz] Prime Minister, Lajos Bokros offered his resignation, which you did not accept, and then Culture Minister Gabor Fodor resigned yesterday. What is happening in your government? Is there a crisis, crisis symptoms, or government confrontation between ministers and the prime minister? What do you think?

[Horn] Look, I am not pleased either by the fact that government members keep resigning, for it would be good if they could carry on until the end of the parliamentary cycle. However, no one can be forced to do so. It is simply that several people cannot cope with the difficulties. As government members, several people cannot bear or survive the tension that is part of every single government session and significant topic.

It would be dramatic only if the government was continuously getting smaller, but it is out of the question. I do not know, perhaps some people thought one and a half or two years ago that these things will be easy to carry through here. In this country, in the government's present situation, practically no good decisions can be made by the government, only bad or less bad ones. Most of the time we have been making efforts to avoid the worst ones.

Gabor Fodor has received plenty of criticism from teachers, cultural workers, and many others. I have to say, and he also accepted it, that the ministry's performance has not really been brilliant. It is far from being certain that he is the only one to blame, for he also inherited an apparatus, which is very difficult to put in motion, especially in the spirit of sensible work.

[Orosz] Have you accepted Gabor Fodor's resignation?

[Horn] Yes, I have. I regret, I confirm that I regret Gabor Fodor's resignation. However, I accept it because the ministry's work needs changes.

[Orosz] Many people said after Gabor Fodor's letter and Lajos Bokros' resignation offer that it was a very clever chess move by Gyula Horn, because he had removed from the political scene those two men who would have received the most attacks at the Socialist Party's congress.

[Horn] Before anyone thinks that it was a game, a conspiracy, I have to state that it is not true. Lajos Bokros was indeed very disappointed after the Constitutional Court's decision. He telephoned me in the evening after the decision was made and said work was impossible under such circumstances, for those decisions practically paralyzed his room for maneuver and his possibilities. I asked him to think it over. This is not a chess game of any kind. I like playing chess, but I do not have the time to play it. What happened was what we have now been discussing.

Bokros To Continue Work

LD2611182295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government and the larger government party [Hungarian Socialist Party—HSP] do not question the role of the Constitutional Court, although the latter's decisions have restricted the scope not only of the finance minister, but of the entire cabinet as well. This was stated by Prime Minister Gyula Horn at the international press conference following the Socialists' Congress in Miskolc. The party chairman-prime minister also said that the issue of the resignation of Lajos Bokros has been closed; the finance minister did not set any conditions; he is continuing to work.

Horn Declares Stabilization Program 'Successful'

LD2411212495 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At a closed session, the delegates of the Hungarian Socialist Party's congress have decided not to discuss personnel issues. No vote will be taken on the keynote speech delivered by Party Chairman Gyula Horn at the supreme party meeting held in Miskolc.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] At an open session Gyula Horn, party chairman and prime minister, began his 90-minute keynote speech by saying he was standing before the congress with a clear conscience, since his party dedicated itself to putting the country's affairs to rights without giving up left-wing values. The greatest challenges are presented by the economic situation and the social reform issues. Problems, however, can only be resolved by the consistent implementation of the stabilization process.

[Begin Horn recording] I have to repeat over and over again that the stabilization measures are successful in spite of the fact that the government has to act in dire straits. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Correspondent] Gyula Horn said his party had not promised a quick revival and it will not back out in the face of the challenges. He warned against scaremongers and a destructive self-reproach, but admitted that the government's performance was not steady and the apparatus was sometimes undisciplined. However, he denied accusations that the cabinet was inconsistent, improvising, and drifting with the events. Gyula Horn stressed that social, political, and economic stability cannot be maintained without a stable government.

[Begin Horn recording] We have to put a stop to unsubstantial debates that are not worthy of us. I am ready to assume responsibility for every mistake the government made, but I am not willing to allow anybody to destroy what we have built. I cannot accept either that there are some people in this country and party who want to make good appear as incorrect. I ask everybody not to create hysteria within the party and, through this, in the country. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Criticizes Government Performance

LD2411193495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Gyula Horn has told the Miskolc congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party that the government will continue the stabilization program. However, it admits that the performance of the Cabinet has not always been steady and coordination of the work has not always been successful either. Gyula Horn continues to consider the maintenance of the coalition to be necessary. Attila Kert and Kata Peli Nagy are on the phone.

[Kert] Gyula Horn's nearly two-hour speech ended approximately 40 minutes ago. The party chairman and prime minister sharply criticized the government's hitherto performance and urged the more than 300 delegates to create party unity.

[Begin Horn recording] What is our government like? Its performance has been unsteady, there has been strong unsteadiness in the level of the individual ministries' professional work, and coordination of the government's work has not always been successful either. Sometimes even very important materials were failed to be prepared in time.

Lack of discipline has become dominant in the apparatus throughout the years. The reason why we did not take the March [stabilization] measures earlier was not because we hesitated. The reason for the delay was that no comprehensive, concrete stabilization package was prepared. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Horn Defends His Dual Role

LD2611221095 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 26 Nov 95

[Interview with Gyula Horn, prime minister and Hungarian Socialist Party chairman, by unidentified correspondent; date, time not given—live or recorded; from the "The Week" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, what role do you intend for the committee that will prepare the next congress, which you are to head and which, according to our information, will consist of Zoltan Gal, Mrs. Magda Kosa, Sandor Csintalan, Imre Szekeres, Ivan Vitanyi, and in which Sandor Nagy and Bela Katona are also expected to participate?

[Horn] I have no knowledge about the last two; this is only known from hearsay. [passage omitted]

The task of this committee would be to prepare the congress, in regard to the organizational and other matters that have already been mentioned; and a lot of things will have to be thought through in the party's operation. So this would be a committee that would work as a permanent forum until the congress takes place. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The question of the separation of the posts of party chairman and prime minister has been raised many times before. You have said that you would not go along with that. Why would you not accept one or the other role separately?

[Horn] The problem would be that in that case, the system of government decisionmaking would slow down or perhaps even cease altogether. As a matter of fact, as it happens in West Europe in the case of the Socialist or Social Democratic parties, these two functions are fulfilled by one and the same person, and this is definitely necessary from the operative, the decision-making, and every other viewpoint. [passage omitted]

Congress Votes To Continue Stabilization Process

LD2611130695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The second round of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] Fourth Congress held in Miskolc has ended. The participants argued for continuation of the stabilization saying it did not only have a purpose in itself. The economic program cannot be relaxed but the population should be won over to support it. Attila Kert and Kata Peli Nagy report.

[Begin recording] [Kert] Good afternoon. The HSP gave itself an extension of four months to sort out personnel issues and to take a decision on the possible separation of the posts of prime minister and party chairman. It means that the delegates decided to convene the fifth congress by the end of March 1996 at the latest, when the reelection of the officials will also be on the agenda. The congress will be convened by the national executive. By then a committee led by [Prime Minister] Gyula Horn is likely to be set up to prepare the congress.

[Peli Nagy] In his closing speech the party chairman called the congress successful since it has eased internal tensions and consensus was reached on the most important issues. The party chairman said the congress reiterated that an efficient and functioning coalition was needed.

[Horn] It was raised previously that the HSP's Miskolc congress would prepare some kind of left-wing turn. In a left-wing party there is no need, and it is impossible, to make a left-wing turn. The word 'turn' is not the most important or most typical. However, let me say this: What the delegates said here—that they are standing by implementation of the stabilization program—means tremendous support for the government and the HSP.

[Kert] Gyula Horn was of the view that the party has found itself and regained its self-confidence. Now the [word indistinct] is that people believe they are not making sacrifices in vain since the first results of the stabilization are already visible.

[Horn] After governing for 15 months, this country is not threatened by bankruptcy, [the danger of] which was present in a very sharp and acute way in the summer of 1994. Moreover, I think that not only we, and not mainly we, but the people, society need encouragement that it is worth making sacrifices because there are results, even if they are preliminary.

[Peli Nagy] A statement adopted by the congress says the party is continuing stabilization but they are taking people's tolerance into consideration. The coalition debate [on its future and viability] has closed for the party. The statement says the party is interested in the survival of the HSP-SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] coalition until the end of the government cycle. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Horn on Importance of Reforming State Finances

LD2711103995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0540 GMT 27 Nov 95

[Interview with Gyula Horn, prime minister and chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party—HSP; by Attila Kert, on 26 November, after the HSP's Fourth Congress; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kert] You said that [Finance Minister] Lajos Bokros's resignation was off the agenda. He, however, continues to make his stay [in his post] subject to the expansion or recovery of the room for maneuver in the economy.

[Horn] Look, Lajos Bokros's hands are tied not by the government but the situation. The way the congress received Lajos Bokros's contribution here means a great reassurance to him.

[Kert] How can the finance minister's constitutional, legal scope be enlarged?

[Horn] I deem it important that concrete preparatory work of a new constitution should start in the beginning of 1996 at the latest. I trust that conceptual debates regarding the new constitution will end by the end of the year. But even until then, [new constitution] parliamentary decisions, in order that we can really begin the reform of the state finances, are of key importance. It is a key issue also from the viewpoint that social justice, support for those who fall behind, the reform of the various provision systems are indispensable for a genuine improvement in these areas.

Thus we have to guarantee extra resources not only from a continuous growth of economic performance, but also from restructuring, eliminating unreasonable things in the area of health, culture, education and social provision systems. [passage omitted]

[Kert] [Passage omitted] Are you optimistic about the easing of tensions within the government from now on?

[Horn] Look, the government was criticized. I myself also criticized the government and my own performance. However, the congress gave the government obvious support. I am fully open to listen to every substantial proposal, but debates should end at one point; otherwise, they will paralyze action.

[Kert] Has the period of coalition crises ended?

[Horn] Look, coalition cooperation involves debates, heated debates everywhere. Why would Hungary be an exception? The decisive factor is intention. The HSP's intention, which was also expressed at the congress, is that this coalition should stay together until the end of the parliamentary cycle. So this is our intention. If something needs correction in the meantime, it should be made, but it does not question the existence of the coalition. We have shown and will show this attitude in the future, too.

Karadzic, Krajisnik Interviewed, 'Accept Peace'

LD2511131195 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 2012 GMT 24 Nov 95

[Studio interview with Bosnian Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Serb Assembly President Momcilo Krajisnik by Marica Lalovic — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lalovic] Dear viewers, good evening. This evening we will discuss the Dayton agreement, the agreement which has been approved and which is designed to find ways and solutions for ending the war in the area of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the former Yugoslavia, so that a peaceful solution to the conflict might be achieved. The guests with whom we will discuss this this evening are Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the [Bosnian] People's Serb Assembly. Good evening and welcome.

[Karadzic and Krajisnik] Good evening.

[Lalovic] First, on behalf of the viewers who can ask you this evening about these problems and these issues, our telephone numbers are 071-783179 and 783186.

I would like to thank you for coming at this time, when truly you have had many, many obligations and lots of work, and many things to consider in connection with the documents we will be speaking about this evening. So the first thing I would like to ask you is this: The peace agreement is on the table; what are your initial reactions and assessments?

[Karadzic] Well, we accept peace. To tell the truth, in our struggle for our freedom — and we began with a political struggle, in the election campaign and later in the Assembly — and finally when after the political struggle an armed struggle and conflict was imposed on us, we had to accept this conflict. We fared pretty well against a much more numerous enemy. We achieved a large part of our goals, and now the time has come for us to resume the political struggle. I believe that for our people at this moment it is a good thing that the armed conflict has stopped, and of course we have good, well-equipped, competent, and faithful political forces which, just as our soldiers were competent on the battlefield, will be competent in the political field to put the finishing touches onto the realization of our goals.

[Lalovic] Mr. Krajisnik?

[Krajisnik] Well, I think our public are familiar with the statement I made in connection with this agreement, and I hope that in the course of this program I will be able to clarify some things and make a contribution to explaining it, and maybe give some instructions to our people who are probably anxiously awaiting this. What I would like to add as one of my impressions is that this has been a difficult civil, national, interethnic, and religious war, and when we pondered how it would be ended, we always looked at it from a distance and had a perspective on it, and did not just look at it from the current moment, so that certainly it is a great advantage if the war ends and we can live in peace, and use political means to achieve those goals which we have not yet realized.

[Lalovic] I would like to ask you something. To start with, the negotiations lasted 21 days. Every day we had different reports about what was happening in Dayton, how the talks were proceeding. At one moment it seemed there would be no solution, and that common principles and a common language could not be found, then we got other reports, and so on. I would like to ask you to say, for the viewers of [Bosnian] Serb television, what the talks were like, to what extent you had problems, and how you got on with the adversaries around the table.

[Krajisnik] Well, before we went to the talks, our Assembly approved a delegation in line with a proposal by President Karadzic. We gave our negotiating team a platform. We reached agreement on certain standpoints with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], in other words with the part of the delegation from the FRY, and we evaluated everything which could happen at these talks.

We also foresaw the events that have happened, but we were still somewhat surprised because there was a certain incorrect behavior and — how can I put it? — the failure to adhere to an agreement with the international community was one of the surprises. In order to act correctly at the conference and as a condition for participation, we agreed on certain principles at Dayton — namely that there should be a ban on interviews with the media.

The participants at the conference themselves violated this agreement, as did the organizers — something which was a surprise, because in any event when they spoke up it appeared as if it were news from a reliable source.

At the conference itself there was a lot of tactics-playing, a lot of psychological and various other forms of pressure and disinformation — probably also information which was put about with ulterior motives.

I would like to concentrate, if I may, on something I believe I can say happened. This is that we went to the talks as a joint delegation, part of the delegation being from the FRY and part of the delegation being from the Serb Republic, but we did not know what our objectives were. Our goals were to achieve peace and a satisfactory solution for our people, and as part of our strategic aims we wanted to achieve at least a minimum in these difficult times in order for peace to be achieved. The FRY section of the delegation also said that the desire was to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But in fact the main aim of the FRY section of the delegation was to achieve the lifting of sanctions.

I have to say that this pressure, arising from the obligation to get sanctions lifted, was perhaps crucial for all the dissatisfaction which we must air here, and perhaps for the coordination of our delegation at the conference and the results which we achieved.

A big objective was achieved insofar as the Serb Republic obtained a legal basis and the Serb Republic was promoted. I would be happy if most of our people are happy to live in this republic and in their own state, because what we achieved in this constitutional part, what they call the paperwork part, was a big contribution. In the main, the objective of realizing the principles agreed in Geneva and New York was achieved, and we can be completely satisfied with these.

When I say completely satisfied I mean that we long ago crossed the Rubicon of accepting the union and accepting some kind of common form of membership of the United Nations. But we have both our own government and our own president of the republic and our Assembly, our legislature, our army, our police, our customs, our schools. We have everything the people have created in this war except for the element of an internationally recognized state, and that is something which in the war, ultimately, we did not obtain.

[Karadzic] If I may put it this way, we are an internationally recognized fact, or rather an internationally recognized constituent part of this union, which is only a step away from international recognition. For example, Slovenia had less in the Yugoslavia of the 1974 Constitution than we have in this union. So when I say an internationally recognized state, we are not yet quite there, but we are an internationally recognized fact, an internationally recognized entity.

[Lalovic] Excuse me, Mr. Krajisnik, all the negotiators said there was a lot of tactical maneuvering and a very great deal of behind-the-scenes politicking and deception at the negotiations. Was there any direct pressure by the international mediators on our negotiating delegation — our joint negotiating delegation made up of the representatives of the Serb Republic and of the FRY, or rather Serbia — when it came to making certain concessions?

[Krajisnik] I would like to emphasize, in particular, that our joint delegation had different goals. At the beginning we appeared as a joint delegation. On the constitution and all other enactments we worked together, and much was achieved here. However, when key issues came up on the agenda, then our delegation and the FRY delegation displayed quite different degrees of flexibility and willingness to give in.

And what our viewers, our people, and history must know is that at one point when the conference was in crisis and under threat of being abandoned, the FRY section of the delegation acted autonomously and, using a procedure which was dreamed up specially, we were in some way bypassed.

We were bypassed because at the beginning there were the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Federation delegation signs, while on our side there was only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sign, and when we intervened to say there should be a Serb Republic sign — why should there be a sign for the Federation but not one for the Serb Republic delegation? — we got the answer: You know you are part of a joint delegation, and some people in the FRY delegation believe we ought not to insist on this, so we were bypassed on that occasion, too.

At that moment, the fact that we were part of a joint delegation made things hopeless, and afterwards the situation got worse. When we wanted to put forward some notion we were told: Hang on, you are part of the joint delegation, and you must put your views as part of the joint delegation. We made all our objections through the joint delegation initially, but later we saw that our objections were not going any further than the joint delegation, so then we made direct representations as we saw fit.

As the conference went on, we became aware of a number of unofficial contacts, outside the plenary sessions. One of our delegates joked about this and phoned Yugoslavia to ask what we were doing in Dayton. At one stage we noticed that the Bosnian Croat delegates were also sidelined. Everything was taking place between the three presidents — Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Milosevic, and Mr. Tudjman.

I have to say that two parts were of particular importance. One was the document on military issues. We said clearly that NATO could not be deployed [in Bosnian Serb territory] because our Assembly was firmly against it. The activities envisaged for NATO forces were very dangerous; they were supposed to implement elections, return refugees, use force. We made corrections later, and the only thing that remains unresolved now is the deployment of NATO in our territory, because that contravenes the decisions adopted by our Assembly.

The other section is the issue of maps. I will try to be brief. As far as the document on military issues is concerned, we said that certain issues have to be amended, and that otherwise we could not accept the military document. We had to vote on this, and that was the first time we had a conflict of opinions. Koljevic, Buha, and I voted for modifications of the document, saying that it could not be accepted the way it was. We even tried to say that NATO could carry out its mission, but that they it could not deploy troops in our territory. We could not reach an agreement, and President Milosevic used his right to cast the deciding vote.

The issue of maps pushed everything in the wrong direction. I can show you the map we proposed to the mediators. We also discussed this with the Americans, the Muslims, and the Croats, and we proposed this map. I hope you can see it. We included [in the Serb Republic] Krupa Na Uni [Bosanska Krupa], Drvar, [Bosanski] Petrovac, Kljuc, part of Jajce, Mrkonjic Grad, and Sipovo. We wanted this part of Ozren [Krajisnik shows southern part of Mt. Ozren].

[Karadzic] Your map included the whole of Mt. Grmec.

[Krajisnik] According to our goals and our platform, we included the whole of Mt. Grmec and Klekovaca.

[Karadzic] The town of Drvar, but not the entire municipality.

[Krajisnik] Yes, only the town of Drvar, not the municipality. Our strategic goal was for Orasje to stay.

[Karadzic] In our hands.

[Krajisnik] No, to remain outside of the Serb Republic, because it is an enclave. We wanted to resolve everything with territorial exchanges. In this area we wanted 20 kilometers. We even managed to avoid Gradacac and tried to reduce the Gradacac territory where we would have 20 kilometers and 20 kilometers, or 12 miles, in Brcko. [sentence as heard] In the Teocak area, we wanted slight changes because Teocak threatens our thermo-electric plant [in Ugljevik]. The border would go along Mt. Javorak, north of Sekovici.

As far as Sarajevo was concerned, we took into account the situation on the ground and gave [the Muslims] the central part of Sarajevo except for Grbavica, Ilijas, and Vogosca, providing a wide exit toward the north, where the Muslims could have a bypass linking them with Zenica and Tuzla. In return we would get this part of Sarajevo.

Gorazde would remain as an enclave, and we would try to exchange it and Orasje later. The red line shows where we would demand access to the sea somewhere in the area of Popovici [in Croatia], and in return we would give the high ground above Dubrovnik.

The American view was that this was the map they wanted to present to the other side. Mr. [name indistinct], who spoke with us on that occasion, said that he would ask Mr. Holbrooke to present that map. We discussed it with the Americans in Belgrade and mostly reached an agreement on it with Mr. Milosevic.

[Lalovic] That map envisaged the agreed percentage 51:49.

[Krajisnik] The percentage was a bit higher, and they tried to get around this protruding section of territory [showing southwestern Bosnia] and tried to take Drvar from us. However, even in that case we were supposed to get the towns I mentioned previously: Sipovo, Petrovac, Kljuc, Krupa, Sanski Most, Mrkonjic Grad, and a part of Jajce.

We devoted most of our attention to this area, not because it was more important to us than other areas, but because of a great number of refugees. Our primary concern was to return our ethnic areas which were the last to be occupied, so that refugees could return and we could solve the social problems. In line with the decisions adopted by our Assembly, we focused our efforts on this area instead of trying to recover Mostar or some other areas. We submitted the map to President Milosevic, who demanded it, and said that he would give it to the Americans even though I had given a copy to [word indistinct]. We based all our work on this map. When we compare it with the map as it is now, we see a great difference.

[Karadzic] According to your proposal we were supposed to get Jelah and this road.

[Krajisnik] Yes, we were supposed to get a part of Mt. Trebava and a part of Jelah to make Doboj more secure. We also wanted to hear objections from the Muslim side. We discussed this with the American representative, and the map was completely acceptable to them, so they took it to the negotiations. If you look at the Serb map and the one that was realized, they are completely different, because we were excluded from everything that happened later.

The problem now is that we did not get Krupa, Sanski Most, or Kljuc — you can see Kljuc here. In return they gave us Klekovaca and Vitorog, including the municipalities of Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad. The Muslims got two hydroelectric power plants, and we only got Bocac [hydroelectric power plant].

[Karadzic] According to our proposal, we were supposed to get Bocac and one of the Jajce hydroelectric power plants.

[Krajisnik] Yes, Jajce, and we made certain concessions toward Simprag to bring the percentages into line. Apart from Teocak, where this protruding section was supposed to be modified in this area, some kind of corrections were made.

[Karadzic] Ozren is now in line with the situation on the ground.

[Krajisnik] Yes, in line with the situation on the ground.

[Karadzic] It is clear that it includes the monastery, even though the new map is not precise.

[Krajisnik] That is the state of affairs. And this corridor for Gorazde — what is particularly surprising are three points. It was a surprise when the Muslims demanded this kidney-shaped piece here. We were rather surprised because the U.S. delegation made it quite clear that the territory had to be compact, a viable state, and that there was no question of any kind of unnatural borders. You see, even if it were like this, it would be the same territory and we would have all these towns, perhaps not Jajce, but we would lose a section of forest and would gain three or four towns. What is particularly problematic on this map — I will ask President Karadzic to comment on this in a moment — is the fact that this part is in effect under Croatian administration. This part has been conceded to the Serb Republic.

[Karadzic] Although it is purely Serb.

[Krajisnik] Purely Serb. Now it is occupied. In return for this, they gave Vukovsavlje [Serb name for Odzak]. We had this problem, in fact I should stress four problems: Vukovsavlje, Gorazde, Sarajevo and this part, Sanski Most, and Kljuc. We thought, and our proposal was, that it was natural that we should first take Sanski Most, because Sanski Most is the furthest point with regard to our territory, and then Kljuc, [Bosanska] Krupa, Petrovac, Mrkonjic, and so on, so that this a natural border, because this was supposed to be a rounded or compact territory.

However, I would particularly like to stress that at one point President Milosevic came to us during one of the lengthy breaks and said the Croats had problems with this. He had earlier said that we have gained Posavina completely free of Croats; that was when eastern Slavonia was on the agenda. Later it transpired that Orasje remained after all, and in the end, when the Croats tactically made it known that they would break off the talks, he then came to us proposing — so that the conference would have a positive conclusion after all — that we give a narrow belt here along the River Sava to give some satisfaction to those who were demanding Posavina. We made it clear that many refugees are accommodated here, that these are people who have moved three or four times, and that this was out of the question and had no basis. We pointed out to him that President Tudjman had agreed with this. He said OK and went away, and we thought the question of Vukosavlje had been resolved.

Second, when it came to the corridor for Gorazde — Gorazde is a very small enclave here. It has been increased three times in size. Milosevic then said that we should leave a corridor here which would connect Gorazde with Sarajevo. We said that out of a compact territory we could not cut a corridor, but we told the president that if there had to be corridor, a kilometer wide, let it give the right for official access, or allow a few years for the Muslims to get over their fears, and then if later there is free movement they will be able to cross through other territories. That is where the discussion ended. We simply knew nothing more about this issue.

The biggest surprise, as far as the maps are concerned, is that we received information that we would get access to the sea, and the other surprise was Sarajevo. When we talked about Sarajevo — I have here a map, and it would be a good idea to look at it, I don't know whether it will be clear — it is a map which was... [pauses] I don't know whether this can be seen.

Here, Vogosca and Ilijas are bypassed, and there would be a corridor across parts of the municipalities of Centar and Stari Grad, and we would have the municipalities Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, Rajlovac, and we would get Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija. It would have been a territory that would fit in. This was the official map that, as a variant, we negotiated with the Americans and the Muslims. The Muslims then said as a provocation: We are giving you only Ilijas and the plateau of Nisica. And because we could not find a solution — and I want the viewers in Sarajevo to know this — the following agreement was reached: that the situation on the ground remain the same, that each municipality has its own administration, its own legislation, but there should be one body, comprising five and five [as heard], on the basis of parity, and that such a solution would mean that our municipalities would belong to the Bosnian Serb Republic. They would vote and have full legislation, and their municipalities would belong to the Federation.

The only problem then was the demilitarization of Sarajevo. We told Mr. Holbrooke that if it was an obstacle to a solution for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that we would accept this because we should not dwell on

Sarajevo, we should solve other problems and have as few contoversial issues as possible. Therefore, we said that if we have to carry out the demilitarization of Sarajevo, we should find such a model whereby the security of both populations is ensured. We explained that it is possible to achieve demilitarization within Sarajevo and the departure of the army, but the Muslim Army is along the outer borders of the Sarajevo district, in Visoko, Kiseljak, etc.

Then Holbrooke said: OK, we will solve this problem. And that was the agreement reached on Sarajevo.

As far as the map is concerned, we had been warning President Milosevic constantly for at least 15 days that we should see and be included in drawing the map. The problem was that then we had no opportunity to talk to the American representatives, because they were saying: Well, you know, we are working on the maps and we can listen to you, but we cannot tell you anything. You can only go through the delegation of the Federal Republic.

[Lalovic] President Karadzic — I apologize for interrupting — do you think that the maps, as they are, were drawn up at the insistence or according to the aspirations of the Muslim side — which had a large amount of support at the negotiations — in order to comply with their policy of reintegrating the former Bosnia-Herzegovina? So much kidney-shaped territory — or should I say uneven borders — so many salients. Has this been done deliberately or, as speaker Krajisnik said, could it not have been done in a more even way, while maintaining the same percentages?

[Karadzic] Well, you see, for the Muslim side and its reintegration plans, the constitutional papers and political papers are more important than the map itself. I must say that the Americans have done a great deal for the Muslims by saving them, over the last three and a half years, from total defeat, and that finally, in the final stage, they sided with them in an effort to help them in drawing up the map so that it is to their advantage.

As for the political documents on the reintegrational — or rather disintegrational — processes in a future Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would like to talk about it later. Now I wish to talk about the map. First, the map put forward by the Serbs, outlined here by speaker Krajisnik in red, included the River Una, upstream from Bosanska Krupa. It included all our territory except some mountains. It would have meant that Krajina would have been rounded to the south and would gain strategically important depth. This was a very honest proposal, and was slightly to the detriment of these eastern parts, but it also would have made Krajina look differently. You see how illogical this Sanski Most and Kljuc pocket here is. In other words, when it comes to the map, we are not at all satisfied with its western part. If there is an opportunity in the future to negotiate and talk, we would ask for Sanski Most and Kljuc to be returned to us. The refugees from this area have not yet been resettled, while, as speaker Krajisnik said, the refugees from Mostar have been given some kind of accommodation.

This here is purely Serb territory which has now been returned to us. However, except for Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad, it has no towns of any significance and is more important because of its forests. Half of Jajce should have been given to us. Here, Mt. Ozren is partly ours, in other words we keep what is in our hands now, but we will keep Doboj — and this is good news — and a considerable chunk of Posavina. However, these two bridgeheads spoil the solution considerably; they make it messy, and I would like to know why the Americans agreed to accept messy solutions which could result in further conflicts, and why they had to create a Middle East-like situation, fraught with the danger of frequent incidents. It would be natural for the River Sava to constitute the border and thus help to avoid further conflicts between the Serbs and Croats in that area.

This corridor here is too narrow for air traffic. You see, if we want to fly from Trebinje to Banja Luka and back, we must have our own corridor. It is very important for both our businessmen and perishable goods to have air transport. I think we shall gain this through arbitration. Of course, the Muslims are hoping to gain access to the River Sava through the same arbitration, but that would be too much. They have Orasje, and if they need a port on the Sava they can build it in Orasje.

Here, we are not satisfied, since we have been given no territory in the River Neretva valley, and when I look at the map we have lost something from every single area — of course, we have also gained something.

Looking at the Dayton agreement as a whole, we had 64 percent of territory but we have been forced by the international community to accept 49 percent. I can say that in that respect we have achieved our goal. We have achieved the goals of both our political and military struggle. We have half of Bosnia — this amounts to 46, to forty something towns, municipal centers — and we have a certain amount of good quality land. We have gained something significant in our every region, but there are some regions where we failed to achieve our goal. This refers to Krajina, to Sanski Most, Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Glamoc, Grahovo, and Srbobran. On Mt. Vlasic we lost the telecommunications relay station. We have lost a part of Mt. Ozren. We have lost two bridgeheads in Posavina and that is a nuisance, they do create an obstacle.

We have lost the Neretva River valley. We think that the issue of access to the sea will finally be resolved. It was promised to us. President Tudjman publicly took it upon himself to fulfill this obligation. In any case, he would not have been given the Dubrovnik hinterland unless he agreed to exchange it for the coastal strip near Prevlaka.

The most painful aspect is the loss of part of Bosnian Krajina and Sarajevo itself. I will talk about Sarajevo separately. I think that in both geographical and political terms, a big problem has been created here. The problem has not been resolved but rather created. And, finally, why has Gorazde not been exchanged?

As regards Sarajevo itself, never at any of the regular conferences was there any question of us not having our Sarajevo. We never accepted such a thing. This is why our delegation did not accept the maps at Dayton, but as a package we accepted peace, and we will seek a solution for Sarajevo.

You see how things stand with Sarajevo now. The Sarajevo Serbs have proved themselves to be much firmer and tougher than the world expected, both on the battlefield and in the political arena. The Americans and the international community thought they had resolved the problem by preserving a unified city, but in doing this they have in fact created a problem. They have not resolved it. The problem would have been less severe had they formed two cities and given one to the Serbs and the other to the Muslims.

You see it; Sarajevo has 130,000 to 150,000 Serbs who will never leave their homes. And the international community will have to protect them for at least five years. These Serbs will not accept Muslim police and officers there. Even now, if this accord is implemented, they will be protected by both their own police and army, and later by IFOR, and finally we will also seek international protection for all time, so to speak, until Sarajevo is resolved differently and in another way.

You see, if you recall what the U.S. solutions are like in the Middle East, you will recall that there are incident in the part of Jerusalem where Arabs and Jews live together, and it is difficult to protect this place from incidents. This is what it will be like in Sarajevo, too, because the Sarajevo Serbs are very persistent and courageous, and ultimately this area represents enormous value, which the Serbs will not give up at any price. They will honor their own flag, and will uphold the protection of the international community and the protection of Yugoslavia, and the Muslims will not be able to do anything to the Serbs. The Serbs will have their own schools, their own healthcare centers. They will have their own autonomy and self-administration, and they will always consider themselves to be a constituent part of the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Serb nation, while the Muslims will regret going for this unclear solution.

[Lalovic] I have to tell you that we have many questions from Sarajevo. And I must tell you something else. The opposing side has already begun some kind of threats; naturally, they call on the Serbs to remain, but the Serbs are told that if there is resistance, IFOR will intervene and implement the agreement, and if there is widespread resistance, Muslim units — or rather the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation — would have a green light to intervene militarily and disregard the obligation to divide up the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the 51:49 percent principle. This, as I say, is the propaganda...

[Karadzic, interrupting] And resume the war in all areas.

[Lalovic] Yes, and continue the war, and then take everything they have really wanted, namely the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I would like to ask you once again to tell the citizens of Sarajevo, who have been eagerly awaiting your response, something about the constitutional solutions for Sarajevo and about any possible new agreements which might calm the nerves of the 120,000 people who live there.

[Karadzic] Well, we are convinced that we can still negotiate, and we have asked President Milosevic this, and told him precisely what our objections are, what is unacceptable, and what our aspirations are — in other words, we want to carry on talking until Paris and in Paris itself.

What we know for sure is that the Sarajevo Serbs will remain. They might join a new reorganized Sarajevo, accede to new agreements and new negotiations — this has not been ruled out, because whatever the two sides agree will be acceptable to the Americans and others — or this might be a long political struggle. We still do not know, but we do know that the Serbs will hold out, because these Serbs have centuries-old roots here. They want to see that we will always have a Serb Sarajevo or a Serb part of Sarajevo.

One thing which the international community could perhaps do, and which would be worth doing, would be to build a completely new town for 150,000 Sarajevo Serbs — we are talking about Serb Sarajevo — but prior to this the fact is that the international community must protect the Sarajevo Serbs.

There cannot be any Muslim police or military units mingling with the Serb part of the city; this would be one of those ridiculous things which we have seen in the Middle East. You have seen the youths demonstrating — and the citizens and students who will demonstrate.

What you have in Sarajevo is a city with so much industry, so many jobs, so many young people in the army, and outside it at university, and so on. This is an already created entity. Serb Sarajevo is an entity which has already been created. It will be able to maintain itself because the international community will have to protect the Serbs there. We will demand at least five years of protection, and in the meantime we will see how all these processes develop in Bosnia. Later, we would discuss the tendencies toward the disintegration...

[Lalovic, interrupting] It is just that a group of soldiers from Ilijas are asking whether the soldiers of the Bosnian Serb Republic will have to withdraw from the territories which have already been marked out and restricted, and what will happen to their families in this case. Will the Army have to withdraw, and will this part be demilitarized now, regardless of the negotiations ahead?

[Karadzic] You see, we have here a very complicated procedure: First, there is the separation of the sides in the conflict, and then their withdrawal to new separation lines. However, in Serb Sarajevo, there are — I cannot say how many fighters the Sarajevo Corps itself has, as it is a military secret — but all the soldiers are also citizens of Sarajevo, and many of them are policemen in the Serb municipalities. In addition to them, the Serbs and their families will be guarded by the international community. The international community has become excessively involved in Sarajevo. It will have to pay the price, it will have to protect every single Serb house. There will be no possibility of anything untoward happening here. In any case, 10 years or more after the war, every Serb will be armed and there is no way of harming the Serbs in Sarajevo, as they will be under our protection, under the protection of the international community, and by their own boys and policemen, and from that viewpoint, no one should think of withdrawing.

[Lalovic] Mr. Krajisnik, has a division map been drawn up? Although the phrase undivided and single Sarajevo is constantly being used, there must be a line which defines the parts of Sarajevo which now belong to the Serbs and which will apparently remain parts of the Serb Republic.

[Krajisnik] Well, there is a great difference between Sarajevo at its narrowest and its widest point. Here on the map, I can say that the current separation line — or rather the frontline in the eastern part of Sarajevo which runs along Vojkovici-Kasindol-Lukavica — that part would belong to the Serbs, and everything else...

[Karadzic, interrupting] Would go to the Serb Republic.

[Krajisnik] Yes, the Serb Republic.

[Karadzic] Here, where the Serbs live, that also belongs to the Serbs.

[Lalovic] But, in fact, to the Croat-Muslim Federation.

[Karadzic] However, nothing will happen to these Serbs until the status of the town is changed or some other agreement is reached.

[Krajisnik] This is how it is all divided. However, I now want to go back to your question of security, and the question which the citizens of Sarajevo are rightly raising, especially the soldiers and others living in that part of Sarajevo which is in danger. You see, there will be a special regime in Sarajevo. Irrespective of how much store we laid by the need to resolve all problems, to achieve peace, and to resolve the entire issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this problem has not been resolved, but we must resolve it.

First, there must be security; second, Serb political and territorial needs must be satisfied, and under no circumstance will we agree to take any risks which might threaten the population. This is the message to our people. It must fully trust this leadership and leaderships in individual municipalities, to the effect that they will carry out steadfastly and precisely, and in a very disciplined way, all that is contained in the plan and is of vital importance. Any action taken independently and individually would be dangerous because it would result in undesirable and unforeseen effects. In other words, no one should leave this area. We will draw up a plan, come to an agreement with both the international mediators and the opposing side, and the Serbs will be given maximum protection for both their property and their rights.

[Lalovic] It follows from what you are saying that, regardless of the fact that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Muslim Leader Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, put their signatures in Dayton on a lengthy document, on a mass of documents and maps and papers, there is still a possibility that there can still be negotiations and discussion, and that some things can still be changed.

[Krajisnik] I am speaking in general terms, and I would not want anyone to have illusions about something which is unrealistic. What is realistic is that the problem of Sarajevo, and I would stress not just the problem of Sarajevo... [pauses] We have certain areas around

Gorazde which are also problematic, and we are supposed to be ceding this area to the Muslim part of the state. Second, there is the area of Vukosavlje; a delegation from Vukosavlje is coming to see us tomorrow, and we will hold talks and draw up a plan.

My message in essence would be that we must agree all this according to a plan. We must protect our interests and also not threaten the interests of those who remain in our republic. We must resolve the problems of threatened areas.

So, as I was saying, there are three particular problems — Vukosavlje, Sarajevo, and the parts around Gorazde — and from these areas we have been getting news today that the Muslims and Croats are even torching certain areas. We are forwarding this information to the international mediators. This means that they do not want a fair division but want to destroy everything behind them, so that the Serbs return to burned out homes.

[Karadzic] On the question of whether there will be future opportunities and possibilities and so on, this theory of multi-ethnicity and multi-cultures will rebound on the Muslims. They cannot exercise power over the Serbs in Sarajevo until something else is decided. The Serbs will have their own authorities, and even if there are laws which are not made by the Serb Republic but by the Croat-Muslim Federation, it is still up to the Serbs to apply them; but I am not giving up on a greater degree of autonomy and eventually fresh talks on the reorganization of Sarajevo.

Look at the map of Israel from 1947. [Video shows viewers maps of Israel] These are the kind of corridors we were afraid of at Brcko. Here is a corridor for the Israelis, here for the Arabs. This is another corridor. You see how at the beginning the territory of Israel was segmented. Later, in 1949, there was a war. By then this Arab part in black no longer exists, or this one; there is only the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Jerusalem was — you can see here — a divided city. It was in fact an Arab city.

[Krajisnik] Under the United Nations.

[Karadzic] Yes, under the United Nations in the Arab territory on the West Bank. Later, in 1949, it was divided, and then the Israelis entered and this black area was reduced. You see how much the territory increased. It was a war in which they recognized this, and this part no longer exists, this black section is no longer there. Later, Israel also occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and now the territory of Israel looks quite big. Israel granted autonomy to the area which was Arab while it still controls the Golan Heights. I want to say that such solutions which are not clear at the outset, which are not completely just, open up a long process of political struggles meant to improve the situation and to advance the situation. Sarajevo is especially like this.

The Muslims will pay a price for the fact that they did not go for clear solutions. They think that they can swallow up the Serbs. This for them will be a poisoned chalice, because the Serbs will not allow it. No one will be able or be allowed to enter the Serbs' streets and to exercise any power there. The Serbs will have their self-rule, as Holbrooke said immediately after the conference, and the regime for Sarajevo mentioned by Speaker Krajisnik will be especially worked out. Until we secede completely from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, those Serbs in united Sarajevo will continue to remain in the same country with us, and we have a right and the means to protect them.

However, I repeat that it would be much wiser for the international community to reconsider reorganizing the city in return for Gorazde, or to build a new city of Serb Sarajevo. In the meantime, our people in Sarajevo will no doubt stay put for as long as they wish. There will be no crossings or chaotic resettlement. For example, I feel sorry for the citizens of Sanski Most, who left in haste because they were attacked and their homes were set on fire. The Serbs in Sarajevo firmly held their positions, firmly hold their possessions, and that is of great value. Unlike the people of Sanski Most, whom we could not resettle in one place in order to preserve their family ties and friends. The greatest value of Serb Sarajevo does not lie in machines or buildings, but in its people.

We will not allow the Sarajevo Serbs to be scattered all over the place. The Serbs from Sarajevo will either stay in their Sarajevo and be masters in their own homes, or they will have a city built for them where they will be resettled in an organized manner, under state control and state administration, while preserving all their assets, all their possessions and property [pokretnu i nepokretnu imovinu], and that is how this problem will be solved.

[Lalovic] You had talks today with representatives of Serb Sarajevo. I presume that you succeeded in resolving and clarifying all controversial and unresolved issues that existed among you, and that they went back to their parts of town with your suggestions. I presume a great deal of political work and talks will be needed with the people of Sarajevo who, after all, do not need much persuasion to stay put, but who want to know that they have not been abandoned and forgotten. This is the message for the people of Sarajevo, is it not?

[Krajisnik] Well, I always want to speak about all the regions as one...

[Lalovic, interrupting] Yes, but let us tackle it segment by segment. Others will not object. We shall get to other regions as well.

[Krajisnik] Sarajevo is certainly the biggest problem, but the message which you think we should send to our people is that not a single part of the Serb Republic that is currently in it, and which, under the maps, will have to be ceded to the other side, will be forgotten, and we shall not simply ignore the problems that exist there. This refers to the parts of Gorazde, around Vukosavlje and Sarajevo. But what we saw today at a big meeting of presidents of municipalities, municipal executive committees of the party, and other activists — we issued certain, shall I say, preventive instructions about what should be done at the moment to avoid any spontaneous or undesirable developments. We gave them guidelines and, of course, this process must be completed, and there are a great deal of activities that can be tackled only internally and through direct contacts. Our message and attitude is that the Serbs have nowhere to go from Sarajevo, and that they neither want to nor will leave their city. They must be allowed to exercise their right there where they have lived for hundreds of years, where they have their roots, their cemeteries, and this problem must be solved. We have already taken measures to resolve this in contacts with the other side and the mediators. Of course, we want municipal authorities and other activists to take part as well.

In other words, we think that much confusion has been cleared, but there are still many problems, many questions; and this will be a lengthy process, it cannot be resolved in a day or at a meeting.

[Lalovic] I would also ask you — we shall still be discussing the territories, especially the constitutional system of our state — we have heard on several occasions that over the next few days, after you've discussed and analyzed everything, you will allegedly ask for the withdrawal of the signature which Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic put on the Dayton document. Can you please tell us about it? Such reports have been carried by the foreign media.

[Karadzic] We were deeply dissatisfied with the course of the conference and the way in which our delegation was involved. Under the agreement on a joint delegation which we signed together with Yugoslavia, we did not expect our delegation to be ignored like this. Had we wanted to do everything strictly by the book we could have asked for the full participation of all our people in the process of decisionmaking, i.e. that voting take place on every little issue.

Yesterday, we met President Milosevic and the members of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — the Yugoslav and Montenegrin presidents — our entire leadership was there. We discussed the importance of these initials. We accepted the initials, but there is still a lot to be done before the signature in Paris. Our reasoning was like this: A large number of our political goals have been achieved. A political struggle lies ahead to achieve other goals, not with arms, but with political means.

A large number of territorial goals have been achieved. Some — which we will not give up — still remain to be achieved. You have seen how the map of Israel was changing. We will not give up. While we are in the union and until something concrete happens in the sense of political separation, we will never give up our request for Sanski Most.

We have accepted peace now. This is definite. We no longer want war. We accepted that everything else should be resolved in another way. This is how it will be for the time being, but we cannot say that we will never ever ask for Sanski Most, Kljuc, etc. There will be other problems, there will be more talks, because this is a living process. In particular, we shall not give up our request for Serb Sarajevo. I am convinced that the international community will realize this mistake, that this is a divided city. It is a divided city which has seemingly remained unified.

[Lalovic] Mostar has such a status — a unified city divided into municipalities which have full autonomy.

[Karadzic] That's right. We, too, could have accepted such a solution perhaps.

[Krajisnik] There was a greater degree of independence in our proposal than with regard to Mostar.

[Karadzic] That's right. We could have had five municipalities for us and five Muslim municipalities, and the city could have functioned as a unified entity, without walls. But we know what belongs to whom. It will still be known now what belongs to whom. What is Serb belongs to the Serbs and, no one can deny it to them in this multi-ethnic Bosnia. The international community will put in enormous effort to protect the Serbs in such a divided city, which is de facto divided, but de jure undivided. It would have been better for the international community had it divided the city de jure.

[Lalovic] Zivko Ilic from Vogosca would like you to ask whether the Americans are ready to send their soldiers to die in Bosnian woods, and whether they are ready to face a new Vietnam because of the wrong policy they conducted in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can we link this question with the deployment of the forces for the implementation of the agreement and of NATO forces in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina? Has this been solved?

[Krajisnik] The countries that are sending their soldiers to join IFOR will not send their boys to die in our republic, i.e., in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in general because they will not be sent unless there is consent for approving the arrival of the forces and a friendly attitude toward the force, an understanding that they are coming in order to establish, not to impose, peace.

This was particularly worrying, the mediators were worried. General de Lapresle told us: We are terribly worried about how the implementation will progress, because we are not sure that you have accepted and that you accept the whole package, and the package contains the military agreement on the separation. We had some objections to that part of the agreement, to that annex. That annex created special problems for NATO officials who do not want to come here and find a war going on, they want to establish peace.

If you allow me to say this briefly, because I forgot to mention it earlier when we spoke about the map. We had several goals, and one of them was to compare assets and arguments. We wanted to have part of the Neretva valley where our monastery Zitomislici is. We linked the allocation of the Zitomislici monastery with the allocation of the Sveti Ivo [St. John] monastery near Jajce, and compared these two issues. This was contained in a preliminary map we suggested to the Americans. They later removed this from the agenda because of the problem of the compactness of territory. These monasteries are deep in the other side's territory. What I am trying to say is that in the beginning they respected the rule, the principle of compact territory, but later they disregarded it, and you can see how unbalanced this is.

The second thing is that the agreed principles were observed in the beginning, but with time there were more and more irregularities in the work, probably resulting from pressures, interests, and some blackmail, especially involving the sanctions.

I you allow me, I would like to add something about the issue of the signatures we have just discussed. President Karadzic explained how we accepted the agreement. I would like to say why we did not initial that document. That was not my unilateral decision, but a decision reached by our part of the delegation.

The agreement with President Milosevic, reached in the presence of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle, was misused in the beginning. It was written in an official document: According to the agreement reached with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the presence of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle, the FRY was authorized to represent the interests of the Serb Republic. This is not true. We were authorized to sign the deal, which also clearly means that we — and not President Milosevic — had to initial the document.

So, why did we not initial it? We disagreed with only two annexes: with the maps and the military document. We wanted to initial the military document because there was a vote: three for, three against, and then President Milosevic used his right of veto and we voted in favor of it.

But the maps were a problem. Not because of Sarajevo or Vukosavlje or any other area; perhaps we could have agreed to all that. But I want to say this one thing for the benefit of our public: These maps were not made available to us, we only saw them two hours after President Clinton had announced that the agreement was reached. Two hours after the announcement and some 40 minutes before the ceremony, someone brought us the map on a piece of paper like this one. When we saw the map we were surprised to see how the territory was divided, and to see some points we had clearly said were impossible to accept.

There is another important point, of which I am convinced and I would like our people to know it: We could have achieved much better results. The Muslims themselves were surprised with the maps and the success they achieved. I hold this against a part of the Yugoslav delegation which disregarded even some precise points. We suffered immeasurable damage because of one millimeter of line here or there. They accepted everything, probably because they were cornered by blackmail that the talks would be suspended and the sanctions would not be eased.

Only because of this, because we did not work according to the rules, because we did not vote and decide together, because we could not participate — and we certainly know more about it — we were against the map at the end.

I have a map of Sarajevo from 1993 when the Muslims agreed to give us part of Sarajevo, part of Hrasnica. We got the whole airport and Butmir and Sokolovic Kolonija. Let me show you here. We know what the Muslims agreed to then, what was possible. This is why I have to pay homage — despite the fact that we are enemies — to the Muslim side, which deftly took the advantage of this with our mediators.

Look at this map if you can see it. Here are the parts they would take: not Ilijas and Vogosca, but parts of Rajlovac, Ilidza, Sokolovic Kolonija, Hrasnica, and so on.

[Karadzic] They did not take that. They gave it to the Serbs.

[Krajisnik] That was allocated to the Serbs, and we would have had a considerable part of the territory. We discussed this map with Mr. Owen at the time, but we did not accept it.

[Karadzic] Muslims suggested all this, but we did not agree.

[Krajisnik] I remember, Mr. Filipovic attended the talks at the time. There was Mr. Komsic, too, and so on.

Now they wanted to present a united city. We made a compromise and reached an agreement on Sarajevo. That is why this is a problem.

As for Gorazde, we even told the mediators: We will exchange Gorazde for one of [Sarajevo's] satellite districts, the Muslims can choose which one. I know that would have been painful. We would have perhaps lost part of Grbavica or Ilijas, but in exchange we would have obtained compact territory. As it is this, I must say that everything was done in order to achieve a planned result at any cost. Our delegation unanimously refused to sign the maps and the package, and we did not attend the ceremony.

That was not a sign that we rejected the peace agreement, but a sign of warning and the rejection of the methods of work and the unjust solution. No one has the right not to try to regain purely and truly Serb areas. These areas must become the focus of the problem. No one has the right to sign if they could have fought for them, if the return of refugees could have been ensured; all the more so since there had been some principles which were to our advantage.

The Americans said: The recently captured territory will be given back in order to enable the refugees to return. That was a principle that could have been realized. Mr. Bildt said: We cannot divide Sarajevo, but there is the problem of 120,000 Serbs. We have to make compromises, study the problem and find solutions.

To deny people their rights in this way, to give Vukosavlje to Tudjman — as though it was a match or a box of cigarettes — only because he threatened to walk out of the talks, that is really unacceptable.

[Lalovic] A viewer from Ilijas asks you whether the fact that the Serb Republic institutions were in Pale and not in Serb Sarajevo had an impact on such a settlement in Dayton. After that, let us return to numerous questions on whether, where, and how NATO will implement force in the possible implementation of the agreement. Let's return to the question of where NATO troops will be deployed.

[Karadzic] Pale had opted to remove its administration out of the city of Sarajevo earlier on, by the decision of the Pale municipal assembly. The international community's perpetual slogan was "Undivided Sarajevo." Had Pale remained part of the city of Sarajevo there might have been attempts to give part of Pale to Sarajevo. This was crucial. I think that for us this was all the more surprising, since this settlement had never and under no circumstances been considered. There should have either been several municipalities, like in Brussels or Mostar, and everyone would know what belongs to which nationality, while the city could have functioned as an entity. You cannot just suspend the deliveries of gas, water, etc. And culture would have certainly thrived in the city, as reintegrationists are hoping for, after a certain period of time, when all the hatred and wounds are forgotten.

The surprise is all the greater because the slogan of an undivided city has now been implemented in such a way as not to give the Serb Republic its own property, its own territory in the city of Sarajevo itself.

The Muslim side has been expecting and hoping for such an outcome, under the pretext that the Serbs would leave Sarajevo, as they had left Sanski Most. But this is a completely new, completely different situation. The Serbs will not leave Sarajevo. They have considerable property there — their institutions and their own university, which will remain theirs, and the international community is obliged to ensure the safety of the Serbs in Sarajevo. The Muslims will regret this. I am not sure if the Muslims might not turn up with a request to reorganize Sarajevo into two cities, so they could be at peace. As things are now, they will not be able to enter or mess around in Serb districts. The Americans know this from examples in the Middle East. That's why I am astonished. Had we had more opportunities of cooperating with Mr. Holbrooke, whether Mr. Krajisnik or I, we could have pointed out to him similar settlements in the Middle East, which were not good. It is much better to go for clear-cut solutions, clear-cut divisions than these mixed solutions which will cost the international community an awful lot. It will have to protect the Serbs, or else the Serbs will protect themselves and the Muslims will have to realize what this entails.

[Lalovic] We had to rely on foreign agency reports, because we unfortunately did not have our reporter there. SRNA's reporter was there but she did not have access to certain details. We heard that on the last day, Islamic and Arab states tried to blackmail the United States and the Contact Group members regarding arms imports and oil exports. Is this true, or is it just guesswork? Under whose pressure was this solution for Sarajevo reached? Is this true?

[Krajisnik] I have to say that sanctions were the only factor of blackmail as far as our delegation was concerned. Everything else is far [words indistinct]. Unfortunately, we were not aware of the importance of that factor even though we partly understood it. At the end we could see that the Muslims even got U.S. Secretary of State Christopher to take up their cause over certain minor issues. At one point we had something resembling a theater. The Muslims said that they would break off the talks, and they even announced it. Some members of our delegation were afraid that the talks would be discontinued and imperiled. This was probably blackmail, and it was so effective that we suffered considerable territorial losses.

[Lalovic] Let us go back to the question of the deployment of forces for the implementation of the agreement and NATO forces. There is a lot of guesswork regarding their deployment — will they be deployed along the separation lines or in the territory, or, which is also very important and is being announced, along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on a much larger scale than could previously be imagined?

[Krajisnik] The basic problem is linked with the deployment of NATO forces. This was our decision and we wanted the forces to be deployed with the forces on both sides of the agreed separation lines. We did not discuss the present front lines. According to the agreement, the forces will be initially deployed along the present front lines 30 days after the agreement. The [warring sides'] forces will then have about 45 days to withdraw to agreed demarcation lines, and then NATO forces will be deployed along the agreed demarcation lines. The side which is allocated a certain area will not be able to set up its authorities in the area for about three months. I am talking about authorities, not forces.

Sarajevo is a completely different problem; a special regime must be agreed upon. Three areas have a special status — the areas of Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Brcko. Brcko is another story. Arbitration is envisaged, and then we will see whether we will get 20 km, whether the Muslims will get access to the river Sava, or whether the situation on the ground will remain the same if we cannot reach an agreement. Before the talks we were promised, particularly by Mr. Bildt, that we would get a 20-km wide corridor, but now it is obvious that we did not even get that, because someone was in a hurry to sign the agreement and did not insist on the previously agreed principles.

[Lalovic] Who will arbitrate on Brcko? We have heard the possibility of having one representative from the Serb Republic, one from the Croat-Muslim federation, and one chosen by both sides. If they cannot agree, they will take their case to a court of arbitration, and if they fail to reach an agreement there too, the current solution will remain. What does that mean? Are we sure that the court of arbitration would give us a realistic assessment of the situation?

[Krajisnik] Brcko is the best example to express a doubt I have. We were not at all informed about the problem of Brcko. No one even told us that such a possibility could be considered. We were surprised when we read in a newspaper that problems had arisen concerning Brcko. That happened during the night when there were threats to break off the talks, and questions as to whether the sanctions would be lifted.

What we learned later was that there would be a three-member arbitration team: one person from the Serb Republic, one from the federation, and the third would be appointed by the two sides to decide within one year how the problem of Brcko should be solved. We demanded 20 km, and the Muslims demanded that it should only be a corridor, while they should be given Brcko.

[Karadzic] Or part of Brcko.

[Krajisnik] Yes, or part of it. Anyway, according to what has been agreed, the worst option is if the situation remains as it is now.

[Lalovic] Mr. Karadzic, in the beginning, when I first asked you to comment on the situation, you said that the constitutional principles contained solutions which could satisfy the Serb Republic. They state that the Serb Republic is a fact which cannot be ignored by the world. There is only a small step toward international recognition, which is a political path we will pursue later. Can you tell our viewers what we obtained in the constitutional principles, what is positive and what will enable the Serb Republic to function as a modern state which will be part of the union — temporarily, we hope and believe — but which will also be a state with all its prerogatives?

[Karadzic] You see, the Serb Republic has not been recognized as an independent state, but it is internationally recognized, or rather, internationally accepted. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not exist except as an over-arching structure over the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Serb Republic. Bosnia-Herzegovina ceased to exist as a republic. It simply no longer exists. There are two entities which form Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two entities are completely equal, even in territorial terms they are almost equal — the difference is two percent, 51 per cent to 49 percent — and the Serb Republic has all the functions which the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation has.

So we will have citizenship in the Serb Republic, and through that citizenship we are also citizens of the union. We will issue passports. We have our own sovereign powers, the assembly, a government chosen by the assembly, a president elected by the people. We will have our members in joint bodies. The Muslims suggested that these members should be elected from the whole territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that they themselves could decide which Serbs will go to the joint bodies.

No more [Mirko] Pejanovic! People like Pejanovic can be elected only by Muslims or Croats in the Muslim-Croat federation. They can be part of their delegation in the assembly. Pejanovic, [Miro] Lazovic and all those people can no longer represent Serbs, and Serbs will not vote for them, not even the Serbs who will live in the Croat-Muslim federation, or rather the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, temporarily or for a longer period of time.

We also have all other attributes of statehood, much more so than the republics such as, for example, Slovenia, under the 1974 constitution. We will fight to have two sections in embassies, as Belgium has. Sports, for example, are under the competencies of the republics, i.e., the Federation and the Serb Republic, as it is organized in Scotland.

[Lalovic] We will have our national teams, like Wales and Scotland?

[Karadzic] Yes, we will have our national teams and we will be members of sports organizations. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have its own national team. They probably opted for that name to save the name and its heritage.

There will be a central bank, which will not make a primary issue of money during the first six years, and will not give loans. In these six years it will be a currency board. [preceding sentence in English]. This is in effect a board for the currency [preceding phrase in English], which will be our link with international institutions, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank [words indistinct]. The Croats themselves will retain their kuna.

[Lalovic] That's precisely what I was going to ask you. When the Muslims and Croats signed the document on strengthening the federation, a clear distinction was made between the functions which would be carried out by the Federation and those by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There has not been any currency or joint currency before, only a joint unit of account. What we now have is a joint currency at the level of the future union.

[Karadzic] We don't think it will be a joint currency, because if we don't accept it there will be no currency. The monetary policy does not only mean the first money issue, it also means the coordination of currencies, deciding about the unit of account and similar problems which need to be organized in every union — customs, trade, monetary, or any other union. There must be specially assigned bodies which will coordinate everything. The Croats and Muslims decided to have the German mark as their unit of account. We could join them in this.

[Lalovic] We have our own currency. The Croats have theirs. But the unit of account is uniform. When I say our currency, I refer to the currency of the FRY.

[Karadzic] We can adopt the German currency, or anyone else's. Most likely though, we will keep the currency of the FRY, as we have been very disciplined with regard to [Yugoslav National Bank Governor] Avramovic's program. In a word, there will be a lot of political struggle and political work in which the Serb and Croat interests are almost identical. The Muslims will have to accept the reality that Bosnia-Herzegovina, the one they knew and wanted, has vanished. It is an impossibility. I don't know what they are regretting. In their kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina there would be constant quarrels with two against the third one. In that case the Serbs and Croats would most certainly be against the Muslims, as the Muslims wish to dominate. In this way the Muslims have gained their Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Lalovic] For a long time the numbers of representatives in the future assembly, government, and presidency of the union have been uncertain. First there were going to be nine representatives in the presidency, now we hear there will be three. The assembly will be bicameral. There will be a joint government, as well as separate governments. What are the rights of the states in the union if they are not satisfied with a certain decision and want to veto it, or if they do not want to implement certain agreements which the union has reached?

[Karadzic] I would like Mr. Krajisnik to answer that question. I will just say that our request to have three rather than nine members [of the presidency] was accepted. The Muslims are very skillful in manipulating large numbers.

[Lalovic] I must ask you this. If there are two republics in the union, how come there are three members?

[Karadzic] You are right. There is a mixture of territorial and ethnic principles.

[Krajisnik] You spoke about the national bank a minute ago. We clarified the provision concerning the bank with experts, and we realized that the first part of that provision contradicts the second part. This means that these issues will have to be defined separately in the joint assembly, wherein there will be a mechanism ensuring the functioning of the assembly and another mechanism preventing outvoting.

What they agreed upon at the federation level is completely at odds with what they wanted to push through at the union level. There were certain pressures to accept a solution which will later be fully defined.

You asked how the assembly, the presidency, and the ministerial council will function. There will be a certain number of ministers in the ministerial council; at the moment there are two or three. There will also be a president of that ministerial council, of those ministers, but they will not form a government in the true sense of the word, as the Muslims wanted. There is a certain mechanism whereby every member of the presidency, one from one republic and two from the other republic... [changes thought]

Why are there three of them? They mixed up two principles: The principle of nations and the principle of entities. They put in the third member in order to satisfy Croat interests. In principle, we did not want to dispute this because we believe that the nations have to be equal. We have nothing against that as long as there is a mechanism which prevents outvoting and the imposition of the will and power of one nation on another.

In the presidency itself decisions will be made by consensus. If an issue cannot be agreed upon by consensus, and the decision on it is reached by outvoting, the member of the presidency who is against the decision has the right to put the issue to the vote of the assembly of his own entity. If the assembly supports the presidency member by a two-thirds majority, that decision will not be binding.

[Krajisnik] As for the assembly, we are not against.... I would like to say one thing for the sake of the truth, and I told the Muslim representatives this too: We were against the union. We believe that the logical course of events would have been to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. The outcome would have been more just and clearer. But we accepted the union as a compromise. They caused problems later on because they wanted it to be called a union, then even a republic. Eventually we called it only Bosnia-Herzegovina, without describing it as a union, a republic, or anything else. It is simply called Bosnia-Herzegovina. The paradox is that it is called Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then there is the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, too. They created this mixture, which does not seem to exist anywhere in the world.

We wanted the assembly to deal with the few functions we agreed should fall under the competences of the union. These functions will keep the two entities together until we agree whether we will go completely separate ways or whether we will tighten the links if all goes well. In any event, the current tendency is toward a separation because we are at war and we are enemies now.

We suggested that we should make possible the operation of the functions we agreed upon at the level of the union. But we are against imposing as many functions as possible. The Muslims wanted to place as many functions as possible under the competences of the union in order to give a state that is not a state the semblance of a state. This in fact was proof that they still wanted to continue what they used to do before the war: The outvoting of Serbs, the impositions of their will.

We approved the following principle: At least one third of deputies from the assembly of each entity in the joint chamber must vote in favor of any decision. There are three times five members delegated from the two entities' assemblies into the joint assembly. That is the so-called first chamber. One third of our delegates, two of them, would have to vote in favor of any decision for it to be approved.

There are some other issues that have to be voted against by two-thirds of our representatives from both chambers in order to overrule a decision. In any event, if any decision is so much against our interests, we will have a mechanism of overruling it without being outvoted in any way.

Our aim is not to play the role of Stipe Mesic and raise obstacles even in those few functions under the competence of the union, because that is a real drudgery. We will have some joint functions — communications and I do not know what else — and that is normal. Everything else that happens later, in the economy and in our relations, will be regulated by life itself — we will either establish good relations, or links with a wider union, with Serbia or someone else, or we will fall apart completely. The basic principle and the basic Serb right that we achieved is that we cannot live in the union under the conditions that existed before the war: That someone should impose their will upon us, that both Croat and Muslim delegations should vote against us, that we cannot exercise our rights even if we are 100 percent right, 100 percent in line with the law, 100 percent in line with the Constitution.

[Karadzic] You mentioned it, and many people wonder about what will happen in the future — whether the split will be wider or whether the gap will become narrower. We had already demanded that the Muslims should sign a document, a declaration on the right to leave the union, and it was signed. That signature is for good, and we have the right to leave. Our message was that no one would get married if he knew that he could not get divorced. On the other hand, most people do not get divorced. All I want to know is that divorce is possible, I do not have to get divorced, and I will not. Therefore, in this marriage of ours we will stay in the union as long as we have a good time. The more we are separated from each other, the longer we will stay together. The English have a good saying — a good fence makes good friends or neighbors. We first completed a part of our task by political means. Then we had to resort to military means because they were imposed on us. In normal circumstances the next stage would lead us to further integration and unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state. However, in the present circumstances we are on a path toward further disintegration or further independence of the entities, so that everything could function. As Tito used to say: Let the federation federate, and then they adopted the 1974 Constitution [decentralizing Yugoslavia].

Certain pro-civic and left-wing circles would like a strong Bosnia-Herzegovina again. However, 95 percent of the Serb people are against it. We did our part, and the natural course of events will either leave us where we are now or bring about a complete separation. One must also remember that the Croats also have a great interest in uniting the federation with Croatia. What we have achieved is the fact that the road now leads to further independence. I do not want to speak of disintegration because there we will be a process of integration, in the economy for example. However, as far as state matters are concerned there will be no more integration. Things will go in the other direction, as in Belgium, for example, between Flanders and Wallonia.

Many say that we have a pretext now for a peaceful divorce, as with the Czech-Slovak one. Maybe we will reach this stage soon, maybe not. Everything depends on our position in the union. If our position is good, we can stay in it for a while, but at the same time we must strengthen our links with Serbia. The Serbs will never lose sight of this goal, and it would not be good if we severed the link with Serbia for a longer period. I must remind you that it is easy to create nations within one people. Macedonians [FYROM] and Muslims used to be Serbs, and I can also mention certain Montenegrins who believe that they are not Serbs. Russians produced Ukrainians, Ukraine means Russian Krajina. Ukraine spent a rather long period outside Russia, and it suddenly became a nation. I like Bosnian Krajina and people from Krajina, but I do not like it when people give advantage to their regional identity over Serbdom. Otherwise we could end up as a separate nation, and we are too small to survive. We would be devoured and destroyed as a separate nation.

[Karadzic] That is why Serbdom is our only chance. All those who have become marginalized, who have lost their ties with the mother country, which is the center of all the cultural and economic life, etc., all those who entered the shallow waters, faded away. Macedonia [FYROM] is in great difficulties. Montenegro is certainly holding on, but one part has entered the shallow waters. The Muslims, as you can see, have acquired their own rulers, if I may say so — the Croats. The Muslim viewers and Muslim people must not deceive themselves. They have lost. Had they stuck with the Serbs, even as a separate ethnic group or a separate nationality, they would have been much better off. They have cut themselves off from the Serbs, opposed the Serbs, fought against them. Now they deserve the Croats. They deserve the Croats, and they will get what they deserve. This is definitely the beginning of the extinction of the Muslim nation. We said it in the assembly, although we were quoting one of their politicians who begged me not to quote him any more — it was Tunjo Filipovic — as every time I quote him the Muslims curse him.

They had told me at the time — Filipovic said — if we continue with this policy of seceding from Yugoslavia and dividing Bosnia, the Muslims will vanish.

[Lalovic] Let us go back to our viewers. Slobodan from [placename indistinct] asks what is happening with Yugoslav sanctions against us, now that the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have been lifted.

[Karadzic] Sanctions had been in the foreground, the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the sanctions imposed on the Serb Republic, as envisaged by a separate resolution, have a different dimension. Once our forces are redeployed along the separation lines the sanctions will be lifted, but certain additional conditions will have to be set in connection with the two pilots whose planes had been shot down over Pale, and such matters. What I want to say is that our sanctions are not at the same level and are not treated in the same way as those against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and we are still under sanctions, if I can say so.

There will be no other voting on the lifting of the sanctions. It will be sufficient to report to the chairman of the UN Security Council that the forces have been deployed along the separation lines, and that the Serbs have fulfilled their conditions. The voting on the sanctions has already taken place; we are just waiting for this condition to be met.

Christiane Amanpour [CNN correspondent] reported from Sarajevo on Izetbegovic saying he was in favor of the Serbs staying in Serb Sarajevo, on condition they were not members of the Serb Army. He is not the one to set conditions. An army is an army. We were all in the army. This will cost the international community an awful lot — to protect the Serbs. We will of course protect them if no one else does. But the international community will have to protect them. Therefore, we will have to define many things before the signing in Paris. The real signing is in Paris. Everything so far is just initials. The real signing is in Paris, and I think we will have to insist that both Gen. Mladic and I go to Paris. There is no longer any sense...

[Lalovic, interrupting] Dragan from Grbavica asks precisely that question: Who will give the final signature on behalf of the Serb Republic?

[Karadzic] According to the Constitution, the Serb Republic is represented by the president of the republic. He can of course delegate someone else. I authorized Mr. Krajisnik to take part in the conference, vote, reach decisions, and also initial the document on behalf of our delegation. He had the presidential authorization. The president of the assembly holds a high position in the hierarchy. However, an increasing number of our people are demanding that the original delegation, which had been appointed in keeping with the agreement with Yugoslavia, i.e. Assembly President Krajisnik, Gen. Mladic, and I should go to Paris.

[Lalovic] Viewers would like to know why you made no public appearance in the past few days. Did you want to wait for the final results? Did you wait to hear in talks with President Milosevic whether any changes to the agreement initialled in Dayton were possible? Also, the citizens of Grbavica are sending their regards and telling you that they will defend Serb Sarajevo to the last man and stay there.

[Karadzic] We made no public appearance because the situation was not clear. We did not know what to tell the people, and the people must be told the truth. Of course, we were angry, too. We were angry about all the points from Sanski Most via Sarajevo to the Neretva [river] valley. In the talks with President Milosevic, I congratulated both him and our delegation on their achievements, but we had to tell him that we were dissatisfied with the things we were dissatisfied with. This is why we wanted to clear it out.

Of course, this is a continuing process, and the Muslims or the Croats might change their stances at any moment, and some things could perhaps be solved in a different way. The international community is now a guarantor of all this, the guarantor of the survival of Serb Sarajevo, and we will hold the international community responsible for its commitment.

The possibility of us building a completely new city is not ruled out. For example, the international community could protect the Serbs in Sarajevo for five years, and then if they want to cross over — either everyone will cross over or no one will. This is the most important thing for the Serbs in Sarajevo: either everyone, or no one. The best solution would be if no one did. We should stay where we are, the masters in our own home, and then we will make new deals with the international community.

[Lalovic] A viewer from Ilijas wants to know whether the constitutional arrangements give the Serb Republic the option of joining the Republic of Serbia.

[Krajisnik] Special arrangements are in place, there will be special links. I would like to answer this question by quoting a comment by a senior representative of the Muslim delegation. He said: What do you want now? You have full control, we have no control over you. You can do whatever you want in your state. There is one small umbrella giving us at least an illusion of having a state.

What I want to say is that the Muslim leadership is at the moment in a trance of jubilation over having obtained Sarajevo, and they think that they have obtained a state, too. But the Serbs are not satisfied with this solution because it was forced through under tremendous pressure and against the will of the Serb people in the Serb Republic. Part of our ethnic territories has not been given back to us. As long as there is so much dissatisfaction among the Serbs, they [Muslims] cannot persuade the Serbs to share a state with them.

I do not want to make any predictions, but I believe that after this first wave of jubilation among the Muslims — when they hold a referendum — it will perhaps be the Muslims themselves who will reject the plan because they have gained the least from it.

I will explain this: Out of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina they got only a half to share with the Croats. The territory they have makes no real state, and even that they have to share in the federation in which they have equal rights with the Croats. They have split the power completely with the Croats.

I cannot understand why they did not approach the issue from a different position. I was afraid lest the

Muslims could change their policy. If they had set off from the starting point of equality, respect, consensus and acceptance of different opinion, I would have been afraid, because our people welcome everyone as a brother when they are treated as equals. But not now, after everything we saw at the talks, all their attempts to change any little issue because they considered it to be all important.

The Muslims say: We do not want you to be able to secede. But they cannot prevent us from doing that. If we want to secede, there is always the declaration we can fall back on. But, after all, why should we want to secede if the union functions well. On the other hand, why should we stay in the union if we are not happy in it. People cannot stay married if they are not happy, even if they were married in church, let alone stay in a union based on such loose links. The situation on the international scene is what it is today, but tomorrow it could change. This is certainly no guarantee of a state if we fail to establish good relations between us.

[Lalovic] Who manages the industrial facilities in Serb Sarajevo?

[Karadzic] The Serbs, of course.

[Lalovic]] Let us repeat, the viewers probably did not hear it right. What citizenship do we hold?

[Krajisnik] Our citizenship is specific. It is the citizenship of the Serb Republic and of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We insisted on a possibility of a triple citizenship. The entities in the union are in charge of issuing passports. One passport is issued by the federation and the other one by the Serb Republic. Those not wanting to have their passport issued by either of the two entities can have it issue by Bosnia-Herzegovina [union].

There are three levels at which passports can be issued.

[Karadzic] The third one can be Herzeg-Bosnia, as the Croats will have their coat of arms on their own passport. The name of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be inscribed in small letters somewhere on top, but the main name on the passport will be that of Herzeg-Bosnia and the passport will feature the Croat coat of arms. Furthermore, all Croats now hold Croatian citizenship...

[Krajisnik, interrupting] ...and everyone will have the right to be the citizen of Yugoslavia or Croatia.

[Lalovic] That is what I wanted to ask. All Croats have dual citizenship. Croats from former Bosnia-Herzegovina have Croatian citizenship. They took part in recent elections in Croatia. They have the absolute right to form special links with Croatia.

[Krajisnik] It is all in the economy and in the interests. If the Serbs from the Serb Republic do not want to be the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina no one will ever be able to force them. What is particularly problematic is the approach that everything has to be imposed in an impermissible way, which has never been implemented in practice.

[Lalovic] Many viewers from Hadzici, Ilijas, Ilidza, and all parts of Serb Sarajevo are saying they will not move out and they will fight to the last for Serb Sarajevo. Above all by political means, but some soldiers who phoned said they were not opposed to a new military involvement, if necessary. The Sarajevans are therefore prepared to defend themselves. Unfortunately, we have to tell the viewers that our telecommunications have been cut off since NATO shelling. We believe we would have had the same questions and reactions from the whole of the republic. Some of them will unfortunately have to watch this program at a later stage.

[Karadzic] On the whole we forget that we are usually on the spot when there is a crisis or drama. When we had a drama in Krajina we were there all the time. When we had attacks elsewhere we went to Herzegovina, Majevica, etc. Likewise, Serb Sarajevo will be the concern of all Serbhood, not just the leaders or the Sarajevo-Romania operation zone or eastern Herzegovina. Sarajevo is a very important point on the Balkan map, and we want to protect our rights here. The Sarajevans should not worry. They have become the concern of the entire Serbdom and the international community, which wanted to have such a settlement. It will now see how much it will cost to maintain such a situation. Only if the international community were to build us a pretty modern town would we leave Sarajevo. Otherwise, we will not leave. No Serb will leave Sarajevo, and that is his absolute right.

Izetbegovic must know that he will not be able to threaten the Serbs there. They will simply not let their [Muslim] policemen in. No one will have access.

Even under the current agreement, no Muslim official or policeman will be allowed to enter it for five months. Furthermore, we will reach a deal with the international community extending this period to at least five years, perhaps even longer, unless Izetbegovic understands that it is better for him to create two cities and release the Serbs. If not, this will be a very weak spot in his federation, a spot that will pose a threat to his sovereignty. I believe that we will find a solution much before the end of that period.

One thing is clear. So far we have lost territories only militarily. People fled carrying only bundles, leaving all their property behind, and dispersed all over the place. I would have been happier if we could have gathered the residents of Sanski Most in one place, to avoid severing business links and friendships.

Our greatest asset in Sarajevo is not property, but the residents of Sarajevo, the Serbs who have over centuries developed a special mentality within Serbhood. They demonstrated their political and military tenacity, which equals that of the Serbs from Krajina, Herzegovina, and Romania. They will stay here and preserve Serb Sarajevo. If they are offered a better option, they will — but only all together, in an organized fashion, with all their belongings, and after having received compensation — move to a new city that would be built somewhere in the area. But this is a long way off. What is important is that we know that the international community has brokered a solution that will cost it dearly.

[Krajisnik] I would like to add something to this. I have often heard, even on Muslim television, that a Serb politician allegedly said: You held out in your Sarajevo over three and a half years of shelling; this entitles you to have Sarajevo.

[Karadzic] I think that [Haris] Silajdzic invented this. President Milosevic allegedly said: You deserve Sarajevo because you went out of it through the tunnel. President Milosevic would never say that the Muslims deserve the whole of Sarajevo.

[Krajisnik] Yes, but I wanted to say something else. Even if this was true, and I do not believe that it is, the Muslims stayed in Sarajevo because they could not have gotten out, whereas all Serbs could have left Hadzici, Ilijas, Nedjarici, Rajlovac, and Ilidza, but they did not. They are the true fighters.

During these talks, I often heard various places being described as Croat and Muslim symbols: Teocak, Orasje, and so on. Ilijas, Vogosca, Hadzici, Ilidza, Nedjarici, Rajlovac, Dobrinja, Vojkovici, and so on, are our symbols. But perhaps we put too much stress on the areas from which people have to move out. It is no less painful that our people could not return to Sanski Most and Kljuc. These places contain our history. Take a place such as Sanski Most — which was lost in an unjust way, after heavy overnight shelling — where 5,000 young Serbs died in one day during the World War II. Someone now claims the right to these ethnically Serb areas of Kozara, Grmec, and so on. They claim that these places belong to Croats on the basis of some figures.

[Karadzic] Figures established by such criminal methods.

[Krajisnik] With Serbs it is not numbers that matter. But, in the end, we can even accept the imposed solution, because the historic circumstances force us to accept it, but later generations have the right to contest the solutions reached under pressure and injustice. No one has the right to give away our ethnic areas.

When they said that the whole of eastern Bosnia was Muslim territory, we did not dispute that there are areas where Muslims are in majority. But more Serbs remained in Muslim Sarajevo, and in Zenica and Tuzla, than there were Muslims in the whole of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we go by numbers, we have to take into account both sides' numbers.

I would never like to see an unjust solution, even if it was to the benefit of the Serbs. There is no solution unless the solution is just. But injustice cannot be tolerated only because one nation is threatened. There has been so much injustice at these talks, at which huge stress was placed on the Muslim factor, but only because of the current international climate.

My message to Serb fighters and the citizens of Sarajevo and other areas is: Serbdom and the Serb Republic will share the suffering of these people. This leadership will stand up to protect the people. Our delegation refused to sign the peace deal. This will go down in the history books as proof that no one had the right to sign such an unjust agreement. However, we will perhaps accept this solution because the large majority of our people in the Serb Republic will be happy, and their happiness will ensure that on average we will all be happy.

[Lalovic] The Vukadin family from Pale want to know what will happen to the Serbs who have so far lived in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, and who we consider to be the prisoners of Muslim Sarajevo. Will this agreement open the door of that part of Sarajevo for the Serbs who have wished to leave, but were prevented, over the past three and a half years?

[Karadzic] I believe that they will cross over to the Serb part of Sarajevo, which will be protected until its final fate is resolved. Or perhaps they will cross over to the remaining parts of Sarajevo. [sentence as heard] Pale will develop very fast. We would like to preserve the concentration of intelligentsia. As I said, it is not buildings and streets but people that make a city. Sarajevo Serbs are precious to us, and I think they will come out.

I have just remembered all the numerous stories alleging that Prijedor, Novi Grad, or Banja Luka have been sold out. Do you remember the maps that circulated, showing that Banja Luka was exchanged for Tuzla? We bent backwards trying to convince our people not to believe these stories, trying to explain to them that nothing had been sold out, nothing had been agreed. If we had managed to keep control of Sanski Most and Kljuc in military terms, no one would have taken them from us now.

So, as speaker Krajisnik said: We accepted peace, we accepted the peace deal, but we have the right to contest many issues and demand that they be solved by political means. We have renounced military methods, but we will always seek a way to regain the Serb areas in Krajina. India and Pakistan have never managed to resolve the issue of Kashmir. Of course, the issue of Serb Sarajevo will be dealt with more speedily because there will be a greater intensity of life, and the international community will have to deal with it.

[Lalovic] Let us address another issue from the peace package: the issue of war criminals. Zoran from Pale sends his regards to you, Mr. Karadzic. He would like to know whether you will run for president of the Serb Republic in the next elections.

[Karadzic] It is too early to speak about that. You know that in 1990 I did not run for any office. I was and remained only the chairman of the party. I became a member of the presidency and the president only when the war broke out.

I was always far removed from the authorities. All of my colleagues were dissidents. In peacetime I could not imagine being a politician, although I do honor that profession. But it was inconceivable to me to carry a briefcase and go to the office. I really loved, and still love, my own profession. But the impending drama after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, threatening a massacre, a genocide, against the Serbs forced us all to go into politics.

It is too early to speak about it now. Of course, we will make completely independent decisions about which one of us will go where. We must find a good candidate for the presidency of the union, an incorruptible man. The Muslims are counting on wheeling and dealing. If their proposal to have ten members in the presidency had been accepted, that would have been a big problem. That would have required the vote of two of our representatives to veto any decision, which would increase the chances of behind-the-scene deals. In the same way, we have to put forward exceptionally loyal men as candidates for the lower chamber of the union's parliament, which will consist of 15 people. The five people delegated by our assembly to the council of people [vijece naroda] will be able to do everything. Any decision must go through both councils. This is an excellent system devised to prevent outvoting.

We will see. As a sovereign nation we will decide who will run for office and who will not. These are our rights. No one has the right to appoint the commander of our army. This is a prerogative of the president of our republic. So Mladic will stay in that position, and no one can replace him.

[Lalovic] There have been many stories about the International Tribunal in the Hague and the pressures on the Serb Republic and the Serb negotiating delegation, with the blackmail from The Hague and other centers in the world which did not monitor events in the former Yugoslavia objectively. They mounted a terrible campaign against you and the chief of the general staff as the people who will be treated as alleged war criminals in The Hague. That put a tremendous pressure on the Serb people and the Serb leaders. From the very first day we considered the tribunal in the Hague invalid. We have not acknowledged its stances.

[Karadzic] It is a discriminatory and political instrument, not a legal one.

[Lalovic] It was set up only to try the Serbs. Everyone is keen to know whether you will stay with us until the definitive solution, whether you will stay in Serb Sarajevo, and whether you will continue to fight with us as before. The same question for both of you, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, from a great number of viewers.

[Krajisnik] Well, we told party chairmen and presidents of municipalities and executive committees that we shall stay with our people, and that we shall stay with Serb Sarajevo and share our people's destiny.

With regard to the first part of the question which is aimed at disqualifying our senior state officials, I think that the intention was to try only the Serbs, but it seems now that these judges got out of control and started indicting the other two sides. Our partners in these negotiations got upset, thinking this was reserved only for the Serbs. I fear that first charges were fabricated, and it is only now that real criminals have been indicted. In any case, we have always been in favor of all criminals being prosecuted; we have to try them, we have to establish facts. We do not wish to be a criminal state. But you cannot try the entire nation.

This cannot be used for political ends. When we arrived in Dayton, our hosts afforded us a really unpleasant welcome. On the front pages of some newspapers even President Milosevic and the Serbian leadership were accused. This all amounted to pressure in order to come to some solution.

[Lalovic] The people will elect their representatives...

[Karadzic, interrupting, addressing Krajisnik] You have to say where you are going to live.

[Lalovic] Are you going to live in Rajlovac with your family?

[Krajisnik] Yes, let me just explain. My mother, father, and brother lived all the time in a tiny room. Then I received from Srebrenica two prefabricated houses and I wanted to join them into one prefabricated house — that is, a log cabin. Now I heard from some information media in Belgrade that I am building a villa in wartime when there is a lack of money. I am grateful to the president of the war presidency of Srebrenica who enabled us to have this house. I am also grateful to my friends in Ilijas who are now trying to construct it.

Now you can see how all this can be misconstrued. I have become, quote, the most popular person in Serbia, unquote. Everything that I read, at these moments of extreme hardship for our people — I cannot understand that somebody is so full of anger, as if I were the main culprit for all their difficulties; the situation is completely the opposite.

[Karadzic] With regard to my situation, I have been here since day one. Up to the last day of peace I was in the Holiday Inn [in Sarajevo]. Several hours before the onslaught I left the Holiday Inn; I was forced out by our security people. My family has lived in Pale all this time.

When Banja Luka was in crisis — when Banja Luka and Prijedor were under the threat of falling, because a huge force had homed in on them, when trust in some officers disappeared, when rumors emerged, when maps were published in which Banja Luka was to be exchanged for Tuzla — then I was in dire straits: I had to be there, and my wife was there with me while my children stayed in Pale. Nobody was in a position to say that the president had given up on Sarajevo or Banja Luka. We had to be separated because the people monitor our conduct.

Our people can see the truth so clearly. Our people can see through the attacks and extremely filthy lies about our entire leadership that speaker Krajisnik has just mentioned. The people know very well who is doing what. We are not too worried about that — we neither accuse anyone nor judge anyone. We would have reasons and right to ask our state prosecutor to indict many people who are talking a lot of nonsense that can smear the leadership and the state, and thus weaken the morale among the soldiers and the people.

Fortunately, we still believe in a soft-touch policy, soft management of the state. We are not going to try anyone, because the people know very well that President Krajisnik does not live in a villa, that his parents live in a log cabin, even though they had villas before the war, but now they live in a log cabin. In this respect our people are really very benevolent and very grateful, because they can hear rumors, but they do not trust them outright. On the other hand our people look at examples. You cannot tell something to the people — you have to show everything by examples — where the leaders live, where their families live. Then we can say that the people trust that leader.

[Lalovic] Let us wind up this program. On behalf of the throngs of viewers who have called us, I would like to ask you to be around, available to the media to explain everything that will happen over the next month or two, while the most intensive consultations will take place before the meetings in Paris and London.

[Karadzic] I would like to repeat a few points now. First, the special arrangement for Sarajevo has not yet been agreed. But even without that agreement, no one has the right of access to Serb Sarajevo. The Serbs down there are safe, they are masters in their own home, for five months. Then we will see what we can agree on with the international community. This is the most important thing for them at the moment. The other point is that the Serbs should stick together. No one should leave, all Sarajevo Serbs should stay together. We will work out our future together.

Although most refugees throughout the Serb Republic have found accommodation with families, unfortunately some refugees are still in collective housing. I am demanding that [refugee] headquarters and municipal authorities immediately find them housing in warm family homes.

[Lalovic] If indeed there is peace, it will be much easier to solve many problems which have so far come upon considerable obstacles because of the fighting.

[Krajisnik] To round up the ideas we discussed this evening, I would like to say that throughout the war we had to come up with temporary solutions to deal with the large numbers of refugees and displaced people, and with many family and personal tragedies. All this is coming to an end now. We have huge obligations toward the dead soldiers, toward their widows and orphans, toward invalids, our young people, the army, toward the students who fought and died for the Serb Republic instead of attending classes, and toward the women who displayed incredible courage. If we can be proud of anyone, it is our women, who did not wince at the sight of tanks, did not wail as their sons went to the war, and did not try to stop them, as happened in Serbia and elsewhere at the beginning of the war.

Today we have an unjust allocation of territory, there are ethnic territories which remained in the other side's territory. Only one battle has ended now. The war — not in a literal sense of the word — has not ended. There are many political battles ahead of us before we achieve our aim.

My message to our people — not only in Serb Sarajevo, in Vukosavlje, around Gorazde, but to all those who were unjustly removed from our Krajina, from Serb Krajina, from eastern and western Slavonia — this people has achieved a great goal. We have achieved a great deal, but a large amount we have not achieved due to the international situation. We are still faced with major tasks, but this generation, both in the future and in elections and as part of new authorities, must ensure that all that has been achieved is not cancelled — as it was cancelled in previous wars when the Serbs, instead of being victors and enjoying the fruits of their efforts, allowed others to do so. This was illustrated the other day; as we were discussing Prevlaka we remembered Djuro Pucar [post-World War II Bosnian Serb politician], who gave up our access to the sea — and then we think, was that just? Yes, we are brothers, but we the Serbs, we all have to have access to the sea.

My general message is: We still have a great deal to do, many tasks, and this leadership, as long as it is in power, will stay with the people and will keep the promises it made. I am sad that we have not done much more, that we have not achieved many of our strategic goals...

[Karadzic, interrupting] But we are on the way to achieving them. A great amount has been achieved. Let us recall, for instance, in 1989, when Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, when we became aware of the grim hours that were ahead of us, when we realized that in many parts the Serbs were going to be the victims, when we founded our party, when we stood up to defend the Serb rights, when we said: Whatever you do, the Serbs will provide a democratic response. It went like that until 5 April [1992], when they aimed their guns at us, forcing us to resort to guns as well. Since then we have succeeded in preventing genocide against the Serb people, but unfortunately it was the most recent developments that created our refugees. Otherwise, until the attack by NATO and Croatia, we had no refugees, no epidemics, illnesses, hunger, sufferings, or large-scale killings. We protected and kept a large territory, including almost all Serb ethnic areas, for a long time. But now our territory has been maimed, in Krajina, in Herzegovina. We have not been maimed in Sarajevo because we are still holding it, and the people will help to keep it. In the case of Sarajevo we have a very bad political solution, and something will have to be done about it. But if you remember, we started with the community of municipalities, which we had a right to under the constitution. These we transformed into Serb communities of municipalities, then we transformed them into SAO's [srpske autonomne oblasti], Serb autonomous regions, the autonomous region of Krajina. We then founded the assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which each Serb was represented. Then on 9 January 1992 we declared the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later to become the Serb Republic, and many mediators told us then: There can be no state within a state, there will be no Serb Republic; they even mispronounced it and called it Sprska. Well, you see, there is the Serb Republic and it is being pronounced by CNN and used without translation. In other words, we are on the road to achieving our goals, and we have covered about 70 to 80 percent of that road and in some aspects, for instance in the political aspect, perhaps even more. From the territorial point of view, we are displeased with some aspects of it, but the Serb people will never again be ruled by someone else unless some other forces appear — I do not want to attack the left wing, but what I have in mind are non-nationalist [anacionalan] forces — and not all left wing forces are non-nationalist. In Russia, the left does not seem to be non-nationalist. What I have in mind are non-nationalist forces who favor brotherhood and unity, if they are to take power, then we could again come under alien authority. But we have crossed the threshold, which means that after 600 years we are our own masters and no one else can rule us. This is our epochal achievement. And I wish to say again, if it were not for some of these territorial mishaps: the considerable chunk of Krajina, the Neretva valley, etc, we would have the reason to triumph since the existence of the Serb Republic is an epochal achievement.

The West, led by the Vatican, has for centuries been trying to prevent Serbia's expansion to the left bank [of the river Drina]. It has not occurred to anyone that a child can grow up on its own, without its mother, even if it is pushed away by the mother who imposes sanctions, and that the child itself can cross the river Drina from the left to the right bank. That child has been born. The Serb Republic is that child. The child must be nurtured, the whole international community must nurture it, because it was born in the bloodbath of a four-year war.

When one nation achieves its statehood, that is the greatest of all achievements, an epochal achievement. Think about the Kurds and the Palestinians or other minorities who have never reached the point we have reached: the Serb Republic. This is the culmination of every nation's aspirations, the culmination of this nation's 600-year-old aspiration.

[Krajisnik] I just want to say that we have not achieved many of our aims. What we have achieved is by no means little, but we could have achieved much more. But we failed to achieve more because a policy which did not place our interests in the foreground was pursued.

[Karadzic] If there had been no sanctions against Serbia, everything would have been different.

[Krajisnik] But I would like to quote a proverb in connection with the question of whether future generations can spoil this agreement, as it happened many times before. A popular proverb says [passage indistinct]. We cannot do anything for the future generations if they do not appreciate our achievements.

I remember when we were in Athens, terrible pressure was exerted on us to initial the Vance-Owen plan. After that the then co-chairman, Mr. Owen, came to me and sympathetically congratulated me on having signed. I was all dejected and powerless because we had initialled that plan which broke our territory into pieces, we would have never established the Serb Republic. I told him: Mr. Lord, one day you will be an honorary member of the Serb Republic. He laughed. But my message to Mr. Lord now is: The Serb Republic is here.

[Karadzic] He can become an honorary citizen.

[Krajisnik] We will salvage what is now on the other side's territory, too. Our people must be happy, and God willing, all this will become a traumatic past, and we will live in our own state.

[Karadzic] Even President Milosevic has publicly said and admitted to us that this was the best plan so far. He had said that we should have accepted the Vance-Owen plan [in 1993] because it was unviable, it would have failed. But it would not have failed. They would have deployed international forces in Zvornik and in Posavina, and we would have been dismembered.

However, this is really the best plan. May all those who were killed rest in peace and may the memory of them be everlasting. I must say that I will soon receive a delegation of the families of the fallen soldiers, and I have been receiving them frequently.

Do you know who are the most fervent supporters of the Serb Republic? The families of the fallen soldiers, because theirs was the biggest contribution. When they phone me or write letters to me, the most fervent ones demand from me not to give up the Serb Republic. You have no right to betray us. They say to me: My child did not die for a unitary Bosnia, but for the Serb Republic.

President Milosevic therefore openly admitted to us that this plan was better than any other plans or proposals so far, although several points of the plan are not good. Political and constitutional matters are tolerable even now and we can perfect them further.

[Lalovic] My invitation is extended to be present in the media when there is any need for clarification, or when there are any changes. Thank you.

London TV Interviews Karadzic on Peace Agreement

MS2711104195 London BBC Television Network in English 0830 GMT 26 Nov 95

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb leader, by program host David Frost; Karadzic in Pale, Frost in London; from the "Breakfast With Frost" program — live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Frost] Are you still as of today the President of the Bosnian Serb state?

[Karadzic] If I understood you correctly, you are asking me whether I am as the President of Bosnian Serbs for the peace, yes, we have accepted the peace accord as a general framework. But we see very many bad solutions, but the worst of them is the solution for Sarajevo. Sarajevo has always been half Serbian, half Muslim city, and Serbs in Sarajevo have their own rights and their own fears, and they are not willing to accept Muslim authority, and they require either renegotiation of the city of Sarajevo agreement or special status and protection of the international community during the next — at least five years.

[Frost] And you did sign, you did initial every page though of the peace treaty, didn't you, the Americans say?

[Karadzic] Yes, yes sir.

[Frost] And so therefore what will you do if you don't get concessions on Sarajevo, Dr. Karadzic?

[Karadzic] It does not matter whether we make concessions as a center government or not, it is a matter of the legitimate rights of those people who are supposed to be handed over to the Muslim-Croat federation. They still have their own rights apart from the rights of the rest of Serbian Republic and they claim for special protection, because they would not accept any Muslim policemen or Muslim soldier to enter Serbian part of the City for at least five years.

[Frost] And if the world community says 'no' this is the deal, 'no' to what your asking, if they say 'no', what will you do?

[Karadzic] Well, it's a matter of what the Bosnian Serbs do in the city of Sarajevo. They will certainly resist, apart from the republic of Srpska, they will require special status, and what is wrong with the solution for Sarajevo is that the Dayton agreement has created a new Beirut in Europe, it is going to bleed for decades, it is going to be very, very, maybe the worst place in Europe because now this is a divided city. If we happen to transform Sarajevo into two cities, then it would not be a divided city. Now it is a divided city because there are Serbs and Muslims living in different suburbs and they are frightened of each other and they will be frightened of each other for the next five years at least, and they certainly deserve attention of the international community which has created a new Beirut in Europe.

[Frost] But will you still — you said — will you go to Paris to sign this peace treaty?

[Karadzic] Yes, we are ready to sign a peace treaty. Of course there are some obstacles that have to be resolved and clarified. First of all is the implementation of the agreement in Sarajevo, and second, the implementation or acceptance of the Nato troops in the republic of Srpska, which is not impossible, but it has to be clarified in order to have ratification from our assembly. Still we would have big problems with the implementation in the city of Sarajevo because those Serbs have their own rights. This is 150,000 Serbs living for centuries in this part of the city, and certainly they ask for protection or for other solution that would satisfy and protect them.

[Frost] But Dr. Karadzic, how could you go to Paris for the signing of the peace treaty? You would be arrested surely, because you have been charged as a war criminal, so you would be arrested, so you cannot leave Pale?

[Karadzic] That is another mistake of the international community. I am the legal and legitimate representative of my people. I fought people politically, and during the war I led my people politically, and I did not issue any single wrong order or decision. All of my decisions are public and publicized in the official journals, and those things about the indictment are spoiling the peace process, and certainly it would be a big obstacle for the NATO presence here unless we negotiate and clarify what NATO can do or will do here, whether NATO will behave friendly or not, because we should not forget that all people are armed and I would not like to see any incident with NATO here.

[Frost] But I still say that you might be arrested if you went to Paris?

[Karadzic] It would be completely wrong, because nobody can sign a final peace treaty except me and if they want to arrest me, then how do they want to end this war. And simply the Hague court was a means of pressure against us to accept the peace accord. We will accept the peace accord without any pressure if it is acceptable. I think it should be reconsidered.

[Frost] And in terms of — there has been as you know world-wide criticism of the massacre, the atrocity at Srebrenica. Did you order that or did General Mladic order that?

[Karadzic] Neither I nor Gen. Mladic ordered any massacre, and no massacre has happened in Srebrenica, and we will clarify it after the war. Besides that we have the witnesses, the UNPROFOR people have seen the whole of the operation and did not notice any irregularity in those terms.

[Frost] So you feel that if you are at some point arrested and charged in a court with war crimes, you are saying this morning that you think you will be found innocent?

[Karadzic] Absolutely, I would be found innocent, but besides that, I would not cooperate with this court, even if I am arrested. I simply would be completely silent, because this court is a political and discriminatory one, and this is not justice, this is politics, and I think it should be banned and disbanded immediately, and the national judiciary should obliged to trial any single allegation about atrocities.

[Frost] Do you think that this peace will work, or do you think the Bosnian Serbs will have to try to go back to war?

[Karadzic] We certainly see this peace accord with many painful solutions for us, with many painful compromises. But certainly peace has many values and we are not crazy to fight if we don't have to. We are in a rush to get back to the economy, to the improvement of our life, to the introduction of free society and market economy catching up with European values. Why should we return to the war when we are safe and secure, and we didn't fight for 45 years of communist regime, and we would not fight after this war. I do hope forever. And we did not initiate and start this war, it has been imposed against us.

[Frost] One last question — do you think you will keep the support of the Generals, Dr. Karadzic, and the soldiers, or do you think they will attempt to overthrow you?

[Karadzic] The line is completely wrong, but I'll tell you — our army is completely under control of the civilian authorities. We do hope we would demobilize many soldiers and turn them to the economy, and I do not expect any incident, except if the forces that come here behave unfriendly. But the presence of NATO forces here has to be renegotiated or clarified, and we need special agreement with the NATO, if we accept the NATO. The last decision is the decision of our Assembly.

[Frost] And if it's not renegotiated, will you refuse to sign?

[Karadzic] We would sign the peace agreement but a last decision is ratification of our Assembly. If the Assembly do not ratify the paper about the presence of foreign armed troops here, then they are not welcome, and they can't come into our country. We certainly would like to avoid it, that's why we need complete clarification and special arrangements with NATO or other troops.

Bosnian Serbs Question Plan for Unified Sarajevo

Army Will Not Desert Sarajevans

LD2511145595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1420 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 25 Nov (SRNA) — There can be no peace agreement for former Bosnia-Herzegovina without Serb Sarajevo, Mirko Sarovic, chairman of the executive committee of the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo, said at today's meeting in Grbavica.

He said this message was communicated yesterday to international negotiators, and also that Colonel General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serb Army, sent his own message which says: "The Serb Army will not desert Sarajevo Serbs."

"Someone wanted to make gift of Serb Sarajevo to the Muslims. But he will not be able to make a gift of 120,000 Serbs, 5,000 graves, thousands of fighters, and one-third of the Serb Republic industry, because we are going to stay here," Sarovic said categorically.

Sarovic announced a meeting with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and with Gen. Mladic for 1400 today, at which the message — "we are staying" — will be conveyed to Karadzic and to Mladic.

Outside the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, citizens were addressed by Mirjana Pandurevic, who asked the world mediators "how they could even think that 120,000 Serbs would want to leave Serb Sarajevo."

Students also said they will stay here, that they will not abide by the initials [on the agreemnt], and that they will fight for their rights.

Schoolchildren from the Radojka Lakic primary school expressed their disappointment with the Serbian President "handing over the graves of their fathers," saying that "if needed, they will take weapons into their arms to defend themselves."

Ilijas Official Rejects Solution

LD2411192295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 24 Nov (SRNA) — Ratko Adzic, president of the war presidency of the Ilijas Municipal Assembly, intimated this evening that the people of Serb Sarajevo will use all their power to fight for a better status for their town, as envisaged in all previous proposals for the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.

"Our town has been taken away from us without any reason. The people of Serb Sarajevo simply have nowhere else to go, unless the United States offers us some town in Ohio for us to emigrate to in an organized manner," Adzic explained in a statement to SRNA after today's meeting of representatives of Sarajevo municipalities with Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb Assembly, in Pale.

Describing the situation in Serb Sarajevo, Adzic said that people were confused, but that there was no panic.

"What else can cause panic among a people who have literally experienced everything over the past three and a half years?" the president of the war presidency of the Ilijas Municipality asked.

"This is obviously the most resolute section of Serbs who have defended their hearths. The only guarantees for our inhabitants are our soldiers," Adzic said, adding that "we must now be alert more than ever and we should not allow any kind of improvisation."

He said that first and foremost, we must preserve our town and our property militarily and fight all for one and one for all, and do everything that is in the interests of all of us.

Karadzic on Protecting Serbs

LD2611112195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1015 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 26 Nov (SRNA) — A meeting ended in Vogosca early this morning, which the Serb Sarajevo municipal war presidencies, the city war presidency, and the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps held with the Serb Republic [RS] president, the RS People's Assembly president, and the RS Minister of Internal Affairs.

Talks over several hours focused on the future of Serb Sarajevo in the light of the Dayton agreement, and the overall conclusion was that a new solution must be found for the entire Serb Sarajevo as soon as possible, because the Serb part of the city can by no means remain within the Croat-Muslim Federation.

"Until a different and better solution is found — compared to the one initialled in Dayton — the international community should take care of the Serb part of Sarajevo and protect the Serb people," RS President Radovan Karadzic said after the meeting, adding that the Serb Army would remain on its existing positions until then. According to Karadzic, the opposition of the Serb people, especially young people at protest meetings, to the proposal that the whole of Sarajevo become a unified city, has brought on numerous reactions in the world.

Appealing to the citizens of Serb Sarajevo not to leave the city, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic Assembly, said after the meeting that the Sarajevans could count on the solidarity of the entire population and political leadership of the RS.

"Until an adequate solution for Serb Sarajevo is found, the Dayton agreement will not be put into practice," specified Krajisnik, while Tomo Kovac, RS minister of internal affairs, said that the police was also a firm guarantee that no one from the outside will be able to impose their power on the Serb people in Sarajevo.

"In the worst case scenario, whereby the people would be forced to move out of Serb Sarajevo, members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [police] would be the last ones to leave the city," Kovac said.

'New Solution' Must Be Found

LD2611223695 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croat 1930 GMT 26 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting ended in Vogosca early this morning of the war presidencies of the Serb Sarajevo municipalities, the town's war presidency, and the commander of the [Bosnian Serb army's] Sarajevo corps on the one hand, and Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic; Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the People's Assembly; and Tomo Kovac, the minister of internal affairs in the Serb Republic's government, on the other.

The talks, which lasted for several hours, covered the future of Serb Sarajevo following the Dayton agreement. The general conclusion reached at the meeting is that a new solution for the entire city must be found as soon as possible since, as was stressed, the Serb part of the city cannot and will under no circumstance be part of the Croat-Muslim Federation.

[Correspondent Branka Nogo, identified by caption] The Dayton agreement and its guidelines were the main topic of the meeting that took place last night between Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic; Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly; and Tomislav Kovac, minister of internal affairs of the Serb Republic, on the one hand; and the presidents and representatives of the municipalities of the western part of Serb Sarajevo and representatives of the army, on the other. The meeting, which lasted until the early morning hours, agreed on specific steps that must be taken as soon as possible, and concern the future and survival of Serbs in Serb Sarajevo:

[Begin recording] [Karadzic] Serb Sarajevo has been defended with the blood of its best sons, and Serb Sarajevo must remain Serb — in other words, these people will go nowhere. The international community must find a solution. It has reached a bad solution. It has not, in fact, found a solution; rather, it has created a new problem. It would have been better if Sarajevo were to be two towns; it would not then be divided. By their quasi-solution, they have divided the town in the manner of Beirut, Belfast, or other towns for which the international community cannot find any appropriate solution. In other words, the determination of Sarajevo Serbs to remain in their homes and to insist on a better solution must be taken by the international community as a signal that no solution will be accepted if it will deprive 130-150,000 Serbs of their rights.

My message is that the whole of the Serb Republic, all its regions, and all the Serb nation are amazed at the courage and heroic stand of the Sarajevo Serbs and by their silent firmness and determination. Sarajevo Serbs are not prone to showing off, and they themselves were not aware of what heroes they were. My message to them is: The entire Serb nation is admiring you, is behind you, and their determination to keep their part of the town and their institutions oblige the rest of us to stand behind them and behind Serb Sarajevo. I am confident that we shall succeed.

[Krajisnik] There have been many proposals, many suggestions, anxiety, but what particularly characterizes this meeting is the resolute position of those who took part in it that the Serbs will not leave this area, that the Serbs have a right to Serb Sarajevo, that they cannot accept a political solution according to which they should be under the control of the Muslim-Croat Federation. They therefore demand a solution due to them within the Serb struggle for the Serb Republic.

Serbs from Sarajevo had not set any conditions for the signing of the peace agreement. They have embraced peace, they are happy that the Serb Republic exists, but they also demand and hope to be understood by other parts of the Serb Republic, that these parts will display solidarity with the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo, and that solutions will be found which will enable their protection and a better political solution. [end recording]

[Nogo] The meeting stressed the need for complete unity and determination of the civilian population, members of the army, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and our state leadership in the implementation of guidelines agreed upon last night.

[Begin Kovac recording] The task of the police in the forthcoming phases when the international forces begin deployment along separation lines after the army has withdrawn and everything else... [changes thought] As long as our people live in this area, the Serb police will not allow anyone else to exercise power apart from our police. It will not allow any other sort of government, as long as the people remain in this area. Our people will remain in Serb Sarajevo. Our people will know how to do it. In any case, the police will be a guarantor that nobody will come to exercise power over this people. [end recording]

NATO Warns Karadzic After 'Bloodbath' Threat

AU2711115395 Paris AFP in English
1132 GMT 27 Nov 95

[Report by Angus MacKinnon]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Nov 27 (AFP) — NATO on Monday [27 November] warned Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic that any attempt to intimidate the peace force the alliance plans to send to Bosnia would be greeted with an "extremely robust" response.

The tough signal from the alliance was issued after Karadzic warned on Sunday that any attempt to arrest him as a war criminal would lead to a bloodbath for western soldiers.

"It is very irresponsible for Mr Karadzic to make remarks that imply NATO is not going to be even-handed," chief NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said.

"We are clear at NATO we will treat all parties alike. This force is not going to go in with some kind of anti-Serb bias."

Shea added: "This is not going to be the UN. The rules of engagement, the equipment and the command and control of the force will be very different and therefore it would not make any sense for the Bosnian Serbs or any other party to try to intimidate NATO or be hostile against it.

"Although we are going to help implement a peace, if we are attacked we will defend ourselves extremely robustly indeed."

Karadzic's warning was seen as an attempt to undermine U.S. President Bill Clinton's bid to persuade the U.S. Congress and people to back sending 20,000 troops to Bosnia. If Clinton fails to deliver the U.S. troops, it is extremely unlikely that any western forces will go to Bosnia.

"Either we should all be there on the ground or no one is," British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind told NEWSWEEK magazine in an interview to be published next week.

Military chiefs of staff from the NATO countries were due to meet later on Monday to put the final touches to their plans for the biggest operation in the alliance's history, involving 60,000 troops on the ground and another 40,000 in various support operations.

The endorsement of the planning by NATO's military commanders will clear the way for NATO ambassadors to authorise the deployment of an advance contingent of between two and three thousand troops.

This authorisation could come as early as Tuesday, NATO sources said, clearing the way for the first troops to arrive in Bosnia by the end of the week.

The advance forces will be charged with establishing the infrastructure which will allow the implementation force to operate effectively. It will include experts in areas such as telecommunications and management of road, air and maritime traffic.

The main body of the force will not begin to arrive until after the signing of a definitive peace accord in Paris next month. Full deployment is expected to take up to three months to be completed.

Doubts still remain about whether the multinational force will include a small contingent from Russia. NATO defence ministers are due to meet their Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev here on Tuesday in a bid to overcome outstanding differences over whethr NATO having final political authority over the operation.

NATO and Russia have already agreed a formula on the day-to-day running of the operation which will allow up to 1,500 Russian troops to participate in the force without coming under direct NATO command.

Article: Krajisnik's Position 'Threatens Peace'

AU2611190995 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 95 p 10

[Article by Boro Maric: "Krajisnik Threatens Peace!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two nights ago, the president of the people's assembly of the Serb Republic, Momcilo Krajisnik, tried to disclaim the validity of the Dayton agreement, which, after 46 months, has ended the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Besides, Krajisnik said that the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, did not have the legitimacy to decide in the name of the Serb Republic! According to Krajisnik, Milosevic had no right to sign the Dayton agreement!

Bad Memory

"I talked to President Karadzic, who is the only person authorized to entitle somebody to sign the agreement. The situation is clear — this signature does not mean anything, unless in Paris it is verified by the legal representatives of the Serb Republic, and we will not do that unless the minimum of Serb interests is satisfied," Krajisnik said.

In this way Krajisnik threatened peace and the Serb people in the Serb Republic, which hardly survived the latest offensive of the Croat-Muslim troops on its western and southern borders.

A possible "negation" of the agreement signed in Dayton would bring the Serb Republic to a crossroads from which there are only two paths. The first one leads to a new war against the entire world, and the second into complete international isolation. Both ways would doubtlessly be fatal for the Serb people and for their state in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There are innumerous reasons for claiming this. Let us only mention the crucial ones.

The last months of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that the army of the Serb Republic is not invincible — it lost around 10,000 square kilometers of territory, from which over 150,000 people fled.

The defeats that the army of the Serb Republic suffered directly pointed to another equally important fact: The Serb Republic has not grown into a firm, well-organized state.

If it had, then the serious conflict between the state and the military leadership would not go on for months, caused on the one hand by the dissatisfaction of the civil authorities with the behavior of a number of high officers, and on the other by the opinion of the generals that the state is treating its army like a stepchild.

Spiting the World

Time has also shown that whenever its leadership opposed the world without having strong reasons for doing so, the Serbian Republic suffered heavy consequences.

Let us name only two examples: From the rejection of the Contact Group plan until the cease-fire agreement in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army of the Serb Republic turned from a winning military power into an army that was one step away from being thrown onto its knees.

And the second example: By refusing to withdraw its heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, the authorities of the Serb Republic exposed the army and the people to the bombardment of NATO and the Rapid Reaction Force.

Approximately 160 people were killed in those strikes, and the value of the destroyed and damaged property is estimated at several billion dollars.

Krajisnik explains his threats to peace and to the Dayton agreement with his dissatisfaction with the maps — that is, with the division of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

"At the beginning of the negotiations, we drew a map with President Milosevic and the rest of the delegation according to which Krupa Na Uni [Bosanska Krupa], Sanski Most, Petrovac, Drvar, Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, a part of Jajce, and Sipovo were included in the 49 percent of the Serb Republic territory."

However, Krajisnik did not say which towns and territories the Serb Republic would have lost in the event that the map would have been accepted.

He also did not say that all the previous plans for the division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina did not anticipate Doboj, Derventa, [Bosanski] Brod, Modrica, Srebrenica, Zepa... being in the Serb Republic, and those towns are now — together with Visegrad, Samac, Srebrenica... — a part of the Serb state in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

War Agitation

According to a SRNA report, Krajisnik "has refused the allegations that the president of Serbia has the legitimacy to make decisions in the name of the Serb Republic — that is, that the parliament of the Serb Republic does not have the right to refute his decisions."

"Those are attempts to misuse the agreement we have with Patriarch Pavle. President Milosevic is a member of the joint delegation. His voice is decisive only when there is no way out," Krajisnik says.

The text of the agreement signed on 29 August 1995 denies Krajisnik's allegations. In the first point of the agreement, it is written: "The leadership of the Serb Republic complies to completely conform their approach to the peace process with that of the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the objective of achieving peace."

The second point of the agreement says:

"In that sense, the Serbian Republic will delegate three members in the joint delegation of six members, which, with the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, at its head, will conduct negotiations about a global peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina...."

"The delegation is entitled to sign a peace agreement in the name of the Serb Republic in the section that relates to the Serb Republic, with the responsibility to implement the reached agreement strictly and consistently."

Krajisnik's claim that the agreement of 29 August is actually an agreement made with Patriarch Pavle is incorrect. The agreement, as is written in the introductory part, was reached "at the joint meeting of the leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic.... at which the patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church Pavle and the Vladika Irinej Bulovic were also present."

After all this, Krajisnik's words: "We want peace, we want to reach a solution, but nobody has the right to sell the Serb state" in fact sounds like a call to a new war.

War and the behavior of the president of the parliament of the Serb Republic are contrary to the interests of the Serb people. As if the leadership of the Serb Republic has locked itself in a circle from which they cannot see the people who have entrusted them with the mandate to govern the affairs of the state. The expressions of joy of the people in the Serb Republic because of the peace agreement of Dayton and Krajisnik's negating of that agreement show that there are big differences in the understanding of war and peace. The people are for peace — Krajisnik is for war.

[Box p 5]

The Corridor

Commenting on the end of the Dayton talks, Colonel Milovan Kutlesic, commander of the defense of Brcko, said to VECERNJE NOVOSTI that the concluded peace has finally brought calm to the people of Posavina after the infernal four-year war in this area.

Answering the question as to what will happen to the corridor in Posavina, which is to be widened, Kutlesic said that the corridor will be widened in a peaceful way and not with the help of tanks and transporters.

"We want peace and we are ready to negotiate, but also to defend the corridor if necessary. I believe an agreement will be easy because it is of mutual interest."

Fireworks

The citizens of Posavina watched the signing of the peace agreement in Dayton on television, where it was directly broadcast. After it was signed, the citizens of Brcko, Samac, Modrica, Odzak and other towns went out into the streets in a great number and celebrated the coming of peace. They fired from all sorts of weapons; such shooting has not been recorded during the entire war. The neighbors, Muslims and Croats, also celebrated.

It is interesting that everybody was shooting in the air, and that no bullet or shell was "sent" to the enemy's territory.

Granic Views Dayton, E. Slavonia, Posavina

AU2711123095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 24 Nov 95 pp 4-5

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Mate Piskor in Zagreb "three days after the Dayton conference": "Achieved Peace—Only One Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Dr. Mate Granic spent all 21 days of the negotiations in Dayton either as a member or the head of the Croatian state delegation, when President Tudjman was not present. Therefore, the Dayton negotiations and the Dayton peace are the topics of our interview, the first to be given by the head of Croatian diplomacy to either domestic or foreign journalists since his return to Zagreb from the United States.

[Piskor] Minister, three days after Dayton, can you tell us precisely what kind of peace this peace conference has brought us—a peace that will satisfy the people whom it affects or a peace to suit the interests and hearts of the world superpowers?

[Granic] It is true that the world superpowers, and principally the United States, essentially influenced the shape of the agreement to be signed. We must realize that this peace agreement is not a result of one warring side being completely defeated or the other being utterly victorious, in which case the victorious side would determine all the provisions of peace. This is a peace through which the United States, the EU, and the Russian Federation wanted to establish a new balance of power in the region and establish stability in this part of Europe. The one and only possible peace, one could say, has been achieved.

Turning To the Future

[Piskor] Was the price not important?

[Granic] It is in any case difficult if somebody else makes decisions about you, so it is clear that the peace achieved in such relation of power had to result in certain compromises. However, when we look at the Dayton agreement from a Croatian standpoint, we must realize that we have got a lot.

[Piskor] Are you talking about the Republic of Croatia or the Croats?

[Granic] I am talking both about Croatia and the Croats, but it is clear that one has to be able to distinguish between things and that if one wants a precise explanation, one should wait for a detailed analysis.

[Piskor] Well, here you are, this is a chance to do that.

[Granic] Talking about the Republic of Croatia and the Croats, the main result of Dayton is that both the Croatian state and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been given a chance to turn to the future. By the agreement in Dayton, it is finally and definitively confirmed that the former Yugoslav state has falen apart and that new states and new realities have been created. Also, Dayton has brought the final recognition of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders because Croatia left Dayton as a whole within its own borders.

Both Prevlaka And Eastern Slavonia

[Piskor] With both Prevlaka and eastern Slavonia?

[Granic] With both Prevlaka and eastern Slavonia. However, let me continue with what else Croatia has got. A month ago, we were subjected to perhaps the fiercest pressures of the international community since the creation of the Croatian state, particularly after Operation Storm, which was a brilliant military and diplomatic action, whose result was a free and strong Croatia, and many have been concerned about precisely such a stable, free, and strong Croatia. By some acts and procedures that brought discredit on Croatia, we ourselves have given additional arguments to the world for pressures on Croatia. Here I am referring to acts of arson, robberies, murders, and other criminal acts, which have been exceptionally damaging to Croatia's reputation in the world.

[Piskor] And therefore the Croats had to make so many concessions?

[Granic] It is not as simple as you have just put it. First, Croatia has not made any concessions regarding its integrity. But, after Operation Storm we have been put into a situation that we must not realize our full territorial integrity by military means.

[Piskor] You are thinking of eastern Slavonia?

[Granic] Yes, I am thinking of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. A situation has been created in which nobody in the world would support us in launching another liberation operation, one in eastern Slavonia. However, Croatia has achieved peaceful reintegration through the Erdut-Zagreb agreement, through written U.S. guarantees in interpreting that agreement, through the Security Council resolutions on peaceful reintegration, and through the agreement on the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia. Nobody questions that the occupied territories belong to Croatia or that Croatia will peacefully reintegrate those territories. Croatia is only asked to do it while fully respecting the human rights of the Serb and other minorities.

And we must not forget that, because of our confirmed commitment to peace and because of our assistance in reaching that peace, Croatia is now completely welcome in European integration and European and world's financial institutions. In addition, Croatia will now become a safe country, in which foreigners and foreign capital will feel safe and well. All these are guarantees of faster development, in which Croatia has the best chances of all the countries formed after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

What Have the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina Won?

[Piskor] So, as you say, that is what Croatia got. What did Bosnia-Herzegovina get and what did the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina win?

[Granic] Throughout the negotiations, the Americans advocated the thesis that Bosnia-Herzegovina had to remain one country within its borders. And that was achieved. We strongly pleaded for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina that they had to have full security, protection, and equality, and that the Croatian people had to be a constituent nation. That was also solved in that way, on the Presidency, the parliament, the constitutional court, and all institutions. In my opinion, equally important are the agreements on the implementation of the Federation and Mostar, then the strategically exceptionally important agreement on the Council for the Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the military annex to the agreement, which enables the arrival of 60,000 to 80,000 NATO peacekeeping troops. Various annexes should be added on human rights, the return of the displaced, and the return of or compensation for property. It is true, there are two entities of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation and the "Serb Republic," but the constitutional solutions and the world will grant that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be an integral state with international status, because the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution does not allow secession of, for instance, the Serb entity, or joining Serbia. Belgrade had to sign that, as well as a special guarantee that it would respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Piskor] How successful will those two entities be, assisted by the international community?

[Granic] Time will tell, but I will emphasize once more that the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been granted all rights, security, and equality.

[Piskor] Could it happen that one of the sides, one of the entities, sabotages implementation of the agreement?

[Granic] Theoretically, everything is possible. But in the first phase, the NATO military force and the international community will ensure that nothing like that will happen. Later on, it will be possible to remove or prevent such attempts by using mechanisms of isolation, sanctions, etc.

[Piskor] I am asking you this because the Bosnian Serbs have refused to initial the Dayton agreement, which inevitably reminds me of the well established Serbian game in which Milosevic accepts something and then it happens that the people, supposedly, reject it.

[Granic] Not any more. There is no chance of anything like that, because Milosevic has taken responsibility for all the Serbs upon himself and signed on behalf of all the Serbs, and Milutinovic, his foreign minister, initialed the agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. So, the responsibility for the failure to implement the agreement will be directly Milosevic's. Any kind of stalling over the application of the agreement will, within just five days, put him into a position of having sanctions again.

The World Is Not Ideal

[Piskor] By insisting on reaching such a peace, has the world violated some of its basic principles, because it has recognized the results of ethnic cleansing and changing of the borders by force?

[Granic] The world has never been ideal and has always looked for and has been prone to compromises, so one can now characterize it as you have just done.

[Piskor] What about ethics?

[Granic] Regarding this, the world has disassociated itself from it by the Hague Tribunal. All the criminals will be prosecuted for ever and the other solutions are the result of political pragmatics.

[Piskor] So, because of the world's pragmatics, the Croats have lost Bosanska Posavina?

[Granic] Regarding Bosanska Posavina and the internal division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one has to point out that the Croats, after the Washington treaty, controlled only 11 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that now, after this agreement, they will control 20 percent of the territory. Apart from quantity, they have been given very important areas, also from the strategic standpoint, by which both the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be satisfied. The thing with which we cannot be satisfied is, as you have also mentioned in your question, the issue of Bosanska Posavina. That solution is a tough compromise, achieved under strong pressure from the world. Until the last moment, in line with the census before the aggression and the ethnic cleansing, we were asking for the whole Bosanska Posavina, or at least most of it. We were offering areas three to four times larger in exchange for Posavina, but it was all in vain. The Serbs would not agree and we had no international support for such demands, because the world has, after all, recognized the military solutions achieved. It is now clear how important the decisions of Croatia were to join in the liberation of certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina before and after Storm. Had it not been for that, the solutions would have been even more unfavorable.

West Prevented Fall of Banja Luka

[Piskor] Why did we not take Banja Luka then, although it was ready to fall?

[Granic] It is a fact that we could have taken Banja Luka in two days, but we were seriously warned by the United States, Germany, the whole West, not to mention the Russian Federation, that we could not do that.

[Piskor] Why did the world do that?

[Granic] If Milosevic had lost Banja Luka, he certainly would not have negotiated any longer. Or the war would have entered a completely new phase, with the direct confrontation of Croatia and Serbia and a tendency to spread, or Serbia would have gone into turmoil and then the spreading of the conflict. In addition, the world was afraid of the many refugees, what to do with them, how to accommodate them, where to put them, and the West in particular was afraid of the total inability to achieve peace, which would be the result of the continuation of the conflict and the Croatian-Bosniak capture of Banja Luka. It is certain that the majority of the Serb refugees from the Banja Luka region would move into the occupied area of eastern Slavonia. And, after that, who would allow us to launch a military liberation operation and how could we achieve peaceful reintegration? The result would be that the Croats and the Bosniaks would get Banja Luka, but Croatia would lose eastern Slavonia, and, probably, get sanctions.

Ethics Do Not Stop War

[Piskor] Having commented on the Dayton agreement, Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, the archbishop of Zagreb, said that the compromise at the victim's expense is dubious and unfair. Does it seem to be just like that?

[Granic] From an ethical standpoint, this is correct, as a compromise at the expense of the victims of the aggression is unfair, but it is also correct that that ethics do not stop war and the world wanted to stop the war in whatever way, leaving the questions of ethics and justice to the Hague Tribunal. Had there been any ethics and justice, the aggression would have been halted at its very outset in 1991. And we have had the situation that many Western powers, which now advocate opposite stands, allowed the aggression and did nothing about it.

[Piskor] The world politicians and media are unanimous in the assessment that Croatia left Dayton as a victor?

[Granic] It is true, not only are the Croatian president and Croatian delegation being praised as the crucial factors in reaching the agreement, but, starting with Secretary of State Christopher, it has been pointed out that Croatia has achieved most of its strategic interests. Everybody agrees on that, which does not mean that there have not been certain compromises. However, if we consider that only four years ago, Croatia was a country that nobody wanted and nobody recognized, and now we have everything that we wanted and desired, then it is clear why the world speaks so and why Dayton will represent a very important event and very significant date in Croatian history.

Financial Support, NATO, Guarantees

[Piskor] What is to follow now?

[Granic] The agreement is to be applied now. When we say that peace has been reached, we must realize that, in fact, there is just a great hope that there will be peace. We believe in that, because the international community has invested too much in it to allow something else to happen. We believe that all the provisions of the agreement will be implemented, but before that the agreement should be formally signed. That should happen in Paris, at the beginning of December, and then on 8 and 9 December the London conference on the implementation of the agreement will take place, the meeting in Bonn on regional security mechanisms, and it is not ruled out that more conferences will take place. The most essential thing is that powerful financial support for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is being prepared and we are talking about immense amounts of dollars.

[Piskor] Congress is strongly resisting President Clinton's wish to send U.S. troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could it happen that the Americans do not come to Bosnia-Herzegovina and what will happen to the agreement then?

[Granic] There is little chance for anything like that. The discussion between Congress and President Clinton is an internal affair of the United States, a power struggle. After Dayton, President Clinton's reputation is very good and we believe that he will succeed in winning support from Congress. After all, even without support from Congress, he can make the appropriate decision.

[Piskor] NATO forces are coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Will they monitor the peace in eastern Slavonia, too?

[Granic] There are ongoing talks and negotiations about this. The most important thing for us is to start the process as soon as possible, that an American is the head of the transitional government, that is the head of the civilian sector. We have received assurances that it will be so, as well as that, apart from the Russian and Belgian battalions, which are already there, some other international forces will come into the area of eastern Slavonia, and we have been intensively negotiating for the Americans or some other NATO forces to be those international forces, and that they start working as soon as possible, of course, as special international forces, and not any more as UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], whose mandate is expiring.

[Box 1, p 4]

Balance of Power

[Piskor] Why does the world persistently want to establish some kind of balance of power and maintain to a certain extent a strong Serbia?

[Granic] A balance of power is attempted to be established everywhere; it is not a specific quality of our region. It is believed that, with a balance of power, the peace will be firmer.

[Box 2, p 4]

Clinton's Support

[Piskor] U.S. President Clinton joined the negotiations directly, having talked to our president. What did he ask him?

[Granic] True, President Clinton joined the final phase of the negotiations by talking to President Tudjman, pleading for his support for that phase of the negotiations. He called our president at a moment when the negotiations were completely blocked because we were asking for the whole Posavina region, or at least most of it. Then we agreed that Odzak would go to the Federation, apart from Orasje, which is militarily defended by the Croats. In addition, President Clinton expressed his support for the Croatian president's efforts and his crucial role in reaching the agreement.

[Piskor] Why is [Bosanski] Samac not in the Posavina package so that a territorial whole is realized?

[Granic] Because of the railroad that reaches the Sava at Bosanski Samac, on which the Serbs insisted and were supported by the United States.

[Box 3, p 5]

Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia Initialed

[Piskor] Will there be mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia in Paris?

[Granic] It is expected. The agreement was initialed in Dayton.

[Piskor] Is this the definitive end of "Greater Serbia" at the expense of Croatian territory?

[Granic] That definitive end had taken place even earlier and was confirmed in Dayton.

[Piskor] Immediately after the negotiations ended and as soon as arrived in Croatia, on several occasions you said that Croatia had left Dayton intact, with its internationally recognized borders. Why did you particularly point that out, because of Prevlaka?

[Granic] It is a very essential fact that Croatia has not made any compromise with its state territory and, therefore, I think that it is important to emphasize that. So it is with Prevlaka, which was not a subject of the Dayton peace agreement. There are demands by the Serbian and Montenegrin side for certain exchanges of territories, but Croatia will estimate what it can lose or win by certain procedure, in line with its strategic interests. A possible decision will be made in line with the Constitution, with a two-thirds majority in parliament, and necessarily by a referendum.

Premier: Dayton Already Producing Economic Results

LD2411205395 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] What direct and indirect consequences can we expect from the Dayton agreement? What does Croatia expect? was the question we put to top government officials:

[Begin Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa recording, identified by caption] What is important to emphasize when assessing the Dayton agreement is its absolutely historic importance, which essentially defines the future of Croatia as a whole. Looking at it from the point of view of the Croatian Government's future activities, it naturally means that the economic program and economic revival will be given a place of absolute priority, and that measures of the current economic policy and the 1996 budget and all our mid-term measures will be adjusted to it and the newly-created situation.

The situation is also changing in the practical aspect of the government's work—next week we are to visit the United States where we are to have a meeting with the World Bank president for the first time, with whom we will discuss the reflection of the Dayton agreement on the economy and reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement has already started producing results, in the first days. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Dayton Accord Viewed as 'Temporary' Solution

AU2611151195 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Visnja Staresina: "A Transitory Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is perhaps better to start with the good aspects [of the Dayton agreement]: The agreement that was after several days of full uncertainty and pressure signed in Dayton will probably stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and enable its population to spend the winter without shooting and grenades, although it will not be easy to spend even a quiet winter in the state destroyed by war. The agreement should also make it possible to reintegrate eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem without a new war. In order to assess whether this possibility could really materialize, we have to wait for the UN Security Council resolution that will enable the implementation of the basic agreement in the field.

The second positive aspect is the deployment of NATO peace forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 60,000 soldiers are coming in order to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, and they will not be able to leave before stability has been reached in the region. On the basis of what was signed under the pressure of their political bosses, however, the NATO forces will certainly not be able to secure the stability—since it is impossible to carry out what was signed. The presence of NATO troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina will later on help Western politicians remodel what they squeezed out as the agreement (primarily out of their internal reasons). It is certainly not a good solution that 60,000 foreign soldiers keep the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina forever.

The third positive element: Once NATO enters Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not likely that it will ever leave again. Admittedly, it will not always be present with 60,000 soldiers there—this would be too expensive a game—but there is a chance that Bosnia-Herzegovina, and probably Croatia, will be admitted into NATO. And NATO membership is the only guarantee of safety of any state today.

And now the bad aspects of the agreement: The Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina have lost the region of Bosanska Posavina [the region south of the Sava River] (except for Orasje and Odzaci). The Muslims succeeded in retaining Sarajevo as one city within the federation, but they had to give up the areas in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they were literally extinguished in the most cruel way, and they only formally kept Gorazde. Formally, since how can a Muslim enclave survive deep in Serbian territory, connected with the Muslim territory only by a narrow corridor? It can, in other words, be expected that as soon as the corridor is opened, people will start moving out of Gorazde and settle in regions in which they feel safe, since no one is ready to spend his life as a hostage of politics.

The absurdity of the corridor is extreme in the case of the corridor in Posavina. First, in its widest parts, the Serbs formally got the regions they are absolutely not entitled to (if we do not consider the "right" of force used at the beginning of the war when they ethnically cleaned the non-Serbian population there). Second, it would be very interesting to ask the brains who are trying to convince everybody that the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been secured by the agreement with the following questions: Why do the Bosnian Serbs need a special corridor, why can they not simply use the road, as this is the case everywhere in the world, which would also be appropriate for a unique state? Do they know any other state in the world that is connected by a corridor in the middle?

The phrases about a unique state (with one foreign affairs minister, a joint currency, two defense ministers, three army chiefs, and two corridors) is not taken seriously by anybody any longer. There is also no wish, first of all in the international politics, to recognize this, so that borders are drawn by agreements that will enable a peaceful separation later on. The borders that include corridors certainly do not grant a peaceful separation.

Furthermore, how can the Banja Luka pocket, which is surrounded by either Croatian or Muslim territory, survive in the long run? Regardless of the corridor width, it would be interesting to ask Serbian refugees whether they feel like settling down in the corridor, even in the widest part of it, and how they see their future there. Corridors are practically the coverage for political hypocrisy: The one in Posavina does not enable the expelled Croats and Muslims to return, nor does it grant the Serbs who are already there or who will be forced to settle there with a peaceful and safe future.

Instead of a permanent solution, yet another temporary agreement was signed under pressure. The contours of a permanent solution will be created under international supervision on the basis of what the UNHCR already calls "ethnic engineering." This means migrations of people. The promises that the rights of every individual or minority will be fully respected and controlled by international observers can perhaps be "sold" in the Rose Garden of the White House. But in order to check their credibility, those who make such promises should spend at least several months in the state they have conceived in such a wonderful way. Everybody could be granted two foreign observers to begin with.

Dubrovnik Opposition Protests Territory Exchange

LD2511183795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Opposition parties in Dubrovnik today organized a protest meeting against a possible exchange of the territory of Croatian Prevlaka and other parts of the internationally recognized Republic of Croatia, under the slogan "Prevlaka is Croatian". The meeting heard speeches from representatives of Dubrovnik's opposition parties and letters of support sent by Zlatko Tomcic, chairman of the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], the chief secretary of the HNS [Croatian People's Party] and the Konavle Croatian society. At the end of the protest meeting Dubrovnik's opposition parties sent out a message to the Croatian public in which they said, amongst other things, that despite many attempts to claim these Croatian territories, Konavle has always shared the fate of Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik has never in its history given up Konavle voluntarily and neither have the Konavle citizens ever given up Dubrovnik.

Tudjman To Extend UN Presence, Not Mandate

AU2611145495 Paris AFP in English 1402 GMT 26 Nov 95

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 26 (AFP)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will agree later this week to extend the presence of UN peacekeepers in the last Serb-held area of the country but will not renew the wider UN mandate for Croatia, a UN source said Sunday [26 November].

The UN mandate in Croatia runs out Thursday and already most UN troops have been withdrawn, leaving behind mainly UN civilian staff, including humanitarian workers and human rights monitoring teams.

Tudjman, who Friday met UN special envoy Kofi Annan, wants the 1,600 UN troops based in eastern Slavonia to stay, however, and begin implementation of a U.S.-brokered agreement under which the area is to return to Croatia in one to two years. The UN troops should remain while awaiting the arrival of a larger international force to fully implement the agreement, he told Annan.

Tudjman, however, refused UN demands for human rights monitoring teams to be allowed to stay on in Croatia to ensure that Zagreb does not mistreat its minority Serb population, which has remained behind in Croatia after the defeat of the Serb rebellion in western Slavonia and Krajina earlier this year, the UN source said.

UN-Croatian relations have been badly strained this year after the UN publicised widespread atrocities committed by Croatian soldiers against Serb civilians in the Krajina region.

Friday's meeting between Tudjman and Annan "went very badly," said one source, who requested anonymity. Tudjman refused any suggestion of human rights monitoring teams staying on in the country, the source said.

At the height of its strength, earlier this year, the United Nations had some 13,500 staff in Croatia, complementing the 25,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of early November, its strength was down to 4,700 in Croatia and 16,968 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

More have left Croatia since the start of the month, a UN official said.

The two UN battalions to stay are the 1,600 Belgians and Russians in eastern Slavonia. They are generally considered too few to oversee the demilitarisation of the area and its handover to Zagreb and should under the terms of the accord negotiated between Zagreb and the separatist Serbs be joined by another 7,400 "international" troops.

Both Croatia and the rebel Serbs want US troops to be sent and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said in an interview published Friday that he wanted an American to head the transitional authority to be set up for the territory.

So far, no offers have been made to provide the extra troops needed.

Tudjman Receives Herzeg-Bosna Delegation

LD2411194795 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from the president's office on this evening's talks with the delegation of Croats from Herzeg-Bosnia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation:

The president of the republic received a delegation of representatives of Croats in Herzeg-Bosnia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation in the Presidential Palace today. Also present at the talks, apart from the president of the republic were Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Defense Minister Gojko Susak; Dr. Ivic Pasalic, presidential adviser on internal affairs; and Dr. Ivan Valent, secretary general of the Croatian Democratic Union.

During the meeting the success of the Croatian delegation at the Dayton peace talks was reiterated and in this connection, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, on behalf of the delegation, expressed his conviction that the Dayton peace accord was a solution that was in the general interest of the Croatian people as a whole. During the talks steps that needed taking in order to implement the abovementioned agreement were agreed. There was also discussion of the structure and authorities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the joint council for cooperation with the Republic of Croatia and the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its officials, and also the economic reconstruction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and economic cooperation with the Republic of Croatia.

The delegation of representatives from Herzeg-Bosnia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was made up as follows: Dr. Jadranko Prlic, Dario Kordic, Ivan Bender, Ivica Primorac, Ante Jelavic, Ilija Kozulj, Pero Markovic, Vladislav Pogarcic, Mijo Brajkovic, Martin Ragus, Ivan Vrankic, Marko Dragic, Drago Bilandzija, Valentin Coric, Mato Madjarevic, Ivica Lucic, Mariofil Ljubcic, Ivo Lozancic, Vladimir Soljic, Neven Tomic, Zdenko Cosic, Jozo Maric and General Ljubo Cesic.

Tudjman Forms Defense, National Security Council

LD2411151295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin the broadcast with a statement by the President's Office:

On the basis of Article 100, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the president has decided to form a Defense and National Security Council as an advisory body of the president to cover the fields of defense and national security.

The following members of the Defense and National Security Council have been appointed: Hrvoje Sarinic, chief adviser of the president of Croatia; Zlatko Matesa, prime minister of Croatia; Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister of Croatia and minister of foreign affairs; Dr. Ivo Sanader, head of the office of the president of Croatia; Gojko Susak, defense minister; Ivan Jarnjak, minister of internal affairs; Dr. Miroslav Tudjman, acting head of the National Security Office; Dr. Ivic Pasalic, adviser to the president of Croatia for internal affairs; Corps General Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the general staff of the Croatian Army; and Major General Slavko Baric, head of the military cabinet of the president of Croatia. Dr. Ivo Sanader has been appointed secretary general of the Defense and National Security Council. The decision comes into effect on the day it was passed.

On the basis of Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Article 6 on decisions concerning the office of the president of Croatia, the president has decided to relieve Hrvoje Sarinic of his duties as head of the office of the president of Croatia, and appoints him as chief adviser to the president of Croatia. Dr. Ivo Sanader is appointed as head of the president's office, and is relieved of his duties as deputy foreign minister.

In addition to the above decisions and on the same legal bases, the president also adopted the following decisions: Vesna Skare-Ozbolt is appointed as deputy head of the president of Croatia's office, and is relieved of her duties as assistant head of the president's office.

Corps General Anton Tus is appointed as head of the office for international military cooperation and is relieved of his duties as chief military adviser. Dr. Franjo Greguric is relieved of his duties as chief adviser to the president of Croatia. Bosiljko Misetic is relieved of his duties as adviser and plenipotentiary of the president of Croatia. Josip Sljunski is relieved of his duties as deputy head of the president's office.

Dr. Zeljka Corak is relieved of her duties as a special adviser to the president of Croatia for cultural affairs. Dr. Djuro Njavro is relieved of his duties as adviser to the president because he is taking up a new post. Zlatko Canjug is appointed as adviser to the president for social activities. Dr. Branimir Jaksic is appointed as adviser to the president for the sciences. Zlatko Vitez is appointed as adviser to the president for cultural affairs. Dr. Matko Skred is appointed as adviser to the president for economic affairs. These decisions come into effect on the day they were adopted.

Tudjman To Decorate 27,000 for Krajina Operations

LD2511185395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1809 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 25 (TANJUG)—President Franjo Tudjman will decorate 27,000 individuals for their role in the occupation of parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina and of western Bosnia a few months ago.

It was announced here Saturday that of the 27,000 decorations, as many as 19,000 are for members of the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) and the rest for Croatia's army and police members and journalists.

About 600 employees of Croatian Radio-TV (HRTV) will receive decorations for 'the coverage of the operations.'

Croatia launched aggression on western Slavonia, U.N. Sector West in the Republic of Serb Krajina, in May this year, killing about 3,000 Serb civilians and expelling 60,000.

For days after aggression, international observers were denied access to the region by Croatia's authorities.

Croatia's aggression on the southern and northern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina, U.N. Sectors North and South, followed in August, when several thousand Serbs were killed and about 250,000 expelled.

U.N. representatives have drawn attention in a number of reports to the fact that Croatia's Army and police have been plundering and burning Serb homes and killing Serbs who had stayed behind, mostly elder people.

In both aggressions, Croatia's troops shelled and aircraft strafed columns of Serb Krajina refugees.

Croatia's regular army helped Bosnian Croats and Muslims occupy western parts of the Bosnian Serb Republic Republika Srpska (RS).

On Friday [24 November], three days after the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovia was reached, Bosnian Croat forces started burning Serb homes in Sipovo and Mrkonic Grad, occupied Serb towns which are to be part of the RS under the Dayton agreement.

Four Sentenced for Crimes Against Croatia

LD2211170995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 22 Nov 95

[All names as heard]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the main hearing in the Gospic county court, the council of the Karlovac military tribunal, presided over by Mrs. Sajonara Culina, has sentenced to four years imprisonment: I.T., a Serb national born in 1935 in Jasika in the Bihac municipality [Bosnia], under Article 235, Paragraph One of Croatia's Penal Code.

As a member of the para-military of the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina, he was deployed as village guard and took part in the armed rebellion against the Republic of Croatia on Abdic Hill on the border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under a security regulation, once he has served his sentence he will be expelled from the Republic of Croatia as an alien.

For a punishable offence under Article Four of the Law on Punishable Offences, which refers to destructive and terrorist activity against the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, D.J., born in 1940 and resident of Novi Sad, and Z.G., born in 1952 in Mladenovac, have each been sentenced to eight years in prison, while N.D., born in 1962 in Aleksinac, has been sentenced to six years in prison. All three will be expelled from the Republic of Croatia once they have served their sentences.

Report Profiles New Prime Minister Matesa

AU2311091695 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 p 10

[Report by Milan Jelovac: "Special Agent for the World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although everything had been known several days in advance, when the information leaked from generally well informed circles about the new head of government, that is, about the appointment of Zlatko Matesa as prime minister, for many people this came as a big surprise. Quite understandably, because, compared with many impressive names who had been considered favorites, Matesa was not so well known although he has been at the very top of Croatian executive authorities for almost 30 months.

Who then actually is Matesa—a shadowy figure, "the government's special agent for contacts with the world's business institutions," as he is referred to these days in many reports?

What scanty biographical data there are reveal only the elementary: Born on 17 June 1949 in Zagreb, he graduated from and earned his master's degree at the Faculty of Law at Zagreb University, and attended post-graduate studies at Henley Management College in Great Britain.

He began his working career as a magistrate, but soon afterward he changed to the Ina oil company, where in the following 14 years he had a brilliant career.

Constant International Negotiations

In 1978, Matesa started to work as an assistant to the judge in the Municipal Court in Zagreb; however soon after that he left the magistrate's office to work at the Ina Trade firm. Until 1980 he worked as a legal assistant at Ina Trade, after which he was promoted to head the department, where he remained for two more years. His rise continued and from 1982 to 1985 Matesa was director of the Legal and Personnel Department, while from 1985 to 1989 he headed the Joint Ventures Department. He was a member of the Executive Board and a vice-chairman from 1980 to 1990, and until 1992 he was deputy director general of Ina.

For a year and a half (1992-1993), Matesa was the director of the Agency for Reconstruction and Development of the Republic of Croatia. After that he joined the government and from April 1993 to September 1995 he was a government minister. He is Croat, married, and has two children.

However, what makes Matesa different from a hundred other people of similar educational backgrounds and careers?

Matesa changed some conventions and set off in a different direction. He came to the government from Ina, and not vice versa. Then he was the first man in Croatia to take up the demanding and frequently disputed project of privatization. That is, the new Croatian prime minister, who is close to the HDZ's [Croatian Democratic Community] techno-managerial wing and is himself a successful manager, spent 14 months in the Agency for Reconstruction, considered to be the core of the future Fund for Privatization. During his term as manager, the Agency made decisions to transform 1,600 formerly state-owned firms, while around 200,000 citizens bought shares at discount prices. However, assessments about his performance, primarily from opposition circles, were negative, and in March 1993 Matesa handed over to Ivan Penic.

When everybody thought that Matesa's star had fallen, a new rise followed. Some 30 days after that, Matesa accepted Valentic's [then prime minister] invitation to become a minister without portfolio in charge of contacts with international financial institutions. There has hardly been a single meeting with the world's business institutions in which the current prime minister has not been involved. He was the country's coordinator for PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, the coordinator for Croatia's admission to GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the WTO, as well as a member of the state delegation to the negotiations on Croatia's inherited foreign debt. He met with U.S. President Bill Clinton early this year at a conference in Cleveland, where he organized a very successful promotion of Croatia.

Without Fear From Denationalization

Matesa is to be given the greatest credit for the successful outcome of the negotiations with the Paris Club on the recalculation of much of Croatia's debt inherited from the former state. Many chroniclers would say that he is a man with powerful connections in international financial circles, pointing out that this could be extremely important for the next phase of the stabilization program, because the implementation of the stabilization program initiated by Valentic is the key task of the new government, as well as a precondition for the transformation of Croatia from a war-torn country into a prosperous one.

Matesa has already announced a tough struggle with the problem of denationalization and that production growth and keeping the inflation down to 3 percent will be the priority tasks of the new prime minister. Matesa has willpower, knowledge, and strength, and he is in a good shape as well, as his friends with whom he plays football will occasionally say, but this is also the opinion of the old (new) members of the government.

The new pipe-smoking prime minister and his crew know one another quite well, even from the time when Valentic was the captain of the ship. The storm is over, the sea is almost calm, and Matesa and his government know the destination they are bound for.

Statement on Participation in IFOR Mission

WS2711135395 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 27 Nov 95 p 3

[Statement by Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, Polish Defense Ministry press spokesman: "Poland's Participation in IFOR Operation"; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] In light of the interest on the part of public opinion and incomplete or distorted media reports concerning Poland's engagement in the peacekeeping process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I report that Poland's foreign minister, on behalf of the Polish Government, sent a letter to NATO's deputy secretary-general on 6 November expressing interest in a Polish unit's participation in the peacekeeping mission of IFOR (Implementation Force). Intensive consultations are currently under way on that matter, discussing the issue of interaction with the allied forces in the French and U.S. sectors.

The Council of Ministers Committee for Defense Issues was familiarized with the conditions for launching an IFOR operation at its 23 November session. Intensive consultations are currently under way on that matter, discussing the issue of interaction with the allied forces in the French and U.S. sectors.

At its 23 November session, the Council of Ministers Committee for Defense Issues was familiarized with the conditions for launching an IFOR operation and with conclusions based on the analysis of political, military, logistic, and financial aspects. It was underscored that Poland's participation in an operation under NATO's command would be a confirmation of the credibility of Poland's security policy and a tangible step toward our rapprochement with NATO structures. The Council of Ministers is going to make binding decisions at one of its coming sessions with regard to sending an integrated unit of the Polish Army to former Yugoslavia.

Walesa Says Left Has No 'Moral Right' to Power

LD2611225295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2200 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa thinks that the presidential elections were rigged. According to the president, the great number of election protests is proof of that. At a meeting with miners in Czestochowa, Walesa said there was a lot of evidence that Aleksandr Kwasniewski won by using dubious methods. In the president's opinion, the postcommunists do not have a moral right to be in power in Poland:

[Begin Walesa recording] The highest office in the state will probably be held by the candidate of the Left. Post-August Poland has failed. It is the Poland of the *nomenklatura*, the Poland of dubious links and businesses, and the Poland of people without a moral right to be in power in the Third Republic, which has won so far. [end recording]

Cites 'Doubtful Methods' Used

LD2611173195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1558 GMT 26 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Czestochowa, 26 Nov—At a meeting with miners in the Papal Hall at the shrine of Jasna Gora today, President Lech Walesa called for the rejection of ambition, private interest, and festering disputes, and for the creation of "a wise force."

"It is time to consider how to continue to lead Poland," said Lech Walesa. "I do not bury myself in regret and bitterness. I remain with you, I am not departing, I am not giving up the fight."

After a short speech, the president answered questions from the hall, a significant number of which were about the last elections. In Lech Walesa's view, there were manipulations in the course of the elections, which fact is among others causing the large number of electoral protests. The president has not precluded "possible solutions" becausse "the courts in Poland are independent" and there is much proof that "the candidate won using doubtful methods."

After the end of the meeting with the miners, the president went to the Rosary Chapel, where he is participating in the deliberations of the National Commission of the Solidarity trade union. The deliberations are closed to the press.

Walesa: Forces of Right Need 'Education' Period

LD2611230995 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 26 Nov 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a Mass, President Lech Walesa had a meeting with miners who took part in a pilgrimage. Lech Walesa thanked them for their support in the elections but said he was shocked by the result:

[Begin Walesa recording] My code of values has collapsed. I do not know what the nation has done to me and to us. I must give it a lot of thought now because I have lost my faith in the sense of my fight of 25 years, which, as it has turned out, did not make any sense. [end recording]

Lech Walesa said that he will not stop his political activity because he has a debt to pay to 9 million of his voters. Also, power has now been given to those who have no moral right to it. Walesa thinks that he himself and the entire Right are now entering a period when reconciliation as well as education will be necessary because the election results have shown that it is the people of the Left who are the professionals in politics and the people of the Right who are the amateurs.

After the meeting with the miners, the president had a meeting with the Solidarity National Commission, which was closed to the press.

Kwasniewski Gives Up Party Leadership, Membership

LD2511120295 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 25 Nov 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski has given up his post of chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and resigned his membership of this party. The Supreme Council of the SdRP began its meeting an hour ago in Warsaw.

[Correspondent Maciej Sojka—identified by screen caption] Today's meeting is a result of the SdRP leader's victory in the presidential elections. Aleksander Kwasniewski gave up the post of chairman and then quit the party. In an interview for a German newspaper yesterday, he declared that he will not join any party for the rest of his life and stressed that this will remain the case irrespective of what happens.

Today, the Supreme Council will appoint someone to become acting chairman of the party. The new party leader can only be elected by the SdRP convention, which is likely to meet at the beginning of next year.

Stepping down, Aleksander Kwasniewski expressed the conviction that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] should be enlarged and that its current shape should not be final. The president-elect said that, while in office, first and foremost, he would like to see the adoption of the new constitution and of the budget, which will guarantee economic growth.

Aleksander Kwaśniewski did not comment on the content of protests lodged by Solidarity and by Lech Walesa's election committee.

Kwasniewski Says No Party Will Dominate

BR2411103795 Paris LIBERATION in French 23-24 Nov 95 p 12

[Interview with newly elected Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by LIBERATION Correspondent Elisabeth Kulakowska in Warsaw, date not given: "New Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski: 'There Is No Doubt Regarding Our Pro-European Stance'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In an interview given to LIBERATION, the new 41-year-old Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was elected into office on 19 November, confirmed his desire to continue with the country's reforms and with the process involved in joining the EU and NATO.*

[Kulakowska] Lech Walesa announced that he would not be handing over the presidential powers to you in person on 23 December. What is your reaction?

[Kwasniewski] The election campaign was difficult, but frustration is not a good mentor. The presidential powers should be handed over in the normal manner. We do not have to like each other, but we must cooperate as far as possible.

[Kulakowska] Do you think Walesa will become the leader of an opposition movement?

[Kwasniewski] We live in a democracy in which parliament is scheduled for renewal in two years. If Lech Walesa wants to build up support around himself, I would even look favorably upon such a move because on the Left we already have a powerful political group. The Right must learn its lessons from the elections and rally its forces. Lech Walesa is not a man to stay on the sidelines.

[Kulakowska] What did you think of the international reactions to your election?

[Kwasniewski] I received the first messages of congratulations from Germany, and I think my first trip abroad will take me to that country. Although it was not made by a left-wing politician, the statement that touched me most deeply was that made by Vaclav Klaus (the Czech prime minister—LIBERATION editor's note) who said that in Poland it was not the political line that had changed, but rather a politician. Herve de Charette (the French foreign minister—LIBERATION editor's note) may have been more skeptical, as we do not know each other. But I am convinced that in politics people are judged on the basis of their actions and, as soon as we get down to actual talks, we shall see that the Polish and French positions on the EU are very close and that there is no doubt about our pro-European stance. In his letter to me, President Jacques Chirac stressed that our relations would now be shaped by the prospect of EU enlargement.

[Kulakowska] Are you not afraid that the European Union and NATO will adopt a hesitant attitude toward a Poland led by a postcommunist president?

[Kwasniewski] Let us put an end to such stereotypes. If I were a politician in the West, I would ask myself whether it was not better for the representative of the group which is suspected of having reservations vis-a-vis NATO—to be willing to join that organization. The main thing is that there is a broad consensus on this issue in Poland. All the more so since we are no longer threatened by a resurgence of the Warsaw Pact or the USSR. We are now living in a completely different historical context.

[Kulakowska] Do you think that Poland's accession to NATO should be negotiated with Russia, which is hostile to the idea?

[Kwasniewski] No. It is not Russia that decides in this area, it is the parliaments of the member states of NATO and Poland that will do so. However, we must discuss the matter with Russia, and explain that Poland's accession to NATO is not a move directed against them. Our presence within the EU, along with that of Hungary and the Czech Republic, will not signify a new [Berlin] Wall. It is no coincidence that in the telephone conversation we had on Tuesday [21 November], President Clinton said he was happy that I had emphasized the need for good relations with Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Stability in this part of Europe is in everybody's interest.

[Kulakowska] You have promised to back the liberalization of the antiabortion law. Are you not afraid that your relations with the church will deteriorate?

[Kwasniewski] I have always been in favor of liberalizing this law, and if the Sejm (Chamber of Deputies) adopts a more liberal bill, then I will support it. There will be a lot of debate yet, but society's position on the matter seems fairly clear to me. I would like there to be normal relations between the church and the state because a conflict with the church would not be at all a good thing for Poland.

[Kulakowska] The press has focussed on your political group's monopoly of power. What is your view on this?

[Kwasniewski] Does the fact that Jacques Chirac is president and that there is a right-wing majority in the French parliament pose a threat to France? No. So why should things be different in Poland? Here, as in France, there is a large number of independent institutions: the courts, the media, the National Bank, the business community, and local authorities. This guarantees that no party will dominate.

The media must learn from this electoral campaign. They have been tendentious, but I will never violate their independence. On Tuesday I lunched with the main representatives of the Polish media and I believe I managed to reassure them.

[Kulakowska] Do you intend to proceed with a government reshuffle?

[Kwasniewski] No. Poland needs continuity. In this respect I consider the resignation of the ministers of defense, the interior, and foreign affairs (all three of whom were appointed by President Walesa—LIBERATION editor's note) to have been premature. There is a new president, but the strategic objectives remain the same.

[Kulakowska] What will be your priorities during your presidency?

[Kwasniewski] To adopt a new constitution (since 1989 Poland has had a provisional constitution—LIBERATION editor's note), social reforms—particularly the reform of the social security system, and the process involved in joining NATO and the European Union.

[Kulakowska] Nearly 48 percent of the Poles voted for Walesa. Do you believe that you represent all the Polish people?

[Kwasniewski] The Polish people fully accept the choices made in 1989, in other words the reforms and our country's aspiration to join the European structures. So I will be judged on the basis of what I do.

Kwasniewski: No Return to Compromised Methods

LD2511201295 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski has given up all his functions, as well as his membership, in the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. He handed in his No. 13 party card to Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. Aleksander Kwasniewski said at the SdRP Supreme Council meeting today that his decision did not mean a complete departure and breaking off contacts with his party colleagues, but it was necessary to treat all political partners in an unbiased and equal way.

When recalling the five years of the functioning of the SdRP, Kwasniewski said that not only in 1990, but even two years ago, after the victory in the parliamentary elections, nobody could expect that the SdRP representative would become president.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] When we decided to form the SdRP there were no optimists who thought that in five years' time we would be able to celebrate the election of one of us—and this includes Kwasniewski—to the post of president of the Polish Republic. We were a party that began its existence in very difficult conditions.

However, that decision, the decision we made in 1990, was not an opportunistic one. We had a conviction that there was a social need for left-wing values. We had a conviction that we had to be consistent in our own choices, our own decisions, and our system of values. In 1990, nobody among us thought that we were entering a path of easy success, easy decisions, and full social acceptance. There certainly were no people who thought we were starting on a path of privilege resulting from being in power.

This party, in five years of its existence, has proved that it is the party we described five years ago, a party that has become part of the democratic Poland and that is jointly creating this democratic Poland. [end recording]

Kwasniewski pointed out that representatives of his party supported bills connected with the Balcerowicz plan, privatization, bills aimed at increasing the powers of local government, and the creation of democratic mechanisms, and consistently placed itself in the group of reformers. At the same time, he said that there could be no return to compromised methods of government from before 1989.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] We assess as wrong that part of tradition and activity of our predecessor. We assess as wrong those elements of the political system that prevailed in Poland before 1989 and that meant restrictions of democracy, the curbing of freedoms and liberties, and lack of sovereignty and bad economy. However, for five years we have been talking clearly, and we have demonstrated great determination in fighting for the dignity of people, honest people who spent over 40 years working in the Polish People Republic [PRL]. They did it not for the PRL, not for the Polish United Workers Party, and not for individual [Communist Party] first secretaries but with a deep conviction that they tried to work honestly for themselves and for their families and for Poland, for our common Poland. [end recording]

President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski said that he will try to persuade Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski to withdraw his resignation. In an interview for the Berlin daily TAGESSPIEGEL, Kwasniewski said that he intended to have a conversation with the Polish foreign minister soon.

Radio Zet Interviews Prime Minister Oleksy

LD2211165795 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0710 GMT 22 Nov 95

[Studio interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by correspondent Krzysztof Skowronski—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy is the guest of Radio Zet today. Good morning.

[Oleksy] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[Skowronski] Who will become the new minister of foreign affairs?

[Oleksy] We shall see. Minister Bartoszewski has only just resigned. There is no hurry because all the ministers who have resigned said that their resignations would come into effect on 20 December. I see no reason why I should not agree to it. They are clearly combining their resignations with the date of the end of President Walesa's term in office. This determines their further activity in these posts.

[Skowronski] What will be the criteria for the appointment of new ministers?

[Oleksy] Professional ones rather than political ones.

[Skowronski] What does: rather than political ones, mean?

[Oleksy] The key to the appointments will be primarily their suitability to perform in the specific posts and their usefulness for Polish affairs, which are the priority. When it comes to the minister of foreign affairs, the important things will certainly be the capability to hold this position, knowledge of the world, and how to move around in the world, and the ability to understand what are Poland's most important objectives.

[Skowronski] Prime Minister, you must have some names, some candidates in mind?

[Oleksy] I certainly do, but it is too early to mention any possible specific candidates.

[Skowronski] Will Polish foreign policy change?

[Oleksy] Not at all. When I was in New York at the UN session and talked to politicians from various countries, starting with the Americans, I answered exactly such questions. The questions were often asked in a tone of concern as to whether the presidential elections would not mean a turn, or a change, in Poland. The world is interested in this. I made assurances, with all certainty, that Poland's foreign policy is not an idea pursued just by one team. It is a result of a political consensus between political parties. There is no party in Poland that is questioning the fundamental principles of the orientation which started in 1989. This is a great value of this policy.

Second, this policy, for example in its euro-atlantic aspect, is also a result of public support. Let me remind you that 75 percent of the public support this orientation. So, this is a matter rooted much more deeply than it would seem by just having a look at the government programs.

[Skowronski] What have the elections changed? What have the presidential elections changed?

[Oleksy] It is too early to say. The changes are too fresh for any summing up. The formal changes are known. But you probably mean the intangible changes, which have resulted in somewhat different thinking, in different evaluations, different stereotypes, and different fears. Let us take a minor example. In the debates before the elections, much noise was made about the catastrophic perception of Poland in the world and about Poland's ability to cooperate with the outside world if Aleksandr Kwasniewski won the elections. Let me remind you about the disaster theories that the world would turn its back on us, that we would lose access to NATO and the European Union, that we would find ourselves isolated.

Nothing like this will happen, and I said that already then. Yesterday, a contact took place between Aleksandr Kwasniewski and Bill Clinton, not something which was forced on anybody, but was completely voluntary on the part of the President of the United States. The words spoken in that telephone conversation prove that it is wrong to think that one or another democratic choice in Poland would cause a particular reaction from the West and other countries. This is simply untrue. This particular choice has certainly aroused much interest in the world, but did not arouse the reactions about which we had been warned so strongly.

[Skowronski] Will you meet President Lech Walesa once more?

[Oleksy] I am prepared to meet him. I think that, apart from everything else, we have known each other as people and we cooperated. Disregarding various tensions, which are normal in such long periods of working together, I am ready for a meeting. It depends on President Walesa. At least, I would like to thank him for the time we spent together working for Poland. We could share the reflections we both have. This is normal and this should be normal, for decisions of one kind or another within the democratic system should not antagonize people and should not influence the attitude to each other.

[Skowronski] Are you in favor of early parliamentary elections?

[Oleksy] At the moment I do not see either the need or any reasons for it. It could be taken into account if there were some deeper complications on the political scene, if some new coalitions emerged.

[Skowronski] Can new coalitions emerge?

[Oleksy] I would not think so. Yesterday's meeting of the entire coalition leadership did not become a source of any conflict or tension. We had calm talks and discussion on the current stage of cooperation, about what has to be improved, about the need to identify the most urgent program preferences, about the need to define what the differences between the partners are—so that there are no myths about some awful divisions, but normal differences of program opinions, which are known, identified, and discussed.

[Skowronski] At the same time, the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] has quite great demands from its coalition partner, that is, the SDRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic].

[Oleksy] This subject was not discussed. We shall meet each other regularly. I want contacts with the leaders of the coalition partner to be permanent and frequent because only then can we avoid misunderstandings and overinterpretation of individual opinions and expressions. There will be no bargaining here, no new allocations because these were presidential elections. They have not had any impact on the coalition.

[Skowronski] But there are three vacant ministerial posts. What is the criterion here, any ministers from the PSL...

[Oleksy, interrupting] This is a coincidence, and I am not sure yet whether these posts will actually be available, although I expect such a discussion will take place.

[Skowronski] Who will become the leader of the SDRP? Certainly not Aleksander Kwasniewski?

[Oleksy] Certainly not, because it is almost impossible constitutionally.

[Skowronski] You have been named as a possible candidate.

[Oleksy] There are such cases in the world when the prime minister heads the party.

[Skowronski] Is it possible?

[Oleksy] Formally, it is possible.

[Skowronski] If you agree, you will probably become the leader.

[Oleksy] I do not know. I have not thought about it yet.

[Skowronski] But you have to make the decision by tomorrow?

[Oleksy] Not tomorrow, by Saturday. The meeting of the Supreme Council is on Saturday. It will set the date for a convention, because it is not the Supreme Council which makes this change. The Supreme Council can accept Aleksandr Kwasniewski's resignation. The election of the SDRP leadership happens directly at a party congress or convention.

[Skowronski] Who will be your competitor?

[Oleksy] I do not know. It is a democratic party which functions according to democratic principles and a secret ballot. It is not the object of my dreams, but I am not ruling out a solution which will require from me to combine the functions.

[Skowronski] Will the presidential elections have any impact on public television?

[Oleksy] I cannot see any relation here. I think that we are all learning. The television has also experimented with some new situations and new ways of broadcasting and organizing the way information and comments are passed on to the public. At the moment, I cannot see any relation between the elections and the affairs of television.

[Skowronski] Very often, the SDRP leaders criticized television for being right-wing. Will this not be an obstacle now?

[Oleksy] It depends. The head of state has been elected, and from this moment on, he ceases to be a political figure, and this, in a way, determines the issue. However, there were very many discussions around these elections, and many people had different opinions on their profile, bias, stresses, firm assessment, unambiguous meaning one way or another, and I do not think that these discussions should end all of a sudden only because the elections have taken place.

[Skowronski] What will happen to the National Polish Bank [NBP], to the president of the NBP?

[Oleksy] And what should happen?

[Skowronski] Was it not a presidential appointment?

[Oleksy] The president does not even have the power to recall the bank president, if we are talking about this. This is a matter for a possible amendment to the laws which could change the rules. However, it would be a risky idea, if you look at it from this point of view, because the independence of the central bank adds a certain value to the system. So, personally, I would be against any rapid measures here, against any impulse changes as a result of satisfaction with the election results.

[Skowronski] Are you expecting any social conflicts?

[Oleksy] I have always been aware of social conflicts.

[Skowronski] But now in particular?

[Oleksy] There are no particular reasons...

[Skowronski, interrupting] Because the post-Solidarity side has lost the elections, the first, the second, and the third?

[Oleksy] Unfortunately, statements by union leaders, Mr. Krzaklewski and the others, sounded a bit ominous. However, the consolation is that they always stressed that they would not take to the streets and resort to force, demonstrations, but that this should take the form of protest and argument, of a struggle for their convictions and program principles according to rules accepted by civilized and democratic countries. This sounds very general. I did detect such announcements of increased social pressure. However, I think that some of them were guided by emotions and disappointment caused by the elections temperature. Some, however, may materialize. I would not like this to happen and it would be ominous if some counteractivity should happen, or acts of revenge, for such acts would be a revenge against Poland and not against any specific government. The time has passed when to spite the government, one tries to organize people and release their emotions. Now this would only be done to spite ourselves, all of us.

I do not rule out a social conflict because there are still many matters unresolved, or not solved completely, which can arouse human dissatisfaction. In some areas, one can have such impressions.

[Skowronski] There is also the political dissatisfaction with the elections of the 49 percent who have wasted their votes.

[Oleksy] I do not think that people can be aroused to protest against a certain election outcome. The motivation would be too weak for a collective protest to take place.

[Skowronski] Do you think that the historical division: Solidarity...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I would like... [changes thought] This division became more animated during the elections as a result of the specific biographies of the candidates, but that was predictable. However, I hope and believe that this division will not be very deep and will not last in Polish society, although such opinions were expressed. According to them, a lasting, final division of society has now appeared and it cannot be overcome. I do not think that it is a division which concerns people living together. It is a division of opinions and it does not have to mean a division in the form of mutual animosity. I hope that this will not happen.

[Skowronski] It seems that President Lech Walesa may still announce an enfranchisement referendum. What will your and the government's position be?

[Oleksy] My position on this matter is known. The government's policy is in favor of enfranchisement. However, we understand it differently than what one can read in a very laconic statement.

[Skowronski] So, if the referendum says yes, you will also say yes? Is this the way it is being implemented?

[Oleksy] I hope that it will not be just a simple yes in the referendum. Why should one call a referendum if, when the question is asked in this way, it is already known what the answer will be?

[Skowronski] The Senate will agree and President Walesa will call a referendum.

[Oleksy] Formally, all this is in order, but, let me remind you, this proposal was mentioned when the temperature of elections promises was high and when there were various proposals which sounded good. I am in favor of asking the opinion of the public through a referendum, and I supported it when this entry was being put in the Constitution, but we have to do it wisely. Let us say, in February we shall say yes to enfranchisement. And what will the consequences be? What enfranchisement are we talking about?

[Skowronski] Mass enfranchisement.

[Oleksy] Mass enfranchisement still does not explain anything because the forms of privatization which the government is implementing also are of a mass nature, although they are not total. There will be discussions, and it is a good thing. The bad thing is that we are entering into a referendum with one laconic question, not knowing anything about the political and social infrastructure, and without having agreed upon anything as to what should happen afterwards, financially, organizationally, legally, etc. However, the law is the law.

The only problem is that two months after the referendum the government will have to introduce a government. It will have to implement the will arising from the referendum. It is quite a complex situation. [as heard]

[Skowronski] What vices does Aleksandr Kwasniewski have?

[Oleksy] He knows them best himself, and so does his wife and the people he is close to.

[Skowronski] Do you know of any?

[Oleksy] I do, but this is a festive postelection time and it is not a good time to talk about vices. First and above all, he has an exceptionally high balance of traits and abilities which have made him into a leader and allowed him to win the elections.

[Skowronski] Did you know that he did not have a master's degree?

[Oleksy] I do not think that this subject deserves so much noise and that it should have been raised in this tone. I personally did not know about that. However, this fact does not have much significance.

[Skowronski] So, why didn't he say so?

[Oleksy] Why are you asking me about that? This was not a matter of primary importance.

[Skowronski] Thank you very much, prime minister. The guest of Radio Zet was Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy.

[Oleksy] Thank you very much.

Glemp Sees 'Moral Sickness' in Election Choice

LD2311153795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 23 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the primate of Poland, in an interview for the CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY [KAI], has announced that, after an election in which society chose the candidate who did not represent Christian values, the church will not be calling for revolution. In the primate's opinion, the reason for the defeat was the moral sickness of society, which particularly affected people's consciences. Cardinal Jozef Glemp thinks the choice was dictated primarily by emotions, built on the visual impression of the candidates created by television. In his opinion, Aleksandr Kwasniewski corresponded better to the image of a president-statesman expected by society, although, as he stressed, what he presented had a purely superficial value.

The primate expressed the opinion that neither the church nor its authority had lost. He distanced himself at the same time from the statement that voting for Aleksandr Kwasniewski was a sin and said that this would be an abuse.

Daily Comments on Election Protests

WS2411145995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Nov 95 p 6

[Commentary by Deputy Chief Editor Bozena Wawrzewska: "A Matter of Authority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The beginning of the new presidency is surrounded by a bad atmosphere. The cases of equivocal behavior of candidate Kwasniewski, his staff, and his entourage, which were not explained in time, are bearing fruit that may be unpleasant to him even before he officially assumes office. The issue of the candidate's education and related statements, which transpired right before the elections and which many people did not believe, has brought about official protests and motions requesting invalidation of the elections. The president-elect's aides are using bad propaganda models and presenting unfounded arguments to counter the charges leveled at him. Attempts to stifle the doubts, instead of providing a solid and honest explanation, are not the best solution.

It is difficult to estimate today what the chances are of the protests that have been filed with the Supreme Court. This will be handled by lawyers and judges. However, the issue itself is very serious. Invalidation of the elections for merely this reason is difficult to imagine—it would discredit the state and the office of the president. However, the fact that a situation has been allowed in which soon after the elections the president-elect's veracity must be discussed in public is embarrassing; it is embarrassing not only for the one elected, but also for the democratic elections themselves.

The new president will find himself in a configuration in which those in power may be largely outside any kind of control because all of the centers of power are in the hands of the same group. What is more, the behavior of some ministers, such as [Justice] Minister Jaskierna, for example, may lead people to suspect that appropriate offices will try to obscure his schemes instead of clarifying them. The president, in turn, if he wants to be respected and regarded as an honest man, should be beyond all suspicion.

Anyone can make a mistake, including a presidential candidate, president-elect, or president. However, people should not get the impression that, instead of admitting the mistake, the first citizen of Poland is trying to hide something or wriggle out of it. A much worse situation develops when dishonesty is confirmed—by a ruling of the Supreme Court, for instance—and when the person concerned does not comment on this disturbing issue until the very end.

Sejm Rejects No-Confidence Motion on Minister

LD2411124595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Sejm has overturned the motion of no confidence in Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek. Over to our reporter:

[Tadeusz Sznuk] It happened two minutes ago. The debate on the issue lasted three hours: 46 deputies voted for the motion, 188 voted against, and 73 abstained. [passage omitted]

Two Priests Expelled From Ukraine for 'Espionage'

WS2411150095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 24 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by Jaroslaw Mlynarski in Przemysl and Volodymyr Vorobets in Lvov: "Has the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Deemed Polish Priests Spies? A Very Delicate Matter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian authorities have expelled two Polish priests for "violating the rules of their stay in Ukraine." The decision was preceded by months of surveillance by the secret services. The priests, Jozef Trela and Piotr Buk from the Przemysl Archdiocese, were on a church mission in Kolomyya.

Lvov Metropolitan Archbishop Marian Jaworski informed both clerics early this month that the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has its reservations about them. The two priests were constantly watched by Ukraine's Security Services (SBU). The Polish Embassy in Kiev tried to find out what the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's objections specifically were, but it did not receive an official reply.

In mid-November, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry informed the priests, without stating the reasons, that, if they leave the country immediately, the whole thing will not be made public. Two high-ranking SBU officers tried to persuade them to signing a statement that they will leave Ukraine because they have violated the law. As they did not feel guilty, the clerics refused.

The apostolic nuncio in Warsaw was notified. He and the Lvov metropolitan recommended that the priests come back to Poland and appeal to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's claims from here. The priests returned on 20 November, accompanied by an employee of the Polish Consulate in Lvov. They were followed to the border crossing in Shehyni by three cars with civilian license plates.

Polish Consul General Tomasz Leoniuk told us in Lvov that the case of the priests did not qualify for consular aid: "That would have applied only had they been arrested."

From a source at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we learned yesterday that "this is a very delicate matter; the Polish clerics are suspected of espionage."

Foreign Ministry Protests

LD2411134895 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 24 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] has stated that the expulsion of two Polish priests from the Ukraine is incompatible with international law and inconsistent with the good manners that should exist between friendly states. The Polish MSZ intervened both in Kiev and at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw, but the Ukrainian side has not provided arguments to justify the decision ordering the priests to leave Ukraine.

Hungarian Diplomat on Response to Reconciliation

AU2211134995 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Eva Galambos: "Ferencz Szocs, Hungary's new ambassador to Bucharest: Reconciliation Is Not an Act in Itself, but a Process Consisting of Many Small Steps"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary's new ambassador, His Excellency Ferencz Szocs, held a first meeting with journalists at Hungary's Embassy in Bucharest. The main part of the news conference was the ambassador's presentation of the situation of bilateral relations and the position of the Hungarian side regarding President Ion Iliescu's initiative on the historic Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation.

The ambassador said that bilateral relations could be described as "complex" in certain areas (military, cultural, and economic areas] where remarkable success has been registered, while "stagnation" can be noticed in other areas. However, the possibilities for the development of these relations are endless. The Hungarian Government is interested in Romania's political and economic stability, in developing economic relations, in the success of Romania's integration in the euro-atlantic structures, and in the progress of democracy. Likewise, Hungary wants the Hungarian minority in Romania to feel comfortable in their homeland. The ambassador repeated the Hungarian side's desire to have consulates reopened on mutual bases and have new border crossing points opened.

After he made a review of the Romanian-Hungarian talks on the basic treaty and the four problems on which the sides have not yet reached agreement (connected with Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe), the ambassador presented the Hungarian side's position regarding the historic reconciliation initiative, referring to the three documents forwarded by Romania: the political declaration regarding bilateral relations, the intergovernmental cooperation accord, and the code of behavior regarding national minorities.

The ambassador said that the Hungarian side agrees to the reconciliation initiative, this being included in the program of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Hungarian Government. Hungary, while it appreciates the Franco-German reconciliation model proposed by the Romanian side, still believes that there are other models, but the sides' objective should be to work out an individual Romanian-Hungarian model. Reconciliation is not an act in itself, but a process consisting of many small steps. This should unfold on three levels: reconciliation between nations, between governments, and between the majority and minority populations. By 15 December, the Hungarian Government will prepare an answer to the three documents, and talks at experts' level on those documents will begin in January.

In replying to the journalists' questions, the ambassador also mentioned that as far as the Hungarian minority is concerned, the Hungarian Government's opinion is that its legal organizations should try to have better relations with their governments and the governments should hold discussions with those organizations and include them in negotiations regarding their fate.

'Concern' Over Russian Duma's Dniester Resolution

AU2211183795 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued today a statement in which it expresses concern over the recent Russian State Duma decision, whereby it suggested to President Boris Yeltsin to recognize Dniester as a zone of strategic and vital interest for Russia.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry fully supports the demarches that President Mircea Snegur and the entire leadership of the Republic of Moldova intend to make with the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Council of Europe. Likewise, the Romanian Foreign Ministry advocates solutions through dialogue to the status of the rayons in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova, under conditions of respect for Moldova's territorial integrity and the sovereignty of that state.

Dniester is an integral part of the Republic of Moldova and the territorial integrity of this republic is guaranteed by international law. The key to solving the Dniester crisis is the most rapid, orderly, and complete withdrawal of the 14th Army from this territory, reads the statement of the Romanian Foreign Ministry.

PDSR Council Reelects Gherman, Nastase

AU2511204295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 25 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a first meeting following the national conference of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], the national council of that party reelected Messrs. Oliviu Gherman and Adrian Nastase in the offices of party president and executive president respectively.

The national council also designated the persons to belong among the members of the standing delegation of the PDSR.

As party vice presidents, they elected [?Hildegard Cuvac] and Eugenia Moldoveanu, as well as Messrs. Ion Solcanu, Doru Ioan Taracila, Alexandru Lapusan, Dan Mircea Popescu, Dan Ioan Popescu, Virgil Popa, and Dumitru Danga.

Mr. Miron Mitrea was elected party secretary general.

According to statute, besides the aforementioned persons, the PDSR standing delegation also includes Oliviu Gherman, the president of the party; Adrian Nastase, executive president; Vasile Vacaru, the leader of the PDSR faction in the Senate; Dan Martian, the leader of the PDSR faction in the chamber of deputies; and Liviu Maior [education minister], the leader of the PDSR ministerial group.

The national council also appointed Messrs. Ion Manzatu, Octav Cosmanca, Victor Neagu, Viorel Hrebenciuc, Gheorghe Valceanu, Mircea Pavlu, and Constantin Teculescu as secretaries of the PDSR Executive Bureau.

The first meeting of the standing delegation will take place on Thursday, 7 December.

The national council meeting was followed by a news conference, during which Messrs. Gherman and Nastase, the PDSR president and executive president, respectively, answered the journalists' questions.

PUNR National Convention Elects Leading Bodies

AU2511203695 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 20 Nov 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Composition of the New Central Leadership and Control Bodies of the Romanian National Unity Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the reelection of Gheorghe Funar to the position of president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], the PUNR National Convention voted on the party's central leadership and control bodies. Valer Suian was elected general secretary with 193 votes, thus defeating Ioan Gavra (184 votes) and Viorel Salagean (63 votes). The following were elected to the position of PUNR vice presidents: Corneliu Balan (Department of Labor and Social Protection); Gheorghe Secara (Department of Programs and Doctrine); Teodor Ardeleanu (Department of Economic Reform and Privatization); Valeriu Tabara (Department of Agriculture and Food); Ioan Gavra (Department of Relations with the Presidency, Government, and the Local Administration); Lazar Ladariu (Department of Culture and Art); Iosif Gavril Chiuzbaian (Department of International Relations); Aurel Novac (Department of Defense and Public Order); Ioan Petru (Department of Education and Science); Ioan Pop (Department for Parliamentary Parties and Nongovernmental Organizations); and Mircea Vilcu (Department of Relations with the Mass-Media). Senator Augustin Crecan contested the validity of Valer Suian's election to the position of general secretary on account of the fact that he did not obtain half plus one of the votes. Ioan Gavra withdrew his candidacy immediately so as to avoid a new ballot.

Federal

Milutinovic Rules Out Amendments to Peace Accord

AU2711112795 Paris AFP in English 1100 GMT 27 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 27 (AFP)—Milan Milutinovic, foreign minister of rump Yugoslavia, ruled out the possibility of any amendments to the Dayton peace accord, in an interview published Monday [27 November] by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA.

"We can discuss other questions in Paris, if our hosts propose it, but under no circumstances the documents initialled in Dayton," he said.

The Dayton agreement is due to be formally signed in Paris sometime in the first two weeks of December.

The foreign minister's comments came a day after Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic said the Belgrade government would seek to "correct" parts of the accord.

Quoted by Tanjug news agency, Lilic said: "we will try to correct everything that isn't good," but failed to specify which parts he hoped to revise.

The Bosnian Serbs vehemently oppose the peace plan's solution for Sarajevo, which places the city under Bosnian government control as one entity, including all Serb-held areas.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on Sunday warned that the Sarajevo solution may need renegotiation.

Lilic Views Dayton Agreement, Sanctions

AU2611194795 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Nov 95

["Exclusive" interview with FRY President Zoran Lilic by Dusan Djordjevic, editor in chief of Belgrade Radio's First Program; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Djordjevic] Mr. President, allow me first of all to thank you for receiving me and to express my pleasure that you will be answering my questions for the listeners of the First Program of Belgrade Radio. The reason for the interview, as you know, are the important events for our country that happened this week. This refers first of all to the signing, that is, initialing, of the peace agreement in Dayton and the Security Council's decision to permanently suspend sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Can you tell us the main points of the importance of these two major events for our country?

[Lilic] Of course. I have already had the opportunity to make a statement during the initialing of the agreement in Dayton. I do not think it would be bad to repeat some of the impressions that were expressed at that time in a way that probably expressed the feelings of all of us in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All of us were a bit excited, all of us were certainly very happy and very satisfied that we have found ourselves again in the position of being a part of Europe, part of the world, part of what we have always been, but what we had been deprived of with the introduction of sanctions.

As you said, this event, both events, that happened last week are certainly important events. However, I would like to expand on this and say that this is certainly an important historic event that followed the period behind us, the years that we have spent fighting persistently to prove to the world what the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is really advocating and what policy it is conducting. It is in fact that policy that has experienced the full affirmation and full recognition in Dayton with the very fact of the suspension of the sanctions. It is certain that, in addition to the fact that we have managed to preserve peace in our region, that we have managed to preserve our economic resources, that we have managed to preserve potentials, which are not insignificant in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that we have managed to preserve, and I like to stress this, the people and, what we consider the most important, our man, it is certain that this event is of very great importance for our country.

What is also very important and significant, and I have already mentioned this, is that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has practically been defended in Dayton. In the past four or five years, we have been trying to prove that we are carrying on with the continuity of Yugoslavia, that we are conducting a peaceful policy, that we primarily strive for cooperation among peoples, for good-neighborly cooperation. We have now finally reached the moment for this to be acknowledged by those who have in a way been accusing us of doing the opposite.

What is also very important, in addition to preserving peace and the affirmation of the policy that we had been conducting, is the fact that the Serb Republic has been created and legalized in the practical sense. I think that this is indeed a very, very important moment in the history of the Serb people. All the well-intentioned people who live in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic cannot deny this fact.

Therefore, we indeed have many reasons to be satisfied and to remember with pride the day when the peace agreement was initialed in Dayton, to remember the day when the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led by Slobodan Milosevic practically returned Yugoslavia to the place that belongs to it.

[Djordjevic] Mr. President, you said a few minutes ago that we have preserved peace. It is interesting that despite the fact that there was a fierce civil war in its neighborhood, Serbia has for the first time not been involved in the war, for the first time there has been no destruction on its territory.

[Lilic] What is even more important for me than the fact that you have mentioned is that we have not waged a war among ourselves, which is unprecedented, at least in our history. What is characteristic for the Serb people is that they have always fought among themselves. So this is yet another important moment that shows that when we really want to be united, at least in the sense of (?action), in the sense of accomplishing the aims, the national interests of the Serb people, we can behave the way we should. I think that, in addition to what you have said, it is very important and very significant that for the first time in the history of the Serb people we have not been fighting among ourselves.

[Djordjevic] Mr. President, speaking about that, the leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic recently held a joint session. Could you comment on this event and, of course, its political significance?

[Lilic] On the return from Dayton, it was necessary, of course, to meet again because it was essential for the delegations of the Serb Republic and the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, to meet before departing for the Dayton negotiations to reach a certain degree of unity concerning some views and some principles that were supposed to be promoted there and the minimum that the delegation was supposed to achieve. The delegation has indeed accomplished this with great success.

Why was this new meeting necessary after the return from Dayton? It was necessary for the simple reason that there were certainly some solutions that cannot suit some people. It was certainly impossible to satisfy the interests of everyone in the Serb Republic, as it was certainly impossible to satisfy the interests of everyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, those of the Muslims, Croats, and others. It is also certain that we do not have a single reason to be dissatisfied with what has been achieved in Dayton. This meeting has in fact shown that the leadership of the Serb Republic has indeed accepted everything that has been agreed as its task in the sense of implementing the agreement achieved. I think that the most important thing is that no one should now be allowed to try, even worse, to carry out any sabotage of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. This would certainly not be in the interest of the Serb people nor any citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it would certainly not be in the interest of this region as a whole. Therefore, the meeting was necessary to demonstrate a high degree of unity that was achieved by the delegations there and all the leaderships, the leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, those of the Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serb Republic.

Of course, there are some solutions that cannot satisfy all of us. But it is also completely right that in the period to come, we will try to correct everything that is not good. We will certainly do our utmost so that the members of the Serb nation from both this and the other side of the Drina River have indeed good and correct relations, thanks to our commitment.

[Djordjevic] This will certainly be much easier to accomplish when there is peace and when there is truce than when there is war.

[Lilic] This is only possible to achieve when there is peace and a truce. It was high time to stop destruction, to stop the loss of life, as all this had lost every sense. It is also right to say that the negotiating position of our delegation was extremely difficult, just as it would be right to say that we were in a much more favorable situation a year or two years ago, when we could have probably achieved much better results. This is a result we must be proud of. This is a result that has created the Serb Republic on one-half of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a result that has practically legalized the right of the Serb people to live in that region. I think that we should indeed be satisfied with what has been achieved.

[Djordjevic] They have also won equal treatment.

[Lilic] What is the most important thing is that they have won equal treatment. The future Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution will certainly confirm that. The constitution has been agreed on and it shows that the Serb people are equal to other peoples who live in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. How all this will happen in the future will certainly depend on the Serb people in the Serb Republic and the leadership that leads them.

[Djordjevic] Mr. President, in light of everything that we have been talking about, we cannot bypass a very important question—namely, the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after Dayton and after the Security Council decision to permanently suspend the sanctions.

[Lilic] At the meeting with the leadership of the Serb Republic that we have just talked about, the one that took place in Dobanovci the other day, I said that it was perhaps a good thing that our delegation had spent 21 days in Dayton. The Americans and the United States, as well as the Contact Group member countries, had the opportunity to become acquainted with our real views, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I think that our delegation has affirmed all our foreign policy goals in the best way. I am deeply convinced that Yugoslavia will very soon, indeed very soon, return to all international forums and institutions from which it has been suspended for well-known reasons. Let us not talk about it any longer because, I hope, this is in the past. We will have opportunities in the future and should exploit them. They will require much knowledge and much prudence, as well as much more work and changes in some of our views concerning work ethics at our workplaces and outside them, and our foreign and domestic affairs.

Yugoslavia has its chance and I am convinced that it will know how to use it.

[Djordjevic] This is the first time that the media have devoted their full attention to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In line with what you have been talking about, the media reporting in the world is also changing with regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially Serbia.

[Lilic] Everything is now, of course, much easier. There are no sanctions and there are no reasons to demonize the policy that had been conducted or the people to which we belong to. Nor are there any reasons for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not to become what it, objectively speaking, is—an equal state, a member of the United Nations.

[Djordjevic] President Milosevic and you have said on several occasions in the past few days that now that this part of the work is over, it is necessary to turn to the future. I would like to hear your opinion about the direction of the development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, considering that it has been economically exhausted in the past few years by the tight blockade. I am not only referring to the economy. My question also refers to the development in other areas, in education, culture, sports, standard of living, media, and political life in general.

[Lilic] In brief, this could be defined in the following way: The signing, the initialing of the peace agreement—and the Paris conference is not far when this agreement is actually going to be finally signed—and the lifting of the sanctions have created two key preconditions for us to move toward the aim that, I am deeply convinced, is in all our heads, namely a democratic, economically developed, civic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I think that this sentence contains our basic goal. The realization of this goal depends primarily on skill, knowledge, and I would like to stress a special condition that we need, and this is discipline with which we will have to realize everything that will be needed to accomplish our goal.

As you can see, people are today working here in this building, and this is a good sign that we will be moving toward our goal. It is correct that our economy is in an extremely difficult situation. It is correct that in the last few years it has sustained enormous losses that are difficult to compensate for in a short period of time. It is also correct that we cannot behave as we did during the sanctions. It is also correct that many people will lose the cover of sanctions behind which they have been hiding very skillfully and achieving significant results with much less work, significant results that were not the product of their work. These results were the product of a policy we had conducted in order to protect our citizens, in both a social and economic sense. The period ahead will certainly not allow such business behavior. We will certainly have to turn toward the market economy, we will certainly have to take part in all international activities as much as we can, we will certainly have to return to the international market and show how much we are really worth.

Regarding culture and sports, they also primarily depend on those who work in these important areas, and we will certainly not lag behind the world, as we have never done so in the past. I think that even during the sanctions, we have shown how strong we are in the fields of sports and culture. We even often joked about it, saying that the sanctions had allegedly been introduced against our sportsmen because our men and women were able to win even at that time and to win gold, silver, and bronze medals and many certificates for Yugoslavia. I believe that this will remain so in the future. There is no reason for this not to be so.

[Djordjevic] This shows after all that Yugoslavia has survived and that it has remained on its feet. Considering that you have spoken about the direction of development, allow me Mr. President to ask you about it at the end of our interview. An interesting topic has recently been in the focus of the attention of our public, businessmen, and, of course, politicians, and political parties. We are talking about the transformation of our economy. You used to be an experienced businessman. You are known as such.

[Lilic] Are you referring to the ownership transformation?

[Djordjevic] Yes, ownership transformation, since this is of interest to everyone, considering its economic and political aspects.

[Lilic] I think that those who do not know what ownership transformation means are seeking a solution to all their problems exactly in this (?area). Those who know what it means know that this cannot be an administrative measure. This must primarily be an economic measure, this must be done [word indistinct] interest.

It is certain that no one will buy and invest in what they do not need, just as it is certain that ownership transformation or privatization in the literal sense—since the majority of political parties are in favor of it, probably for some other reasons, not for economic reasons—will not bring about greater efficiency of the economy. If this were possible, then the Latin American countries would, by far, be the most efficient countries in the developed world. You know that this is not the case. I think that as much as 90 percent of capital is in private hands there.

I do not want to speak about it as ownership transformation. I would rather define this as the democratization of property relations. We even now have very efficient state-owned enterprises just as we have very efficient socially owned enterprises and very efficient private enterprises. And vice versa, we have inefficient enterprises on all sides. What we should certainly do and legalize is pass a law on ownership transformation or the democratization of property relations, as I have defined this, and enable all those who are interested in investing in some companies to be able to do so. Why not?

I would above all call this the provision of additional capital [dokapitalizacija], the creation of a surplus of capital for the development of these enterprises. I would not do it the way it has been done in some parts of East Europe after the fall of some countries or the breakup of some countries, or whatever. I called that privatization from cadre lists.

The biggest systems in these countries were bought for next to nothing by those who in fact worked in them or they were sold to foreigners, and in this way allowed a major outflow of capital.

So, no one in this country is against privatization. On the contrary, I think that we have more private enterprises than other types of enterprises several times over. There is even an absurd fact that there are more private firms in Serbia than the workers working in them. This indicates the inefficiency of our law makers, the lack of definition of the process of privatization. I think that the state should do that, it should enable all those who are interested in our country and abroad to invest in some systems and develop these systems here rather than to take them out of the country or close them done in order to create a market for foreign firms. Our aim should be to have strong and efficient firms within Yugoslavia, on the Yugoslav and foreign markets. We should not be left without systems, without enterprises. We should not create possibilities for these systems to be moved out of Yugoslavia.

I do not think this would not be good and would not do justice to the government nor the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor am I convinced to either republican leaderships. Finally, it is our obligation to primarily care about our people and to create conditions for our people to live in the way people live in the most developed countries in Europe and to create conditions for the kind of development that exists in other European countries. We should not be creating conditions in which we would lag behind other European countries. We will certainly not allow that. If there are political parties in our country striving for this, and they probably do, the people will certainly be able to see that and show what kind of, not ownership, but economy they favor when the time comes for that.

Our government faces a major task. The federal assembly also faces a major task. It is high time to stop with politicking in the parliament and the government, and start solving economic problems in our country. The package of measures that will be adopted will certainly be moving in that direction.

We will probably liberalize imports and exports significantly, but will not allow our big systems to suffer because of that. I think that this is a process that should last some time. I will repeat, privatization cannot be an administrative measure. It is evident from our past that administrative measures cannot regulate our market nor our economy. These can be regulated through good legislation, a good monetary policy, a good fiscal policy, and with successful directors and managers, as they are called today. We have forgotten our original terms, which is sometimes shame, as the term manager does not imply someone who knows everything. It implies someone who should work in the interest of its own firm and who should secure fresh capital, healthy capital, and working capital that would help the firm grow. Whether this firm will be developing as a private firm or a state-owned firm is another question. But the main issue is that we need as much money and foreign currency as possible invested in this country to create conditions for our people to live in the way they deserve. I think we can do that. We have good economic potentials, and the most important thing is an exceptionally well-developed system of schooling, and we should protect it and nurture it. We should invest in those who will come after us. This is the biggest capital.

The transformation of ownership is something that will come as a result of all this we have spoken about.

[Djordjevic] The events that happened last week are in fact creating the atmosphere for this.

[Lilic] Absolutely. We have created the conditions, let me repeat it, to return to what the most important thing is for all of us—namely, the economic and every other kind of prosperity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conditions have been created. All those who had been complaining about the sanctions now have the opportunity to show what they know and what they can really do. This certainly refers to the political leadership of the country, too. This also refers to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All of us must turn toward this goal, the development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This will only be possible with more work and with much more will and change in our views on about the work we perform. We should also change our ideas that one can live without work.

I think this is impossible, just as it is impossible to buy something for nothing. This has happened in the past and we had to print more money without cover. I do not mean us personally. This was done a few decades ago to calm social tensions and solve economic problems. I think this cannot be done. The problems can only be solved through more work and through well-devised economic, monetary, credit-monetary, fiscal, taxation, and all other systems that are needed for better work.

[Djordjevic] Finally, Mr. President, all this you have said about moving toward Europe, this is not only in our interest. The recent events and the reaction in Europe and the world to what happened Dayton and New York means that the world is obviously interested in Yugoslavia.

[Lilic] Of course. We have such a strategic position that we are impossible to bypass. We must exploit this position and cash in on it. We know for sure that our neighbors have suffered enormous damage because of the sanctions. According to our last estimates, the damage suffered by Yugoslavia in the last four and a half years exceeds $100 billion. This is the direct damage. The indirect damage, the long-term damage, is that we are technologically lagging behind Europe and the world. We must overcome this and make up for this. This will require much money and much work.

Our neighbors have also suffered damage worth over $50 billion. When you add up these two figures you can imagine what would have happened if we had invested that money in the development of this region.

There is enormous interest. In the past few days and immediately prior to the meeting in Dayton, and during it, we had a number of foreign delegations here. They are very interested in investing capital in some projects and some institutions, and we will, in line with our interests, know how to evaluate the situation and decide who to cooperate with. We will certainly take into account everything that has happened during the sanctions. I like to say this often, and I will use this opportunity to say it again: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should and must cooperate with all the republics of the former Yugoslavia in the sphere of economy.

I think that the principle of interest should fully be applied in our foreign trade and our foreign policy. One should not avoid this. We do not have to live together, we do not have to think in the same way—it would be impossible to think in the same way, although there was a time in the past when it was thought that we can, just as it would be impossible to have the same political and social systems—but it is possible and is very realistic and necessary to help each other in the economic sphere.

After all, the factories and total economic resources on the territory of the former republics of the previous Yugoslavia had been planned to meet the total needs of that Yugoslavia. Why should they therefore not be used. I think that this is possible and feasible, just as it is possible and feasible to cooperate again with all those countries with which we used to cooperate.

In the past two days, we have received a number of contracts. Copies of contracts that have already been signed with some European countries have even arrived together with congratulations to the Serbian president, as the most deserving person for what has happened in Dayton, and the congratulations that were sent to our government and us personally. Interests will, after all, win in the end.

I think the time for this has come and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I repeat, should turn toward these issues.

We will have the opportunity to sign very soon the contracts on foreign trade with the biggest countries in the world. I think that these contracts are very close and you will certainly be one of the first ones to learn about them. Let us not talk about it now. It is still too early, but I think that we will have very good news in that respect by the end of the year.

[Djordjevic] Mr. President, allow me thank you very much for this interview on behalf of the listeners of the First Program of Belgrade Radio and on my own.

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